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Recent food riots throughout much of Africa and the Middle East in the
wake of spikes in international food commodity prices have fueled a renewed aca-
demic and popular interest in the long-recognized connection between food prices
and social unrest. This dissertation addresses the question how do rising prices and
food insecurity contribute to socio-political unrest of all types, rather than focusing
on events labeled food riots in the popular media. The dissertation addresses this
question at the macro and the micro levels. It begins with a macro-level analysis of
changing consumer food price indices and the occurrence of unrest in 40 African
countries. It then proceeds to a case study of protest of in South Africa. This case
study first reviews the history of political protest in South Africa and the context
of a rash of protests that have plagued South Africa over the past decade focusing
on local government service delivery. Next a careful examination of trends of eco-
nomic inequality and food spending in South Africa provides an understanding of
the structural factors contributing to relative deprivation in South Africa. Finally,
vi
the results of an original survey conducted in a service delivery protest hotspot in
Cape Town, reveals that food insecurity is a significant determinant of individual
protest participation. These macro and micro level studies lead to the conclusion
that food insecurity and rising food prices contribute to increased relative depriva-
tion and predisposition to political protest at the individual level and, consequently,
to increased incidence of socio-political unrest.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Already long ago, from when we sold our vote to no man, the
People have abdicated our duties; for the People who once
upon a time handed out military command, high civil office,
legions – everything, now restrains itself and anxiously hopes
for just two things: bread and circuses
Juvenal, Satire 10, Second century A.D.
Them belly full, but we hungry;
A hungry mob is a angry mob.
A rain a-fall, but the dirt it tough;
A pot a-cook, but food no ‘nough.
Bob Marley, Them Belly Full, 1974
In early 2007, the FAO Food Price Index, which measures prices of interna-
tionally traded food commodities, began to rise. Although gradual at first, monthly
price increases quickly began to skyrocket. The index reached a record high in June
of 2008 of 225.8, 43.1% higher than the year before. Then, just as quickly, prices
fell again, dropping to 143 in February of 2009, roughly the same level as in April
of 2007. Then prices began to rise again, reaching a new record of 235.2 in June of
2011. (See Figure 1.1 and Appendix A.)
Also in 2008, a rash of socio-political unrest began to spread across the
globe. Much of this unrest was attributable to the global financial crisis sparked
1
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Figure 1.1: FAO Food Price Index
by the collapse of the U.S. housing market. But some of the protesters, especially
in Africa and the Middle East, cited rising food prices among their grievances,
which also included rising fuel prices. Soon photos of protesters waving loaves of
bread appeared in major news outlets. Then, in December 2010, a Tunisian street
vendor set himself on fire, sparking revolutions that toppled dictators in Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, and Yemen. Major protests also erupted in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, and Sudan and minor protests broke out in many other countries.
This previously unseen volatility in food prices and the coincident outbreak
of widespread unrest brought on a renewed academic and policy interest in the
connection between food prices and social unrest, including widespread specula-
tion and debate about the role of food prices in the Arab Spring (Ciezadlo, 2011;
BBC, 2011; Harsch, 2008; BBC, 2008; IRIN, 2011; Aljazeera, 2012). Dramatic
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weather events, diversion of crops for fuel production, and continuing volatility in
international grain markets have led many to postulate that food riots will become
more frequent, pervasive, and disruptive in the future. One group of researchers
published a report that was picked up in the popular media that suggested that if
international commodity prices continued to rise the world will become engulfed in
riots by August of 2013 (Lagi et al., 2011b; Brandon, 2011).
Existing academic literature, both large-N and case study, that has been con-
cerned with food insecurity and food prices as a driver of unrest has focused almost
exclusively on so-called food riots as the dependent variable. But this narrow focus
ignores significant factors on both sides of the equation. To think that food riots are
simply about food is a dangerous reduction. Such a view could easily lead one to
focus on controlling the cost of food while ignoring political or social injustices.
But it is equally blind to ignore that the cost of food can be a driver of unrest
that manifests in other ways or is directed at targets seemingly unrelated to the food
system. Academic literature focusing on other types of unrest has not adequately
considered food security and food prices as a significant source of grievance.
With this dissertation, I attempt to remedy these shortcomings in the liter-
ature by examining the link between rising food prices and socio-political unrest
more broadly defined at the macro and micro levels. In so doing, I contribute to an
understanding of the psychological, social, and political factors that lead to socio-
political unrest, which in this research includes non-violent protest methods that
3
may not fall into the often used definition of “collective violence,” but are, nonethe-
less, outside the range of institutionalized conflict resolution techniques, such as
elections, court proceedings, collective bargaining, etc.
1.1 Research Questions
The research questions to be addressed by this dissertation are the following:
1. Do increases in local consumer food prices lead to an increase in
the likelihood of socio-political unrest in African countries?
2. What explains the increase in service delivery protests in post-
apartheid South Africa?
(a) How have changing patterns of economic inequality contributed
to the increase in service delivery protests?
(b) Has food insecurity or rising consumer food prices contributed
to the increase in service delivery protests in South Africa?
The primary independent variable is stress on the food security of individ-
uals and households resulting from rising or unstable market prices of food. The
World Food Summit Plan of Action maintains that “Food security exists when all
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutri-
tious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy
life” (FAO, 1996). This definition includes four pillars of food security: availability,
access, stability, and appropriate use. In urban areas where populations depend on
the purchase of food, access requires that food be affordable and stability requires
confidence that the food prices will remain affordable in the foreseeable future.
When food prices rise unexpectedly these pillars are undermined and food security
4
is undermined. This is especially true in African cities where rising food prices
have an undeniably disproportionate impact on poor populations who often devote
over half of their income to food purchases (Kendall et al., 1996; Ruel et al., 1999;
Maxwell et al., 2000).
In chapter 3 the primary dependent variable is politically disruptive collec-
tive action, or unrest. This encompasses several of types of events including but not
limited to labor strikes, student protests, electoral demonstrations and violence, and
communal conflict. This is focus of the study of contentious politics, which are de-
fined and discussed in more detail below. In the remaining sections, the dependent
variable is the micro-level decision to participate in political protest. This is also
defined and discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Throughout this dissertation I attach no normative value judgment to vari-
ous types of collective action or the decision to participate in such action. From
an ethical perspective such a judgment would depend on (1) the legitimacy of the
objective and (2) the degree to which the chosen methods impinge upon to the le-
gitimate interests of others. Food security is undoubtedly a legitimate interest of all
human beings. Food falls into the lowest category of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs,
physiological, while food security falls into the second category of security needs
(Maslow, 1943). It would, therefore, be presumptuous to pass judgment on social
conflict, even the use of violence, as illegitimate to obtain these needs. Rather, this
dissertation aims to understand the role that degrees of food insecurity and rising
food prices may play as a motivation in social conflict that is not expressly about
securing these needs
5
Many authors in this field focus on political violence with the assumption
that either the protesters or the state make the rational decision to engage in vio-
lence. First, some assume that protesters make the conscious decision to engage
in violence. In other words, individuals choose between institutionalized venues of
political expression, e.g. the ballot box, and non-institutionalized venues, e.g. street
protests (Machado et al., 2011; Dunning, 2011; Booysen, 2007). Alternatively, oth-
ers assume that authorities make the conscious decision to violently repress collec-
tive political expression of grievances (Escriba`-Folch, 2013; Carey, 2010). These
assumptions, however, may not be valid. What is otherwise a legitimate and peace-
ful protest can devolve into violence in the absence of any deliberate group or indi-
vidual decision on the part of the protesters or the authorities. In this dissertation,
I do not assume that individuals or groups make a rational decision to engage in
violence. I do, however, maintain that violence is more costly than non-violence.
Similarly, Gurr maintains that collective violence can be good, bad or neutral, but
it is often costly, destructive, and inefficient. He writes, “Violence generally con-
sumes men and goods, it seldom enhances them” (Gurr, 1971, 5).
1.2 Case study selection: South Africa
This micro-level analyses in this dissertation focus on South Africa as a case
study of political protest. Since at least 2004, the urban areas of South Africa have
been plagued with incessant protests over the perceived failure of the government to
provide expected benefits including: affordable housing projects, accessible elec-
tricity, improved sanitation and water, transportation, education, healthcare, and
6
police services. Although such protests involve many different issues, they are of-
ten grouped together around the general heading service delivery protests. This
provides an opportunity to study the contribution of food insecurity and food prices
to individual level decisions to engage in protest.
South Africa is also an important subject for research because of its role
as a leader in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011 South Africa produced 31.4 percent of
GDP of sub-Saharan Africa. Instability in South Africa could have repercussions
across the region. Comparatively, it is considerably more developed than most of its
African neighbors and, therefore, might not be as economically analogous to them.
Nonetheless, political and policy lessons learned in South Africa can provide valu-
able guidance as other African nations strive to replicate its development success.
As a diversified economy with a highly urbanized populous, 64.8% in 2015, South
Africa represents the model that many other African nations are striving to become.
This future, however, includes a food distribution system in which Africans will
increasingly meet their food needs by purchasing imported food in urban markets.
Finally, South Africa can provide some valuable policy lessons for other
BRICS countries. In many ways it is more comparable to these countries, espe-
cially Brazil, than its African neighbors. Both South Africa and Brazil are regional
leaders if not hegemons. Both have federalist governments with considerable de-
centralization. Table 1 shows that economically the two countries are quite similar.
In PPP terms the GDP per capita of the two countries is very close. Inequality
in both countries is quite similar, amongst the highest in the world. Agricultur-
ally, both countries are similarly productive, although Brazil has considerably more
7
Table 1.1: Comparison of South Africa and Brazil
South Africa Brazil
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) $10,959.74 $11,639.72
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1.91% 1.84%
GINI index (2009) 63.14 54.69
Food production index (2004-2006 = 100) 116.12 127.04
Food imports (% of merchandise imports) 6.11% 4.54%
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
arable land. Finally, both countries import similar amounts of food as a percentage
of total merchandise imports making domestic food prices similarly vulnerable, or
not, to changes in international markets.
Most importantly, because the focus of the research is on how individuals
make decisions about disruptive politics, lessons learned in the South African con-
text will provide valuable insight into human political behavior in general. South
Africans are not fundamentally different than other people regardless of how similar
or dissimilar the context may be to any other.
1.3 Outline
The dissertation begins with a review of two bodies of relevant literature.
The first is a body of mostly historical studies on food-related unrest over the past
three centuries. The second is literature on theories of social movements and con-
tentious politics.
In chapter 3, I present a macro-level study of changing food prices and the
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occurrence of socio-political unrest in African countries. I use an instrumental
variable approach to disentangle the endogenous causal relationship between ris-
ing consumer food prices and socio-political unrest of all types. I use international
commodity price changes and local rainfall as instrumental variables for changes in
consumer food prices.
Having established that a causal connection does exist between changing
food prices and socio-political unrest at the macro-level, I turn my attention to the
micro-level. Chapter 4 reviews the history of socio-political protest in South Africa
from the anti-apartheid movement of the last century to the service delivery protests
in the past ten years. This chapter concludes with a brief case study of service
delivery protests through the analytical lens of alternative social movement theories.
In chapter 5 I apply relative deprivation theory to individual decisions to
participate in service delivery. This includes a review of previous sociological stud-
ies of relative deprivation in South Africa in the years after the end of apartheid
and an analysis of changing patterns of economic inequality in South Africa be-
fore turning the Afrobarometer survey data to determine what factors contribute to
individual and group relative deprivation and how this contributes to protest partic-
ipation.
Having answered my research questions as well as possible using publicly
available data, in chapter 6 I present the results of a survey about food security and
protest participation that I conducted in Cape Town, South Africa, in late-2014.
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Finally, I draw some conclusions about these macro and micro level studies
relate to our understanding of protest behavior in general and food as a driver of
protest specifically. In the conclusion I also briefly discuss the policy implications
of these findings and plans for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
This dissertation draws primarily on two bodies of literature. The first is
a fairly limited body of research that has focused on the historical occurrence of
food-related unrest. The second is a much broader area of research concerned more
generally with contentious politics and the development of social movements. In
this chapter I first review the literature on food-related unrest. (Recent large-N
studies are discussed in the next chapter.) I then provide a brief overview of the
literature on contentious politics and social movements as it relates to the analysis
presented later in the dissertation.
2.1 Food riots in history
Historians, political scientists, and sociologists have all documented and
studied the historical role of food and food prices on revolution, rioting, and unrest.
Much has been written about the bread riots in 18th and 19th century England and
France (Rude´, 1964). In both countries, failed harvests during the last half of the
18th century led to corresponding food price peaks and attendant outbursts of food-
related unrest in both the countryside and urban centers. It would be a mistake,
however, to think that these riots, or protests, were all of the same type, carried out
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by crowds of similar composition, or with common targets of discontent. These
so-called food riots took on many different forms with many different objectives
including: the retributive action or market riot, an act committed by crowds against
people believed to be hoarding or profiteering; the blockage or entrave, the pre-
vention of food from leaving the area of production; and, the price riot or taxation
populaire, the seizure of food to be sold publicly at a proper price as set by the
people (Tilly, 1978, 1971; Stevenson, 1974).
Rude´ (1964) also makes the point that the food riot was a more common
form of social unrest than the strike amongst many industrial workers. Later, how-
ever, “these workers, although more prone in times of hardship to seek redress from
grain factors and millers than from their own employers, were also on occasion in-
volved in purely industrial disputes” (Rude´, 1964, 66). Stevenson (1974) makes the
same point and contends that these food riots eventually gave way to other forms of
protest.
So-called food riots largely disappeared from the world stage from the mid-
19th century through the 1970s (Rude´, 1964; Tilly, 1978; Walton and Seddon,
1994). Beginning in the late 1970s, however, widespread unrest, erupted in coun-
tries subjected to austerity programs imposed by international financial institutions
in the wake of the debt crisis of the early 1970s (Walton and Seddon, 1994). In
the context of changes to food systems, the period of structural adjustment was the
historical analogue of the late eighteenth century. Although individual outbreaks of
unrest in the 17th and 18th centuries coincided with bad harvests and price spikes,
the broader trend of unrest in eighteenth century was not a consequence of food
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shortage; they emerged at a time when per capita food supply was probably on the
rise. Rather, they were attributable to three trends that accompanied the rise of the
nation state and the increasing salience of the market in food systems: (1) house-
holds became more reliant on the market for the provision of food; (2) food produc-
tion became increasingly commercialized, which led to an increasing prioritization
of national markets over local needs; (3) institutionalized local controls over the
distribution of food were increasingly dismantled (Tilly, 1978). Similarly, late 20th
century “food riots in the developing nations are generated by processes analogous
to economic liberalization policies that produced classical food riots, but today’s
transformation is taking place at the international level. Neo-liberalism simultane-
ously affects all Third World countries in much the same fashion as laissez-faire
policies within nations once affected particular towns and regions, although the two
processes are distinct in other ways” (Walton and Seddon, 1994, 24).
In sum, two related lessons emerge from these historical studies. First, the
protests of the 17th and 18th centuries and the 1970s and 1980s were the product
of structural changes to the economic and political systems that governed the dis-
tribution of food. These changes were often perceived by as unfair or unjust by
the public and consumers took action against those perceived to be culpable for or
profiting from the injustice. Regardless of the underlying causes, however, periods
of unrest were triggered by sharp increases in the price that consumers paid to feed
themselves and their families.
Second, grievances about the cost of food are often commingled with other
grievances, especially labor disputes, and the occurrence of a particular type of
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unrest is often determined more by a viable target and perceived culpability than
the source of hardship. Goldstone (1982) writes: “Two grievances stand out as the
chief cause of revolutionary urban tumults: the cost of food and the availability
of employment.” Fundamentally, both of these issues are really about the income
necessary to provide the essentials of life, primarily food. When the ability of
people to provide these essentials is strained they may seek relief either in the form
of lower expenses or higher incomes. How aggrieved groups choose the targets
of their ire is a question that is largely outside the scope of this dissertation but is
undoubtedly an important theoretical question with obvious practical import.
2.2 Contentious politics and social movements
In my analysis of micro-level determinants of participation in political protests
I draw on a body of literature concerned with contentious politics and social move-
ments. Tilly and Tarrow (2006, 4) define contentious politics as follows:
Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims
bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on
behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are in-
volved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Contentious
politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: con-
tention, collective action, and politics.
Most authors consider contentious politics to be compromised of political
action outside the realm of institutionalized avenues of politics, types of actions
often referred to as legitimate, acceptable or normal. McAdam is an exception. He
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argues that “the study of politics has too long reified the boundary between official,
prescribed politics and politics by other means. As an unfortunate consequence,
analysts have neglected or misunderstood both the parallels and the interactions
between the two” (McAdam et al., 2001, 6). The argument is that processes and
mechanisms that give rise to both types of contention are part of the same dynamic
system. Nonetheless, he focuses largely on “transgressive contention,” which he
distinguishes from the more institutionalized “contained contention.”
The literature on social movements is focused on the organization, mobi-
lization, and tactics of episodes of contentious politics. Tilly and Tarrow (2006,
202) define a social movement as “a sustained campaign of claim making, using
repeated performances that advertise that claim, based on organizations, networks,
traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities.” McCarthy and Zald (1977,
1217–1218) define a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a popu-
lation which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social struc-
ture and/or reward distribution of a society.”
Political protest and street demonstrations are a visible tactic, or repertoire
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2006) of contentious politics in the modern world. There is often
disagreement about what type of actions can constitute protest. Lipsky (1968, 1968)
defines protest activity as “a mode of political action oriented toward objection to
one or more policies or conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an
unconventional nature, and undertaken to obtain rewards from political or economic
systems while working within the systems.” Turner (1969, 816) writes: “An act of
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protest includes the following elements: the action expresses a grievance, a convic-
tion of wrong or injustice; the protestors are unable to correct the condition directly
by their own efforts; the action is intended to draw attention to the grievances; the
action is further meant to provoke ameliorative steps by some target group; and the
protesters depend upon some combination of sympathy and fear to move the target
group in their behalf.”
In this dissertation, I seek to understand why individuals choose to partici-
pate in political protests, primarily in South Africa, and how food security and food
prices contribute to such participation. In doing so, I rely largely on two fundamen-
tal theories of contentious politics: relative deprivation and resource mobilization.
2.2.1 Relative deprivation literature
Relative deprivation (RD) theory was first introduced by psychologist Samuel
Stouffer in 1949 to help explain why U.S. Army Air corpsmen reported higher lev-
els of frustration over promotion than military police even though the corpsmen
enjoyed a relatively higher rate of promotion than the military police. Stouffer ar-
gued that the corpsmen compared themselves to other corpsmen and the military
police were not an appropriate reference group (Smith et al., 2012). The idea was
that individuals perceived entitlements in comparison to others within a compari-
son group rather than objectively. In 1957, Merton extended the idea to a group
framework (Merton, 1968; Smith et al., 2012).
Runciman (1961) distinguished between egotistic and fraternalistic relative
deprivation. Egotistic RD is the comparison of one’s personal position to others
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within one’s reference group while fraternalistic RD is the comparison of the rela-
tive position of one’s group to other groups with the social structure. Others have
referred to this as individual and group RD (Smith et al., 2012; Walker and Petti-
grew, 1984). (I adopt these terms in Chapter 5.)
In 1968, Gurr applied the idea of RD to political science. He used the idea to
help explain violent civil conflict. He writes: “My basic premise is that the neces-
sary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors’
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment’s
apparent value capabilities” He defined value expectations as “the good conditions
of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled” and value capabilities
as the conditions that “they are capable of getting and keeping.” (Gurr, 1971, 24)
(Gurr, 1968b, 252-53). In addition to applying RD to an explanation of political
behavior, he also argued that perceived political voice was a contributing factor to
perceived value capabilities.
Gurr proposed a three-stage process leading to violent political behavior
(Gurr, 1968a, 1971). The first stage of the process in Gurr’s framework is the gen-
eration of discontent, which is the product RD defined as stated above (Gurr, 1971).
The key here is the subjective perception of deprivation. When people have expec-
tations of values that are higher than those that they believe they are capable of
attaining they become frustrated.
In the second stage, the discontent must become politicized, that is it must be
focused on political objects or actors. “Deprivation-induced discontent is a general
spur to action. Psychological theory and group conflict theory both suggest that the
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greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence. The specificity of this
impulse to action is determined by men’s beliefs about the sources of deprivations,
and about the normative and utilitarian justifiability of violent action directed at
the agents responsible for it” (Gurr, 1971, 13) Furthermore, the degree to which
the frustration becomes focused aggression is a function of societal and cultural
normative values regarding the acceptability of overt aggression, “the extent and
degree of success of past political violence, the articulation and dissemination of
symbolic appeals justifying violence, the legitimacy of the political system, and the
kinds of responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation” (Gurr, 1971, 13).
The third stage of the process toward collective violence is actualization.
This stage involves marshaling of resources and calculations of probability of suc-
cess and expected recriminations given those resources. “Politicized discontent is a
necessary condition for the resort to violence in politics. But however intense and
focused the impetus to violence is, its actualization is strongly influenced but the
patterns of coercive control and institutional support in the political community”
(Gurr, 1971, 14). Civil war is most likely when regimes and opponents command
roughly equal amounts of coercive control and share equal amounts of institutional
support within society.
2.2.2 Resource mobilization literature
Citing ambiguous empirical evidence, McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued
that RD theory fails to explain participation in social movements because some
underlying degree of relative deprivation is always present in society. They write:
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We are willing to assume (Turner and Killian [1972] call the assump-
tion extreme) “. . . that there is always enough discontent in any society
to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is
effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources
of some established elite group” (p. 251). For some purposes we go
even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and
manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations.
McCarthy and Zald (1977, 1215) do not want to remove grievance from the causal
process entirely. Instead, they “want to move from a strong assumption about the
centrality of deprivation and grievances to a weak one, which makes them a compo-
nent, indeed, sometimes a secondary component in the generation of social move-
ments.” In so doing, they emphasize the “mobilization process” (McCarthy and
Zald, 1977, 1215). They present a confusing causal model in the form of eleven
illustrative hypotheses through which they seek to explain the emergence, growth,
and success of a social movement organization on the political left in the United
States. Explanatory variables as synthesized by (Opp, 2009) include: (1) extent of
societal support for movement goals; (2) amount of resources provided by exter-
nal actors; (3) amount of resources provided by members of the organization; (4)
control of authorities; and (5) incentives of the target to yield.
Tilly (1978) also focused primarily on group mobilization. He proposed a
model that includes five components of collective action: interests, organization,
mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself. Interests are defined as the
“the gains and losses resulting from a group’s interaction with other groups.” Or-
ganization involves features of group structure that affect the capacity of a group
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to engage in collective action. Mobilization is “the process by which a group ac-
quires collective control over the resources needed for action.” Resources consist of
a diverse set of things needed for collective action, such as labor, goods and assets,
weapons, communication networks, votes, and community support. Opportunity
involves the relationship of the group to the world around it and changes in the
world that affect the interests of the group (Tilly, 1978).
The resource mobilization perspective as presented by McCarthy and Zald
(1977) and Tilly (1978) does not explicitly provide a clear micro model for individ-
ual participation in social movements (Opp, 2009). Klandermans (1984) sought to
remedy this shortcoming by including social-psychological approaches, specifically
expectancy value theory, within a resource mobilization framework. He found sup-
port for this approach using data from a labor movement campaign in the Nether-
lands in 1979, but this approach has not been more widely tested.
2.2.3 An integrated approach
These two approaches are not contradictory; rather the focus of the analy-
sis is different. Relative deprivation is concerned with the individual psychological
motivations while resource mobilization is focused on group collective action. A
complete analysis of political protest should to include elements of both approaches.
Indeed, shortly after the publication of the 40th anniversary edition of Why Men
Rebel, Gurr reflected that the absence of an explanation of resource mobilization
was likely the most glaring shortfall of his framework. He suggests that this short-
fall could be overcome by complementing his framework with analysis from mo-
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bilization literature such as Charles Tilly’s From Mobilization to Revolution (Gurr,
2012).
Opp (2009) expressly seeks to integrate existing theories into what he calls
a structural-cognitive model. He proposes a model in which protest is a function
of the interaction between discontent and perceived influence plus moral and social
incentives to protest minus the interaction between the probability and expected
severity of repression. This model includes both macro and micro level factors
and expressly recognizes that these factors are interdependent. For example, high
discontent and perceived influence raise moral and social incentives. Conversely,
repeated interactions with other protests can raise discontent and perceived influ-
ence.
2.2.4 Other theories
There are a few other authors that have some influence on this dissertation.
The dynamics of contention approach of McAdam et al. (2001), later refined by
Tilly and Tarrow (2006), places more importance on the role of history and so-
cial processes in the development of social movements. This approach recognizes
that individuals often have allegiances to multiple groups that may have conflict-
ing interests. Individuals may join or defect from groups in times of crisis. Existing
groups may form alliances or entirely new groups may form. In other words, groups
are dynamic and interactions between groups and actors lead to the formation of
new groups and new episodes of contention.
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Social identity theory (SIT) maintains that social behavior is determined
largely by beliefs about the position of one’s identity group and one’s ability to
move between groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). At one extreme is the belief in
“social mobility,” characterized by the general assumption that individuals live in a
highly flexible society and are not bound by the conditions of one’s identity group.
At the other extreme, the belief system of ‘social change’ implies that the nature
and structure of the relations between social groups in the society is “characterized
by marked stratification, making it impossible or very difficult for individuals, as in-
dividuals, to divest themselves of an unsatisfactory, underprivileged, or stigmatized
group membership” (Tajfel and Turner, 1986, 9).
2.3 Conclusion
The focus of this dissertation is on micro-level explanations of participation
in protest activities. I therefore focus on grievance formation. I propose that there
is one key difference between relative deprivation based grievances as described
by Gurr on one hand and the preferences of McCarthy and Zald and the interests
of Tilly on the other. Gurr’s RD approach focuses on individual level conditions.
McCarthy and Zald (1977) refer to “preferences for changing some elements of the
social structure” while Tilly (1978) refers to “the gains and losses resulting from a
group’s interaction with other groups.” Both of these approaches focus on percep-
tions of group conditions. Social identity theory can contribute to an understanding
of group RD in contexts of dynamic social change.
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In chapter 5, I seek to develop a more complete understanding of micro-level
incentives for protest participation, by including both individual, or egotistic, RD
and group, or fraternalistic, RD in an analysis of protest participation. My treatment
of these concepts in the context of South Africa is influenced by the dynamics
of contention approach, social identity theory and the structural-cognitive model.
Chapter 5 will also illustrate that dynamic social change in the post-apartheid era
has led to changes in identities and group allegiances. The end of apartheid also
changed beliefs about the ability of individuals to move between social groups.
Combined with changing patterns of economic inequality has this has led changes
in group RD. Furthermore, persistent poverty and the continued cycle of service
delivery protests over the past decade, discussed in chapter 4, continues to drive
intra-group comparisons and individual RD.
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Chapter 3
Disentangling the causal relationship between food
price spikes and socio-political unrest in African
countries1
3.1 Introduction
Rising food prices can and do lead directly to food riots. This rather ax-
iomatic proposition is widely accepted and not particularly controversial. Prog-
nostications based on this simple correlation are, however, dangerous for a num-
ber of reasons, especially when the observed correlation is between food riots and
international commodity prices. Firstly, it ignores that the connection between in-
ternational prices and local prices is not always clear; countries use agricultural
subsidies, export restrictions, and price controls to stabilize markets. This observa-
tion calls into question the most commonly advanced theory that rising international
commodity prices drive up domestic consumer prices, which, in turn, lead people
to take to the streets under increased economic pressure. Secondly, many different
types of events are often referred to as ‘food riots.’ Rising food prices might be
a catalyst for unrest but more deep-seated grievances might mean it manifests in
1A version of this chapter is published as: Smith, T. G. (2014). Feeding unrest: Disentangling the
causal relationship between food price shocks and sociopolitical conflict in urban Africa. Journal of
Peace Research, 51(6), 679695. http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314543722
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different ways or is directed at different targets. Thirdly, such predictions disregard
the endogenous nature of the relationship between food prices and unrest. Rising
food prices cause unrest and unrest can drive up food prices. Furthermore, both
rising prices and unrest can result from a third factor, such as rising fuel prices or
political corruption.
In this chapter, I unravel the endogenous relationship between food prices
and urban unrest in Africa by introducing several theoretical and methodological
innovations. From a theoretical perspective, I first pose the previously unaddressed
question of whether food price shocks are a contributing causal factor, or catalyst,
of any type of socio-political unrest, including spontaneous and organized demon-
strations and riots involving a variety of issues, rather than just so-called ‘food ri-
ots.’ Secondly, I use domestic consumer food price indices as the primary indepen-
dent variable because they better represent the prices that consumers pay for food,
thereby providing better insight into the economic causal mechanisms. Thirdly, I
analyze the question at a unit of analysis and coverage not previously used: country-
months for 40 countries over a period of 275 months (23 years). Lastly, I employ an
instrumental variable analysis to address the endogenous relationship between food
prices and social unrest and further isolate the direction of causality. In so doing, I
evaluate and use two instrumental variables, separately and together: international
grain commodity prices and local rainfall deviations.
I find that a sudden and sharp increase in consumer food prices in a given
month compared to expected variation in the given country is significantly corre-
lated with an increase in the probability of unrest in that month, which, because
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of the instrumental variable specification, provides evidence of causality. Although
more research is necessary to determine why people choose particular protest meth-
ods and targets, I argue that this is evidence that economic pressure from rising food
prices increases the proclivity of urban consumers to engage in unrest activities.
3.2 Literature
Two related lessons emerge from historical studies of food riots. First, the
bread riots of 18th and 19th century England and France as well as austerity protests
in the last half of the 20th century were the product of structural changes to the eco-
nomic and political systems that governed the distribution of food. These changes
were often perceived as unjust and consumers took action against those perceived to
be culpable for or profiting from the injustice. Regardless of the underlying causes,
however, periods of unrest were triggered by sharp increases in food prices. Sec-
ond, grievances about the cost of food are often commingled with other grievances,
especially the availability of employment (Goldstone, 1982). Fundamentally, both
of these issues are about the ability to provide basic necessities, and when this abil-
ity is strained, the resulting unrest may be determined more by perceived culpability
or the viability of particular targets or methods than the source of hardship. How
aggrieved groups perceive culpability and choose methods or targets is a question
that is largely outside the scope of this chapter but is undeniably important.
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The more recent rash of food riots, like earlier periods, is a crisis not of pro-
duction but of access and stability.2 Despite record grain harvests in 2007, structural
changes mean that while food is often available in local markets, prices are unaf-
fordable for many consumers (Holt-Gime´nez, 2008). In the two years preceding
the Arab Spring, food price increases in Egypt, as in 18th century Europe, provided
‘a catalyst for political mobilization and an opportunity to voice out dissent about
a much broader range of concerns.’ This unrest was often commingled with other
types of unrest, particularly labor strikes, such as a strike in April 2008 in which
workers demanded higher wages to cover the increasing cost of food (Bush, 2010,
119).
An emerging large-N literature has sought to identify a statistical relation-
ship between food prices and political and social unrest. Lagi et al. (2011a) present
a simple and compelling but potentially misleading graph of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) Food Index3 together with media reports of observed
food riots in individual countries during the spikes of 2007–08 and 2010–11. The
proposed causal explanation for this correlation is a breakdown of state authority
2The World Food Summit Plan of Action maintains that ‘Food security exists when all people,
at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.’ This definition includes four
pillars: availability, access, stability, and appropriate use. In urban areas access requires that food be
affordable and stability requires confidence that the food prices will remain affordable in the future
(FAO, 1996).
3This index is ‘a measure of the monthly change in international prices of a basket of food
commodities. It consists of the average of five commodity group price indices (representing 55
quotations), weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups for 2002–2004’ (FAO,
2013).
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Figure 3.1: Domestic consumer food indices and the FAO Food Price Index
and political order when the state fails to provide food security. Upon closer exam-
ination, however, local consumer food indices in the individual countries usually
do not exhibit the same spikes as the FAO Index (See Figure 3.1). Only in Coˆte
d’Ivoire and Cameroon can associated peaks be identified and these are delayed. At
best, this makes the proposed causal mechanism dubious and, at worst, could be the
result of media bias in the reporting of riots during the spikes. Similarly, Bellemare
(2012) finds a link between monthly global FAO data and media reports of food ri-
ots between 1990 and 2011. Recognizing the potential for endogeneity, he attempts
to isolate causality with an instrumental variable approach. Much like Lagi et al.
(2011a), however, his causal explanation is based on the flawed assumption that
changes in international commodity prices are directly reflected in domestic prices
(Bellemare, 2012).
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Others have recognized the correlation between rising food prices and unrest
and have sought to identify the underlying structural drivers. Arezki and Bru¨ckner
(2011) find that political institutions in low-income countries deteriorate signifi-
cantly when international food prices increase largely because those increases ‘sig-
nificantly increased the likelihood of civil conflict and other forms of civil strife,
anti-government demonstrations and riots’ (Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011, 11). Be-
razneva and Lee (2013) find that higher levels of poverty and political repression
were associated with a higher likelihood of riots in Africa during the 2007–08 inter-
national commodity prices spike. The generalizability of this finding is, however,
questionable due to the focus on the particular episode of global economic crisis
and an ambiguous definition of ‘food riots.’
3.3 Theory
The question posed here is: Do sudden increases in domestic consumer
food prices lead to an increase in the likelihood of social or political unrest in
urban areas of African countries? The innovation of this question is two-fold; (1)
the independent variable, increases in domestic food price indices, more accurately
reflects prices paid by average consumers; and (2) the dependent variable is the
occurrence of broadly defined socio-political unrest in urban areas rather than a
nebulous definition of ‘food riots’ that is suspect to reporting bias.
Firstly, while the FAO Index is not a good proxy for domestic prices, in-
ternational commodity prices do pass through to some extent to consumer prices
(Dawe, 2008; Ferrucci et al., 2010). This is not, however, the only mechanism
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through which commodity prices could lead to unrest. Theoretically, increased
international prices of export commodities should benefit the domestic agricultural
sector though higher farm-gate prices, increased revenue, increased income for agri-
cultural workers, improved welfare, and reduced unrest. Alternatively, elite capture
of increased revenue could lead to increased unrest driven by grievances over struc-
tural inequities. Therefore, if the intent is to capture the effect of rising food prices
on unrest driven by consumer grievance over increased economic pressure, one
should focus on consumer food prices and on unrest in urban areas where people
are more reliant on markets for food. Furthermore, food prices naturally fluctu-
ate due to changes in supply and consumers develop coping mechanisms to absorb
these fluctuations (Joshi and Gandotra, 2006). Still, sharp unexpected increases
may overwhelm coping mechanisms and increase grievances and propensity to en-
gage in unrest activities. By using monthly price increases outside the observed
long-term volatility as the independent variable and unrest in a given month as the
dependent variable, I further isolate the causal mechanism to consumer response to
economic pressure.
Secondly, because the definition of ‘food riots’ is elusive, the dependent
variable used here includes unrest in urban areas regardless of the cited grievance.
In Africa, rising food prices have an undeniably disproportionate impact on poor
urban dwellers who often devote over half of their household income to food pur-
chases (Kendall et al., 1996; Ruel et al., 1999; Maxwell, 1999; Verpoorten et al.,
2013). People facing increased economic pressure may seek relief from the gov-
ernment through control of food prices or in other sectors such as housing or fuel
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or through the wholesale removal of a government perceived to be inept or corrupt.
Alternatively, people may seek other forms of relief such as higher wages. In other
words, rising food prices may drive unrest even if not cited as a primary grievance
by protesters. While this is difficult to identify, there are numerous examples of
protests where food is just one of many grievances, including in Nigeria, Uganda,
and South Africa (Nossiter, 2012; Kron, 2011; BBC, 2008).
Based on these assumptions, the proposed hypothesis is: Higher monthly
spikes in domestic consumer food prices will increase the short-term probability of
the occurrence of urban socio-political unrest.
Testing this hypothesis is, however, complicated by the endogenous rela-
tionship between food prices and unrest. Rising food prices can lead to unrest, and
unrest can drive up domestic food prices, or both may be driven by other factors.
For example, in Nigeria in December 2011 and January 2012 rising fuel prices
were likely the driver of both rising food prices and social unrest. This endogeneity
makes it difficult to isolate the causal relationship. I use an instrumental variable ap-
proach to predict the endogenous independent variable, cleansing it of the feedback
effect of the social unrest or other drivers of both higher food prices and social un-
rest. Two potential instrumental variables are employed and empirically evaluated
individually and jointly: international food commodity prices and rainfall scarcity.
3.4 Data and methods
The unit of analysis used is country-months, i.e. calendar months in individ-
ual African countries. This temporal disaggregation helps to better identify more
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Figure 3.2: Social unrest events by country (1990–2012)
immediate connections between food price changes and the occurrence of unrest
events. Geographic aggregation to the national level allows for the use of fixed ef-
fects to control for country level characteristics that are likely to affect food prices
and unrest, such as natural endowments of arable land and weather conditions; in-
ternal transportation and food storage infrastructures; access to external markets;
and national trade and agricultural policies, such as tariffs, export controls, and
subsidies.
3.4.1 The dependent variable: Urban socio-political unrest
The dependent variable is the occurrence of urban socio-political unrest,
broadly defined, and is derived from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)
developed by Hendrix and Salehyan (2013). SCAD includes data on over 10,300
occurrences of demonstrations, protests, strikes, riots, coups, and communal con-
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Figure 3.3: Social unrest events and international food commodity prices
flicts in 48 African countries4 between 1990 and 2012. These events are compiled
from Associated Press and Agence France Presse news reports and are coded for
event type5 actors involved and targeted, motivating issue(s), and location type.
Only events occurring in urban areas are included in the analysis.6 Figure 3.2 shows
the distribution of events by country and Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of events
over time.7 I recode the SCAD data into a binary variable for the occurrence of
4African countries with a population of less than one million – Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe, and Seychelles – are excluded from SCAD.
5SCAD event classifications: (1) organized demonstrations; (2) spontaneous demonstrations; (3)
organized violent riots; (4) spontaneous violent riots; (5) general strikes; (6) limited strikes; (7) pro-
government violence (repression); (8) anti-government violence; (9) extra-government violence;
(10) intra-government violence.
6SCAD location classifications: (1) Capital city; (2) Other major urban area (population greater
than 100,000); (3) Rural (including small towns, villages with population less than 100,000); (4)
Multiple urban areas; (5) Multiple rural areas; (6) Province/region listed, exact location unknown;
(7) Nationwide. Effects several cities and rural areas. Events coded 1, 2, 4, and 7 are included in the
analysis.
7Bivariate Prais-Winsten regression with the moving average of SCAD events as the dependent
variable results in a coefficient for the FAO Food Price Index of 0.140 with a standard error of
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any event unrest in an urban area within a given country and given month because
measuring the intensity of unrest is subjective and using event counts relies on dis-
tinguishing between events that may be related.
3.4.2 The independent variable: Domestic food price shocks
National food price indices are obtained from the International Labor Orga-
nization (ILO) for 47 countries between 1976 and 2012 (the panel is not complete
across all years and countries) (ILO, 2013). These data are collected for a basket
of relevant foodstuffs and are reported to the ILO by each country.8 Because coun-
tries exhibit varying degrees of volatility in monthly food price changes (See Figure
A.6 for country-specific histograms), the data are operationalized as the percentage
change from the previous month and standardized by country.9 This operational-
ization: (1) captures the immediate economic pressure felt by consumers of dras-
tic short-term changes; (2) enables valid comparison of food price changes across
countries that use indices based on different foodstuffs and different currencies; (3)
inherently controls for different volatility in food prices across countries; and (4)
minimizes any inherent autocorrelation bias.
0.113, which does not support the hypothesis of a statistically significant correlation between the
total SCAD events and the FAO Food Price Index. Prais-Winsten regression is used to minimize
autocorrelation bias.
8In the case of overlapping indices (Madagascar, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, and Zam-
bia), the most complete index is chosen. For Tanzania, mainland Tanganyika index is used and the
index for Zanzibar is excluded.
9Long-term (1990–2011) mean of monthly change for a given country divided by the long-term
standard deviation.
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3.4.3 The instrumental variables
A successful instrument must satisfy three assumptions: (1) it must not be
affected by either the independent or dependent variable – exogeneity; (2) it must be
associated with changes in the independent variable – relevance; and (3) it must not
lead to changes in the dependent variable, except indirectly through the independent
variable – exclusivity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, 210).
International food commodity prices. The first instrument captures monthly
changes in international commodity prices and each country’s vulnerability to such
changes, and thus theoretically satisfying the above criteria. Firstly, it is exogenous
because African countries are not significant exporters of grain so local production
does not impact international prices.10 Secondly, changes in world prices of a par-
ticular commodity are relevant because they are likely to be reflected in domestic
food prices but only by a fraction of the commodity price change and depending on
the extent to which the country is reliant upon imports of that commodity as well
as currency exchange rates (Dawe, 2008; Ferrucci et al., 2010). Thirdly, any real
economic pressure felt by urban consumers resulting from international commod-
ity prices should be through domestic food prices, thereby satisfying the exclusivity
requirement. Although commodity price increases could affect unrest through the
elite capture mechanism, this is highly unlikely since African countries do not ex-
port significant quantities of grains.
10According to the USDA, for market-year 2012 Egypt accounted for 2.181% of global exports of
rice and South Africa accounted for 2.385% of global exports of corn. Total African wheat exports
were 0.991% of global total (USDA, 2013).
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The variable is operationalized as a composite of monthly changes in the
price index as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014) of the
three most widely traded grain commodities, wheat, rice, and corn,11 adjusted for
the trade balance, exports less imports as reported by the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA, 2013), of each commodity in each country. A composite is
used because import and export data are not available for each commodity for every
country. The standardized grain instrument, SGI , is calculated as follows:
TBGCit =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
(EXPjit − IMPjit)
(
Pjt − Pjt−1
Pjt−1
))
(3.1)
SGIit =
TBGCit − TBGC
σTBGC
(3.2)
TBGCit is the trade-balance adjusted grain price composite for country i in time
t; EXPjit and IMPjit are the exports and imports of commodity j for country i in
time t; Pjt is the IMF reported monthly average price for commodity j in time t.
Rainfall scarcity. The second instrument, negative deviations in accumu-
lated rainfall over the previous nine months, also satisfies the necessary assump-
tions. Firstly, rainfall is exogenous to the system since rainfall is unaffected by
food prices or unrest. Secondly, it is relevant because rainfall anomalies signif-
icantly impact domestic food prices. Late season or insufficient rainfall leads to
poor harvests, lower supplies of food stuffs, and higher prices (Brown et al., 2006;
Latiri et al., 2010; Tadesse and Shively, 2009).
11Specifically: Wheat No.1 Hard Red Winter ordinary protein FOB Gulf of Mexico price; Rice
5% broken milled white rice Thailand nominal price; and Maize (corn) U.S. No.2 Yellow FOB Gulf
of Mexico U.S. price.
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Although the third assumption, exclusivity, is admittedly more question-
able, I argue that in the short-term, a single month, the sole causal pathway from
rainfall scarcity to urban unrest is through food prices. Although space does not
permit a thorough discussion of the rainfall / conflict literature, it is increasingly
clear that there is likely some correlation between long-term rainfall deviations and
conflict (Levy et al., 2005; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012;
Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012). The causal mechanisms, however, remain unclear and
different mechanisms have been proposed for both rainfall abundance and rainfall
scarcity, i.e. drought.
Rainfall abundance has the potential to affect conflict through several causal
mechanisms. Above-average rainfall can be beneficial for crops and livestock and
lead to increased rent-seeking behavior (Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012; Meier et al.,
2007). Climatological natural disasters may decrease economic growth and lead to
conflict (Bergholt and Lujala, 2012). In the short-term, extreme rainfall can cause
floods, which may destroy infrastructure, displace populations and lead to con-
flict when migrant groups can come into conflict with local populations (Reuveny,
2007). Because of this, I use separate variables for negative and positive deviations
in expected rainfall and limit the instrument to negative deviations, i.e. rainfall
scarcity.
Several theories have been proposed for the connection between rainfall
scarcity and conflict. The resource scarcity theory postulates that in times of scarce
rainfall, conflict will intensify as conflicting groups compete for dwindling re-
sources (Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012). Other studies
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have found little support for the proposition that drought increases the onset of civil
war (Theisen et al., 2011). Building on a body of literature that suggests that eco-
nomic growth is connected with civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and
Laitin, 2003), Miguel et al. (2004) found that reductions in annual rainfall decreased
agricultural productivity and economic growth, which, in turn, increased the risk of
civil war. Ciccone (2011), however, questioned the finding and mechanism. In
sum, there seems to be a connection between long-term rainfall scarcity and com-
munal conflict but the connection between drought and civil war is questionable and
theoretical causal mechanisms have yet to be robustly substantiated. Nevertheless,
none of these mechanisms are relevant here because: (1) any potential impacts on
pastoralist or communal conflict is excluded by limiting the dependent variable to
urban unrest, and (2) any potential long-term effects of drought are minimized by
the focus on short-term impacts on socio-political unrest. This leaves the changes
in food prices as the sole causal mechanism linking short-term rainfall scarcity with
socio-political unrest in urban areas.
The instrument is calculated using data from the Global Precipitation and
Climatology Centre (GPCC) (Schneider et al., 2013). Monthly rain gauge data at
a resolution of 0.5 degrees is aggregated to monthly totals over each country and
transformed into a moving standardized cumulative precipitation, MSCP . This
is defined as the cumulative rainfall of n months (current month plus the previous
n− 1 months) minus the moving average of the analogous period over the previous
20 years divided by the moving standard deviation (SD) of the previous 20 years.
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The formula is written as follows:
CP nit =
n∑
k=0
Pit−k (3.3)
MSCP nit =
CP nit − 120
∑20
z=1CPity−z
σCPit
(3.4)
P is monthly precipitation and CP is the cumulative precipitation over the previ-
ous n months. This differs from the more widely-used Standard Precipitation Index
(SPI) (Guttman, 1999) because: (1) rainfall is aggregated to the country-level; and
(2) the base period for the long-term mean and SD is the 20 years prior to the year
of interest rather the total period. The latter modification inherently controls for
the expectations of the population, particularly farmers, regarding rainfall (Sovey
and Green, 2011; Koubi et al., 2012). Admittedly, this does not address the po-
tential cross-border effects of rainfall anomalies in one country on the agricultural
conditions of downstream countries, but this is minimal in Africa where irrigation
infrastructure is lacking and agriculture is almost entirely rainfed. Intra-country
differences in rainfall are also not captured, but food prices in urban centers are
theoretically the sum of changes in local conditions across the country. Lastly,
this single MSCP variable is bifurcated into two separate variables, dryMSCP
and wetMSCP , which are the absolute values of negative and positive deviations
respectively. DryMSCP is used as the instrument for changes in food prices.
WetMSCP is not used as the instrument but it is, nonetheless, kept in the model
because of the potential for above average rainfall to boost food supply and reduce
prices as well as its potential to affect unrest through alternative mechanisms.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of main sample
Mean SD Min Max
Occurrence of unrest 0.278 0.448 0.000 1.000
Standardized change in domestic food price index 0.007 1.003 -10.724 15.117
Trade balance adjusted grain price instrument 0.011 1.012 -19.504 21.792
Nine month dry MSCP 0.442 0.655 0.000 7.400
Six month wet MSCP 0.482 0.814 0.000 9.912
Monthly change in international wheat price 0.005 0.065 -0.197 0.258
Monthly change in international rice price 0.005 0.069 -0.245 0.509
Monthly change in international corn price 0.006 0.059 -0.223 0.246
National elections 0.032 0.175 0.000 1.000
Polity IV democracy 2.840 3.092 0.000 9.000
Polity IV autocracy 2.686 2.610 0.000 10.000
Occurence of armed conflict 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000
Population (millions) 18.567 24.793 0.853 170.806
Population growth (monthly %) 0.204 0.104 -1.740 2.804
Urban population (% of total) 36.106 16.630 5.385 86.447
Youth population (% of total 14 & under) 42.873 4.983 23.184 50.096
GDP per cap (in 000, constant 2005 USD) 1.184 1.538 0.122 7.725
Life expectancy at birth total (years) 54.053 7.776 26.764 75.100
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 76.262 28.874 13.600 155.300
Observations 10,102
Because the effect of rainfall on crop production is inherently a product of
timing and total rainfall during the growing season, accumulation periods of three,
six, nine, 12, 15 and 18 months were tested. DryMSCP over nine months had the
most pronounced negative effect while wetMSCP over six months had the most
pronounced positive effect. Additionally, both variables are lagged by one month
to account for the time it takes precipitation changes to have a noticeable effect on
the market.
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3.4.4 Control variables
Based on the hypothesis that more unrest will occur in months when national
elections take place (Dunning, 2011; Linebarger and Salehyan, 2012), I include a
variable for the occurrence of national elections in each country-month (Nunley,
2012). A variable is included for the occurrence of armed civil conflict within a
country, taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Datasest (Themne´r and Wal-
lensteen, 2013). Other control variables include: the relative institutional democ-
racy or autocracy, separately, of countries from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2011); size of youth population (ages 0-14) because of an association be-
tween youth bulges and the likelihood of conflict (Urdal, 2006); urban population
as a percentage of total population; GDP per capita because the relative wealth
or poverty of a population may be associated with the likelihood of conflict in a
given country; and indicators of life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates
as proxies for the relative poverty or development of countries (WDI, 2015).
Finally, indicator variables are included for individual calendar months and
individual years. The former is intended to control for the seasonality of crop pro-
duction and rainfall expectations for the susceptibility for unrest during different
times of the year. For example, Islamic societies may be less inclined to protest
during Ramadan than during other months. Year indicators should capture changes
in global economic conditions and political changes.
The compilation of all these data resulted in a complete dataset of the pri-
mary variables of interest for 10,080 country-months over 40 African countries for
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the 275 months between February 1990 and December 2012. Table 3.1 presents the
summary statistics of the final sample. (Figure A.7 shows sample coverage.)
3.5 Estimation and results
Because the dependent variable is a binary for the occurrence of unrest, I
choose to use a two-stage endogenous probit model that restricts the dependent
variable to values, interpreted as the probability of unrest, between zero and one.
Although somewhat biased in the coefficients because the dependent variable is
modeled incorrectly as a linear function, a two-stage fixed effects model is also es-
timated to evaluate the instrumental variables and check robustness to model spec-
ification.
Regardless of the second stage estimation, the first stage model predicts the
standardized percentage change in consumer food prices, FPit, using the instru-
mental variables and all other covariates included the second stage and follows the
general form:
FPit = β0 + β1SGIit + β2dryMSCPit−1 + β3wetMSCPit−1 + β4SUit−1
+
∑
βXit +
∑
βM +
∑
βY +
∑
βC + uit (3.5)
SGIit is the standardized grain price instrument in month t;MSCPit (wet and dry)
are the rainfall anomalies in country i and month t− 1; SUit−1 is a binary variable
for the occurrence of social unrest in country i in month t − 1; X is a vector of
time varying control variables; M is a vector of binary variables for each calendar
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Table 3.2: First-stage model results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade balance adjusted 0.026** 0.027** 0.027** 0.030** 0.029**
grain price instrument (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nine month dry MSCP 0.066* 0.076** 0.062** 0.066** 0.057*
(t–1) (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Occurrence of unrest 0.081* 0.073* 0.073*
(t–1) (0.017) (0.028) (0.029)
Six month wet MSCP -0.030+ -0.031+ -0.030+
(t–1) (0.087) (0.072) (0.082)
National elections 0.036 0.036
(0.509) (0.510)
Polity IV democracy -0.004 -0.004
(0.637) (0.643)
Polity IV autocracy 0.017 0.017
(0.145) (0.144)
Occurence of armed 0.013 0.013
conflict (0.781) (0.792)
Population (millions) -0.002 -0.002
(0.613) (0.601)
Population growth 0.013 0.014
(monthly %) (0.889) (0.868)
Urban population (% of -0.010 -0.010
total) (0.514) (0.524)
Youth population (% of -0.016 -0.016
total 14 & under) (0.366) (0.369)
GDP per cap (in 000, -0.159 -0.156
constant 2005 USD) (0.204) (0.211)
Life expectancy at birth -0.007 -0.007
total (years) (0.576) (0.592)
Infant mortality rate -0.001 -0.001
(per 1,000 births) (0.692) (0.690)
Trade bal adj grain 0.005
price instrument (t+1) (0.474)
9 month dry MSCP (t+1) 0.013
(0.658)
Observations 10,583 10,583 10,560 10,102 10,096
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.034
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; Model 1 is a pooled OLS model;
Models 2, 3, and 4 include country, year, and calendar month fixed effects.
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month; Y is a vector of binary variables for each year; and C is a vector of country
fixed effects.
The first stage results are presented in Table 3.2. Model 1 is the most parsi-
monious, model 2 adds country, year, and calendar month indicator variables, and
models 3 and 4 include additional covariates. Regardless of the specification, the
instrumental variables are significantly different from zero and in the expected di-
rection. WetMSCP is also significant (at α = 0.1) and in the expected direction,
indicating that above average rainfall brings food prices down in the near term. Oc-
currence of unrest in month t− 1 is also significant and positive, which is evidence
of the endogenous relationship between food prices and unrest. Following the ex-
ample of a ‘false experiment’ in Miguel et al. (2004), the instrumental variables in
month t+ 1 are included in Model 5 and are found to be near zero, which confirms
that they are orthogonal to food price changes in month t.
Next, the two-stage fixed effects results are presented in Table 3.3. Model
1 is the fixed effects models without instrumental variables and is presented for
comparison. The coefficient of the standardized change in food prices is near zero.
In contrast, the coefficients for the same variable, although potentially biased, are
significant (at α = 0.1 or lower), in the expected direction, and stable in the in-
strumental variable (IV) estimations. An increase in domestic food prices of one
SD above the long-term mean increases the probability of unrest between 14.3 and
17.8%.
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Table 3.3: Fixed effects results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized change in 0.007 0.145* 0.182 0.167*
domestic food price index (0.117) (0.011) (0.103) (0.019)
Trade balance adjusted 0.004* -0.001
grain price instrument (0.022) (0.777)
Nine month dry MSCP 0.010 0.002
(t–1) (0.151) (0.767)
Six month wet MSCP 0.011* 0.016** 0.017** 0.016**
(t–1) (0.013) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001)
Unreported covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102
Adjusted R2 0.100 -0.035 -0.105 -0.076
Log psuedolikelihood -4559 -5180 -5511 -5377
Anderson cannon corr LR 9.445 14.938 23.934
Anderson LR X2 p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.000 0.000 0.084
Hansen J X2 p-value 0.772
Cragg-Donald F 9.435 14.927 11.963
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include year, and calendar
month fixed effects; Unreported covariates: national elections; Polity IV democracy and autocracy; occurrence of
armed conflict; total population; population growth; youth population; urban population; GDP per capita; life
expectancy; and infant mortality.
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These models are presented primarily for evaluation of the instrumental
variables. The Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio is an underidenti-
fication test with a null hypothesis that the model is not identified, i.e. that the
instruments are not relevant. The p-values indicate that this null can be rejected
in all cases and when combined with the significance findings of the instruments
in the first stage provide evidence of relevance. The Hansen J statistic is a test
of overidentification and is only applicable when using both instruments. The null
hypothesis is that the model is not overidentified and this cannot be rejected. The
Cragg-Donald F statistic tests weak identification when compared to critical values
established by Stock and Yogo (2005) for the maximum IV estimator bias. In model
3 the Cragg-Donald F , 19.863, exceeds the critical value at 10%, 16.38, which pro-
vides evidence that the instrument, dryMSCP , is not an overly weak instrument.
In model 2, however, the Cragg-Donald F , 9.453, exceeds the critical value at 15%,
8.96, but not 10%, 16.38, indicating that the standardized grain commodity instru-
ment, while not weak is not as robust as possible. Similarly, when both instruments
are used the Cragg-Donald F , 14.445, exceeds the 15% critical value, 11.59, but
not the 10% critical values, which indicates that one cannot rule out the potential for
limited bias in the IV estimation. Exogeneity tests of the instruments are included
in the models presented in Table 3.4. The null hypothesis that the instruments are
not exogenous can be rejected at the α = 0.05 level in all models. There is some
doubt about the exogeneity of dryMSCP when fixed effects are not included (see
Table A.3) but the inclusion of fixed effects improves the efficiency of the estima-
tion and determination of exogeneity. In sum, the standardized grain commodity
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instrument is exogenous but weaker than dryMSCP and dryMSCP is a stronger
instrument but one cannot be as confident in its exogeneity. When used together,
the instruments perform well and do not lead to significantly different estimation
results, which provides good support for the substantive findings.
For the reasons discussed above, a second stage probit model provides the
most reliable coefficient estimates of the probability of the binary outcome, the
occurrence of unrest. These models follow the general form:
Pr(SU) = Φ
(
γ0 + γ1F̂Pit + γ2wetMSCPit−1 + γ3SUit−1
+
∑
γXit +
∑
γM +
∑
γY +
∑
γC + (uit + vit)
)
(3.6)
Pr(SU) is the probability of social unrest; Φ is defined as the normal cumulative
distribution function; FPit−1 is the predicted percentage change in the food price
index from the first stage equation and all others variables are defined as above in
the first stage equation. When used as the instrumental variable the grain instrument
and the dryMSCP are excluded from the second-stage equation. Each is, however,
included in the first stage when the alternative is the sole instrumental variable.
The ivprobit routine is used to estimate the equation (Newey, 1987; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010; StataCorp, 2013).
The results are presented in Table 3.4. Again model (1) is a single stage
probit model without instrumental variables and is presented for comparison. The
estimates presented show that changes in domestic food prices are not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. The grain commodity price instrument and
dryMSCP are both statistically significant but very small in magnitude.
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Table 3.4: Endogenous probit model results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Occurrence of unrest
Standardized change in 0.025 0.484** 0.594* 0.558**
domestic food price index (0.124) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001)
Trade balance adjusted 0.016* -0.004
grain price instrument (0.039) (0.710)
Nine month dry MSCP (t–1) 0.046+ 0.010
(0.064) (0.717)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.716** 0.604** 0.549** 0.569**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.046** 0.055** 0.056** 0.055**
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
National elections 0.589** 0.508** 0.466** 0.481**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Polity IV democracy -0.068** -0.059** -0.054* -0.056**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.005)
Polity IV autocracy -0.052* -0.054** -0.053** -0.053**
(0.020) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Occurence of armed conflict -0.047 -0.048 -0.046 -0.047
(0.574) (0.535) (0.534) (0.531)
Population (millions) 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011
(0.290) (0.255) (0.270) (0.261)
Population growth (monthly -0.137 -0.128 -0.120 -0.124
%) (0.684) (0.645) (0.632) (0.634)
Urban population (% of -0.015 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007
total) (0.504) (0.693) (0.759) (0.735)
Youth population (% of -0.032 -0.021 -0.017 -0.018
total 14 & under) (0.408) (0.467) (0.567) (0.531)
GDP per cap (in 000, -0.155 -0.065 -0.037 -0.047
constant 2005 USD) (0.280) (0.645) (0.777) (0.717)
Life expectancy at birth -0.015 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
total (years) (0.438) (0.512) (0.559) (0.538)
Infant mortality rate (per -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
1,000 births) (0.407) (0.433) (0.466) (0.452)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102
Log psuedolikelihood -4,527 -18,694 -18,694 -18,694
Positive predictive value 69.91 62.19 58.63 60.03
Negative predictive value 81.72 81.31 81.11 81.21
Correctly classified 79.54 77.29 76.05 76.57
Wald X2 . 4.36e+10 3221 5097
X2 p-value . 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 4.391 3.597 6.164
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.036 0.058 0.013
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include year, and calendar
month fixed effects.
48
Models (2), (3), and (4) better isolate the causal effect of that regressor on
the dependent variable and provide the most unbiased estimates for the effect of
changes in domestic food prices on the probability of unrest. The coefficients of a
probit model are not as easily converted into odds ratios as the coefficients of a logit
model and the marginal effects differ depending on the baseline variables. They are,
however, comparable to other coefficients in the model and across models. The es-
timates reveal that a monthly increase in domestic food prices of one SD above the
long-term mean increase has a positive effect of roughly the same magnitude across
models. (Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 presents additional specifications of these
models.) These estimates are not statistically different from each other and pro-
vide evidence of the true effect of food price increases on the probability of unrest.
Moreover, the coefficient for dryMSCP is not statistically different from zero in
model (2), which provides evidence that the sole mechanism connecting rainfall
scarcity and urban unrest is through its effect on domestic food prices as captured
in the first stage estimation. Similarly, the coefficient for the standardized grain
commodity instrument is not statistically different from zero in model (3), provid-
ing similar evidence about the exclusivity of the causal mechanism. Additionally,
rainfall abundance, measured by wetMSCP , increases the probability of unrest
despite lowering food prices as shown in Table 3.2, indicating that another as yet
unidentified causal mechanism connects the two.12
12One possible explanation is that an over-abundance of rainfall leads to flooding in urban areas,
which can displace populations and lead to conflict over relief supplies.
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Model (4) of Table 3.4 is likely the most reliable because it uses both instru-
ments and produces the most efficient parameter estimate for standardized change
in domestic food prices. Again, the coefficients of the probit models are not easily
interpreted. Nonetheless, the estimates reveal that, all else equal, the effect of a one
SD increase in domestic food prices has a positive effect comparable in magnitude
to the occurrence of unrest in the previous month and a larger effect than the occur-
rence of national elections. Accumulated rainfall in the previous six months of one
SD above the expected mean leads to a small but statistically significant increase in
the probability of unrest. Although outside the scope of this dissertation, the prob-
ability of unrest are lower with higher levels of both democracy and higher levels
of autocracy, which could be a subject of future research into the motivations and
opportunities for mobilization of unrest activities.
Understanding the magnitude of these effects is complicated by the fact
that changes in probability are dependent on the baseline probability. Figure 3.4
shows the country specific difference between the predicted probability of unrest
given a monthly increase in food prices equivalent to the long-term mean, versus
an increase of one SD over the long-term mean, holding all other variables at their
means. (The country specific long-term means and SDs as well as the predicted
probabilities and confidence intervals are given in Table A.9.) Increases of one
SD or more occur in 12% of the months in the sample. The highest probabilities
of unrest given an increase of one SD are in Nigeria and South Africa, 0.942 and
0.904 respectively. But these countries also have the highest baseline probabilities
of unrest, 0.844 in Nigeria and 0.772 in South Africa. The largest increases in
50
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
 o
f u
nr
es
t
Ni
ge
ria
So
ut
h A
fri
ca
Eg
yp
t
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Cô
te
 d
’Iv
oir
e
Ke
ny
a
Al
ge
ria
Ni
ge
r
Ce
nt
ra
l A
fri
ca
n 
Re
p
M
ala
wi
Za
m
bia
M
or
oc
co
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
Bu
ru
nd
i
Se
ne
ga
l
M
au
rit
an
ia
To
go
Gu
ine
a
An
go
la
Ug
an
da
Bu
rk
ina
 F
as
o
Ta
nz
an
ia
Ga
bo
n
Et
hio
pia
Gh
an
a
Ca
m
er
oo
n
M
oz
am
biq
ue
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
ali
Sw
az
ila
nd
Gu
ine
a-
Bi
ss
au
Ch
ad
Tu
nis
ia
Rw
an
da
Le
so
th
o
Be
nin
Co
ng
o
Bo
tsw
an
a
Na
m
ibi
a
Ga
m
bia
rank of (-estimate)  
Increase in food prices equal to long-term mean 95% confidence interval
One SD increase in food prices over long-term mean
Figure 3.4: Predicted probabilities of unrest by country
probabilities occur in Niger, Central African Republic, Malawi, Zambia, Morocco,
and Algeria.
3.5.1 Different types of unrest
The question remains as to what types of unrest are more likely to be trig-
gered by higher food prices. Table 3.5 presents the effect of changes in food prices
on categories of different types of unrest as coded by SCAD. (See Table A.5 for
full model results.) These models provide some evidence that rising food prices are
most likely to lead to violent events, riots, and spontaneous events. The effect is
the strongest when limited to spontaneous violent riots (SCAD event code 8). The
effect on organized events is not significantly different from zero and the effect on
strikes, which generally require considerable organization, is close to zero. Taken
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Table 3.5: Probit model results for different unrest outcomes
Effect of a one
Country-months SD spike in food price
Type of unrest with unrest type price index
Violent unrest 1,202 0.459∗
Riots (spontaneous and organized) 720 0.626∗
Spontaneous events (demonstrations and riots) 1,551 0.724∗∗
Spontaneous violent riots 648 0.623∗
Demonstrations (spontaneous and organized) 1,043 0.582∗
Spontaneous demonstrations 1,551 0.483∗
Organized events (demonstrations and riots) 718 0.091
Strikes 985 0.046
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
together these results suggest that increases in food prices increase popular propen-
sity to engage in disruptive behavior but without time to properly organize. Planned
events, on the other hand, might proceed irrespective of short-term changes in food
prices.
3.5.2 Robustness checks
A number of additional models confirm the robustness of the main finding
to various model specifications and subsamples. First, two models, one with no
fixed effects and no control variables and one with control variables but no fixed
effects, were estimated to ensure against overspecification. Next, Egypt, South
Africa, and Nigeria were excluded in order to ensure that they were not biasing
the results from either the fact that Egypt and South Africa both have relatively
developed irrigation infrastructure or that South Africa and Nigeria also account
for a disproportionate amount of unrest events in SCAD. A model was run on a
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subsample for post-1997 in order to eliminate any potential reporting bias due to an
increase in the events captured by SCAD after the use of the Internet became more
widespread by media outlets. Next, I tested whether the results are driven by the
dramatic rise in international prices in 2007–08 and 2010 by excluding 2007 and
later from the analysis. I also used 6 months and 12 months of accumulated rainfall
as the basis of the MSCP transformation. Finally, I used the Global Precipitation
and Climatology Project (GPCP) (Adler et al., 2003) and a transformation more
consistent with the accepted Standardized Precipitation Index13 as the basis of the
rainfall instrument. None of these robustness checks lead to an estimate of the main
effect of rising prices that is substantially different from the estimate of the main
model. (For full model results see Tables A.7 and A.8.)
Further robustness checks could be conducted using alternative datasets for
the dependent variable. Initial analysis using the Armed Conflict Location and
Event Data (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010), has not yielded similar results, which
might indicate reporting bias in one or both datasets. ACLED tracks riots and
protests since 1997 using a wider set of source material, but the events are not
as easily disaggregated by type or location in an urban area. Using the Global
Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013), I
have begun to explore the relationship in other regions of the world but this requires
a different specification of the grain instrument due to different relationships of lo-
cal economies with global food commodity markets. The UCDP Georeferenced
13The full coverage, 1979 to 2008, was used as the base period for the mean and SD.
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Event Data (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) tracks armed conflict, includ-
ing low-level conflict, which might make it possible to explore whether rising food
prices increase the likelihood of other types of conflict.
3.6 Conclusion
These results provide convincing evidence of a causal relationship between
changes in domestic food prices and the probability of unrest. Furthermore, they
provide evidence that in the aggregate populations respond to the short-term eco-
nomic pressure of rising food prices regardless of the cause of the increase. Unrest
is more likely during times of larger food price spikes regardless of other potential
drivers of unrest.
These findings have important policy implications. Price stability in local
markets is important to maintaining political and social stability. Two important
points to remember when considering policy prescriptions are: (1) price spikes
have destabilizing effects regardless of the source; and (2) maintaining consistently
low prices is less important than preventing sudden price shocks. Controlling price
fluctuations in international markets is important at a macro level but will have little
benefit if local markets are still vulnerable to local conditions. Uncertainty around
climate change and changing weather patterns must be considered here but from a
different perspective than it is usually considered in adaptation circles. Increasing
overall long-term production through drought resistant crops or farming techniques
is less important than ensuring availability and access in times of poor conditions.
This means improving irrigation infrastructure to buffer against changing rainfall
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patterns, transportation networks to deliver food regionally, and storage capacity to
allow for warehousing of food.
This finding does not preclude that fundamental economic or political grievances
may be the real drivers of the unrest that is triggered by spikes in food prices. This
chapter cannot answer the theoretical question of how and why people choose par-
ticular methods, venues, and targets, which may, in fact, be determined by the un-
derlying grievances driving unrest that is merely triggered by rising food prices.
More research is needed to answer these questions and is likely to be context spe-
cific and require in-depth case studies.
Like the bread riots of the 18th and 19th centuries and the austerity protests
of the 1970s and 1980s, episodes of unrest and political instability generally involve
many issues and contributing factors. The list of possible drivers of unrest is long:
perceived lack of justice and equity in global food and economic systems; lack of
political freedoms and avenues to voice grievances; poor governance and lack of
government accountability; general high levels of poverty and the lack of public
service delivery; poor workplace conditions and labor disputes. All of these issues
are intimately connected with access to food and many of them will be considered
at length the remaining portions of this dissertation. But rising food prices and food
insecurity is a major driver of grievance and must not be ignored or considered only
when protesters are waving loaves of bread.
In sum, this chapter has presented evidence that short-term spikes in food
prices lead to increases in socio-political unrest. The question remains, however,
about how food prices can lead to unrest that are not directly related to food. The
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remaining chapters of the dissertation focus on protest in South Africa. The ques-
tions to be addressed are what factors determine individual participation in protest
activities and how food security and prices contribute to such participation. Before
addressing these questions, however, it is necessary to understand the history and
dynamics of social movements and protest in the particular context of South Africa.
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Chapter 4
From anti-apartheid movement to service delivery
protest: A case study of protest in South Africa
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I first review the history of the anti-apartheid movement that
provides a backdrop for the context of protest in South Africa today. I then provide
a description of the evolution of post-apartheid grassroots movements that were
the predecessors of the service delivery protests and a narrative of the emergence of
widespread protests that have plagued South Africa since 2004. Labeled service de-
livery protests (SDPs) this unrest has cost the South African economy considerable
resources and strained the ability of the police service to maintain order.1
In the last section of this chapter, I present a brief analysis of the outbreak of
SDPs through the lenses of some of the social movement theories presented in chap-
ter 2: political opportunity theory, resource mobilization theory, and social identity
theory. Finally, I argue that although these analytical frameworks can help one un-
derstand the conditions in South Africa that permitted the emergence of the SDPs,
they are better suited to understand individual campaigns within the wider outbreak.
They cannot adequately explain individual participation in protests, largely because
1In a speech to Parliament in May 2015, the Minister of Police said that over 14,000 incidents in
the previous financial year had stretched police resources to the limit (Williams, 2015).
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the spread of SDPs is not a cohesive social movement but consists of related but
separate campaigns and events in different urban centers with different leaders and
different participants.
4.2 A brief history of the anti-apartheid movement
It is an oversimplification to claim that street protests brought down the Na-
tional Party regime and the system of apartheid in South Africa. The anti-apartheid
movement, however, has a long history of political protests that culminated with
the dismantling of apartheid in the early 1990s. The struggle against apartheid,
while seemingly disorganized and chaotic at times, was a large-scale, long-term
movement led by a handful of organizations with a single and well-defined goal.
The democratic elections of 1994 marked the culmination of a long strug-
gle of resistance for the ANC that began 82 years earlier when it was founded in
Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, as the South African Native
National Congress (SANNC). The SANNC was created in response to government
policies of the newly formed Union of South Africa2 including the forced removal
of Africans from their farms to cities and mines and the institution of pass laws that
restricted movement of Africans through government-mandated identification cards
(Welsh, 2000).
2The Union of South Africa became a nominally self-governing dominion of the United King-
dom by act of the British parliament on 31 May 1910, eight years after the end of the second Boer
War. It consisted of the two former British Cape and Natal colonies as well as the formerly indepen-
dent Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The independent Republic of South
Africa was declared following a referendum in 1961 (Welsh, 2000).
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Employment in the South African manufacturing industry increased by 60
percent between 1939 and 1945, in support of the war effort. New factory workers,
most of whom were Black Africans, settled in shantytowns and townships on the
outskirts of Johannesburg and other urban centers. The appalling living and work-
ing conditions created resentment and resulted in a number of protests and strikes.
One such strike occurred in in 1946 when 60,000 men organized by the African
Mineworkers Union stopped work and demanded higher pay. In the ensuing police
response twelve people were shot to death (Welsh, 2000).
In June 1948 the National Party came to power in South African and began
instituting apartheid laws, which codified and strengthened existing discriminatory
and oppressive policies.3 In response, the ANC increased its resistance.
In 1952 it initiated the Defiance Campaign that sought to overwhelm the
legal system and jails through mass violation of apartheid laws inviting arrest of the
violators. The ANC initially eschewed violence but many peaceful demonstrations
devolved into violence when confronted by the police. Notably, the Sharpeville
Massacre of 21 March 1960 began when a crowd of 5,000 to 7,000 demonstrated
outside a police station in Sharpeville, a Johannesburg township. They were protest-
ing against pass laws that required all South African resident to carry documents
identifying them by race group and thereby limiting where they could legally go.
3Key among these laws were the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act under
which all individuals were categorized as White European Black African, or Coloured, which pre-
determined their place in society by restricting where they lived, worked, and went to school.
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Although it is unclear how the violence started, in the end 69 people were killed
when the police fired on the crowd (Welsh, 2000).
In 1961, after a heated internal debate, the ANC leadership decided that
armed resistance was necessary because peaceful efforts had failed to bring about
change and demonstrations were increasingly met with violence from the police.
A militia group, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), meaning “Spear of the Nation,” was
founded under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo. MK began a pro-
gram of sabotage and tactical violence against government installations. This esca-
lation of the struggle also led to an increase in violent street protests and in 1964 the
government outlawed the ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).4 ANC leaders
including Nelson Mandela were arrested and sentenced to life in prison during the
Rivonia trial (Welsh, 2000; Mandela, 1995).
The struggle continued despite these setbacks and it became even more vi-
olent. Students also became an increasingly important part of the movement led
largely by the South African Students Organization (SASO) founded in 1969 by
Steve Biko. On 16 June 1976, students from across Soweto, Johannesburg, planned
to march and gather at a school in Orland in demonstration against the use of
Afrikaans in classrooms. Police attempted to disburse the students, which by some
estimates numbered as many as 20,000. They initially used teargas but at some
point began shooting killing eleven people. Hector Pieterson, a 13 year-old boy was
among the dead, and a photo of his body in his sister’s arms became an icon of the
4The PAC was another opposition party founded in 1959 by Robert Sobukwe and a often-troubled
political ally of the ANC.
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movement. The protests continued in the ensuing days and gave rise to other riots
across the country and “by the end of February 1977 the official death toll . . . stood
at 575 including 75 coloured, two white, two Indian and 496 African people. Many
areas were affected including 22 townships in the Transvaal, 16 areas around Cape
Town, four townships in Port Elizabeth and nine other towns” (Ndlovu, 2007, 350).
In the 1980s, widespread rebellion and mass protests continued and in-
creased. Eventually diverse groups including students and workers under the lead-
ership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)5 were able to
overcome their differences and coalesce into a strong movement. They marched
and toyi-toyi’d,6 under ANC banners, and Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo were
upheld as leaders of the movement. Emboldened in part by military support from
the United States for its proxy war against Cuba and the USSR in Angola, the
National Party government continued to respond oppressively. Nonetheless, the
anti-apartheid movement gained support from across the globe and became an in-
ternational movement that put increasing pressure on the South African government
through boycotts and divestments (Welsh, 2000; Tilly and Tarrow, 2006; Ndlovu,
2007).
In September of 1989, F.W. de Klerk became the president after a brief
power struggle within the National Party brought on by the unexpected health prob-
lems and resignation of P.W. Botha. Understanding the need to negotiate a peaceful
5COSATU was launched in 1985 after four years of talks as a coalition of 33 unions opposed to
apartheid.
6The term toyi-toyi is a uniquely southern African term that refers to a type of dance involving
foot stomping and chanting of slogans used during political protests and labour strikes.
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transition away from apartheid, de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC and released
Mandela and many other political prisoners in February 1990.
The next fours years, 1990 to 1994, were a period of transition that was
not without difficulty.7 Many South Africans were fearful of how the ANC would
run the government. But the calming presence of Nelson Mandela won out and
peaceful elections were held between April 26 and 29, 1994 (Welsh, 2000). Over
19.5 million voters went to the polls representing 86.9% of registered voters and
over half the total population of the country of 38.3 million, 36% of which were
under the age of 15 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014; WDI, 2015).
Nelson Mandela was inaugurated into office on May 10, 1994 and the country was
changed forever.
4.3 Social movements in post-apartheid South Africa
In the heady days following the first democratic elections the streets were
relatively peaceful, but the calm did not last long. Nelson Mandela stepped down
after one term and Thabo Mbeki was elected president in 1999. During his term,
new social struggles emerged over a range of issues. Ballard et al. (2005, 616)
identify three “overlapping but distinct types of struggle.”
First, some were campaigns against a specific government policy. An ex-
ample was the opposition of COSATU, the largest umbrella labor organization in
7The country came closer to self-destruction than perhaps any time prior to 1990 after the as-
sassination of Chris Hani, a leader of the South African Communist Party and a former member of
MK, in April of 1993 by a militant right-wing Polish immigrant.
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the country, to the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
strategy, which embraced a trade liberalization strategy to promote economic growth
and create employment opportunities, thereby redistributing wealth. Oldfield and
Stokke (2004, 7) describe the period immediately following the end of apartheid as
one “characterised by a remarkable political liberalisation” during which “the state-
led Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was designed, concomi-
tant with other restructuring processes, to rectify socioeconomic differentiation and
discrimination.” In subsequent years, such state-led transformation programs gave
way to other macro-economic policies designed to increase international economic
competitiveness and attract private investment in the long-run. In the short term,
however, these programs, the largest of which was GEAR, “perpetuated and deep-
ened unemployment, poverty and inequality” (Oldfield and Stokke, 2004, 7).
Egan and Wafer (2004) describe the shift from RDP to GEAR similarly. In
an attempt to correct “Apartheid created infrastructure disparities,” the Reconstruc-
tion and Development Programme (RDP) instituted by the ANC in 1994 included
a “relatively progressive set of welfare-oriented policies.” These included the ex-
tension of electricity and water services through proposed free “lifeline,” or basic,
tariffs, cross-subsidization from areas with higher rate bases, and a government un-
derwritten National Electricity Fund. Democratization and decentralization were
seen as crucial to the success of the RDP, and “local governments were to be re-
sponsible for delivery of services, for drawing up programmes to extend service
networks, and for engaging local communities in dialogue” (Egan and Wafer, 2004,
5).
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With international boycotts and trade restrictions lifted, the demands of join-
ing the highly competitive post-Cold War global market became increasingly more
pressing. In 1996 the ANC began shifting economic policy toward the more growth-
oriented Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy and away from
RDP. To some GEAR was regarded as a “neo-liberal inspired policy package,” but
the shifts in policy that accompanied GEAR had unequal impact in terms of bene-
fiting the majority of South Africans who continued to poor (Egan and Wafer, 2004,
5).
The COSATU campaign against GEAR emerged out of this policy environ-
ment. It was not dissimilar to anti-globalization campaigns in other countries. One
distinctive aspect of the South Africa case was that the anti-globalization move-
ment came at the same time as a transition to democracy (Ballard et al., 2005, 620).
Indeed, the causal relationship between globalization and the end of apartheid is
complicated and endogenous. Increasing global attention as well as the end of the
Cold War both contributed to the end of apartheid. The new ANC government was
unable to deliver on its promises of economic redistribution and began pursuing
what in the eyes of many South Africans, especially those that had felt solidarity
with international communist movements, were the same policies of the apartheid
regime.
The second type of campaign focused on the government’s failure to deliver
basic human needs and address socio-economic rights.8 Ballard et al. cite the
8The new Constitution of South Africa 1996 guaranteed a number of previously unrecognized
rights to all South African citizens. Section 26 provides:
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Landless People’s Movement (LPM) and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) as
examples of such campaigns.
Third, some struggles emerged to resist the local government policies or ac-
tions that were perceived to be unjust or oppressive. “The Soweto Electricity Crisis
Committee (SECC), the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF) and the Anti-eviction
Campaign (AEC) are all attempts to organize poor and marginalised communities
to resist local, provincial and national governments’ attempts to cut off electricity
and water, and to evict residents” (Ballard et al., 2005, 616). These three campaigns
were the organized forerunners to the emergence of widespread and disorganized
SDPs that sought to replicate their tactics and, hopefully, their successes. As such
they deserve closer attention.
4.3.1 The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee
In 2001, faced with electricity arrears of 1 to 1.2 billion rand from default-
ing electricity customers in Soweto ESKOM, the monopolistic parastatal energy
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary
evictions. Section 27 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents,
appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
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producer/distributer, made the decision to proceed with an aggressive cost recovery
program that involved disconnecting customers in default. The Soweto Electricity
Crisis Committee emerged in response to the perceived injustice in disconnecting
poor residents, many of whom were pensioners or unemployed, and to alleged cor-
ruption on the part of ESKOM employees. The SECC was a loose coalition of
Soweto residents that formed informal alliances with COSATU, the SA Munic-
ipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the Anti-Privatisation Forum, a coalition of
activists and organizations opposed to iGoli 2002, a World Bank supported plan
to turn around the troubled finances of Johannesburg in large part by privatizing
many city functions. SECC embarked on a widespread campaign that at one point
reconnected electricity to over 3,000 households within six months.
The SECC also launched many protest activities and demonstrations. In
April 2002, 87 activists were arrested when they attempted to disconnect the elec-
tricity at the home of the mayor of Johannesburg. They staged protests at the World
Conference Against Racism in Durban and staged a march from Alexandra town-
ship to Sandton in August 2002 to protest the World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment (WSSD), a march that as of 2002 was the largest single protest undertaken
in the post-apartheid era. Many of SECC actions and protests were directed at the
ANC or opposed to ANC policies. Indeed, the de facto leader, Trevor Ngwane, was
a former ANC councilor who was dismissed from his post because of his opposition
to iGoli 2002. Still, “most SECC members voted for the ANC in the 2004 General
Election as the SECC/APF leadership implicitly acknowledged by not calling ex-
plicitly for a stayaway. In contrast to the political and academic backgrounds of
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some of the founding members of the SECC, the majority of branch level members
are probably less educated. They articulate their concerns as immediate and ma-
terial, related to their daily lives rather than abstract ideas about privatisation and
globalisation” (Egan and Wafer, 2004, 18).
4.3.2 The Concerned Citizens Forum
The Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF) emerged in the early 2000s in eThek-
wini Municipality (Durban) largely in response to municipal government actions
such as evictions from informal settlements and disconnection of households from
water or electricity. It was a “loose association of individuals and organisations
. . . united by what they bring to the CCF: a broad array of shared living experiences,
identities, symbols and resources that they draw on (and continually create and ex-
change) as a source of mobilisation and campaigning” (Dweyer, 2004, 2). Like the
SECC, the CCF did not have a formal structure. Rather, it was a network or coalition
that employed various tactics, including swapping skills and training plumbers and
electricians to illegally reconnect disconnected homes, protesting against the ANC
government at the World Conference Against Racism in August 2001, and partic-
ipating in protest marches outside the WSSD in 2002. Within the CCF there was
considerable debate about whether to participate or not in local elections. Dweyer
quotes one interviewee, “one day the CCF in one area could be voting and in
another area maybe 5 kilometres away this very same CCF was campaigning vig-
orously against the vote in Bayview” (Dweyer, 2004, 20).
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4.3.3 The Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign
In Cape Town, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) was formed
in February 2001 in response to the city’s eviction of families from state-owned
flats in two Coloured townships, Valhalla Park and Tafelsig. The campaign quickly
evolved to oppose other cost-recovery actions. The Anti-Eviction Campaign em-
ployed many of the same tactics as the SECC and CCF, most notably informal
reconnections of households that had been disconnected from municipal water and
electricity. But in its efforts to resist evictions and repossessions in many areas of
the Cape Flats, the AEC was more engaged than the SECC or the CCF with state
institutions and private banks, including the Municipality, Provincial Minister of
Housing, and Servcon, a parastatal that negotiates between banks and homeown-
ers in arrears on bond payments. This mix of opposition and engagement was the
source of considerable tension, especially in neighborhoods with a mix of both for-
mal and informal housing, but yielded positive results in other areas.
These three campaigns, the SECC, the CCF, and the AEC, represent sim-
ilar movements in the three largest urban areas in South Africa. All three were
organized in opposition to local government policies perceived to be unjust and in
contradiction to ANC campaign policies and expectations of post-apartheid redis-
tribution of wealth. Indeed, part of the SECCs explicit demands were “free basic
supply of electricity and water the ANC had promised during the 2000 municipal
elections campaign and a return to the flat-rate monthly pricing system that the
community had managed to wrest from the apartheid regime in the 1980s” (Egan
and Wafer, 2004, 10). All three of these campaigns employed similar tactics, or
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repertoires, including large-scale demonstration marches at high-profile events and
illegal reconnections of households to public utilities (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006). This
indicates considerable learning between them either as the result of direct commu-
nication or of an indirect connection through media reports.
The tactics employed by these campaigns also reveal a genuine tension
within the movements between participation in formal political institutions and un-
dermining the official government functions. This tension is also manifested in the
internal debates regarding participation in elections and the continued support for
the ANC despite opposition to ANC policies and leaders, notably Thabo Mbeki
and his shift toward trade liberalization and growth strategies and the privatization
of government services.
4.4 The outbreak of service delivery protests
These more organized movements seemingly gave rise to more grassroots
and hyper-localized protests. Researchers have identified 2004 as the year that a
new protest phenomenon began to emerge (Alexander, 2010; Booysen, 2007; Atkin-
son, 2007). In July 2004, 3,000 protesters marched through Diepsloot, an informal
settlement located on the periphery of Johannesburg with a population of approxi-
mately 150,000 at the time. They demanded that their local councilors be dismissed
for failure to deliver basic services such as water, sewage, electricity, and rubbish
removal (Alexander, 2010). In September, protests erupted in Harrismith, a town
in the eastern Free State municipality of Maluti-a-Phofung (population 360,549
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in 2001 (Statistics South Africa, 2015)). Alleging inept service delivery, unre-
sponsiveness, corruption (municipal officials requesting cash in exchange for RDP
houses), and nepotism, residents demanded the resignation of the councilors and
the removal of the town from the larger municipality. One young boy was killed
during skirmishes with police when the protests turned violent (Alexander, 2010).
Soon after the protests in Harrismith, protests erupted in the Phumelela
towns of Warden, Memel, and Vrede. Atkinson (2007) describes the protest as
follows:
As in Harrismith, tyres were burned, buckets of excrement and rubbish
were emptied into the streets, and a night-soil truck was overturned
. . . . Residents accused the local council of poor service delivery, un-
acceptable living conditions, nepotism, unwarranted salary increase,
irregularities in the allocation of tenders and Reconstruction Develop-
ment Programme (RDP) houses, and weak management which had re-
sulted in failed development projects. The mayor and councilors were
shouted down by young people when they tried to address the crowd.
Some councilors were briefly held hostage, and were released only on
the condition that the Free State Premier, Beatrice Marshoff, would
visit the municipality (Atkinson, 2007, 55).
In the same month, similar incidents took place all around the country.
In Ekhurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality just east of Johannesburg, residents of
Harry Gwala informal settlement protested in the streets of Benoni against poor
service delivery. In the North West Province town of Vryburg, residents petrol-
bombed the homes of two allegedly corrupt local councilors. In Mitchells Plain, a
large Coloured township in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town, residents blocked
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roads with barricades of burning tires complaining about the poor quality of RDP
houses and evictions for non-payment of rent. In the Mpumalanga town of Delmas,
the police fired on street protesters demanding the resignation of the municipal man-
ager over the poor handling of a typhoid outbreak (Alexander, 2010, 55).
Similar events continued in to 2005. Between March and May street protests
alleging nepotism, corruption, and poor service delivery took place in all of the fol-
lowing: the Emalenhle township of Secunda in Govan Mbeki Municipality, Mpumalanga;
Harding in Umuziwabantu Municipality, KwaZulu-Natal; Uitenhage in Nelson Man-
dela Municipality, Eastern Cape; the New Brighton, Motherwell and Veeplaas town-
ships of Port Elizabeth in Nelson Mandela Municipality, Eastern Cape. Protestors in
some cities began to get attention by barricading major thoroughfares with burning
tires, including the residents of King Williams town in Buffalo City Municipality,
Eastern Cape who blocked the N2; residents of Kwa Nomzamo near Humansdorp
in Kouga Local Municipality, Eastern Cape who blocked the R330; residents of
Khayalitsha and Gugulethu in Cape Town that invaded city land and blocked the
N2; and residents of Hopetown in Thembelihle Municipality, Northern Cape who
blocked the N12 (Alexander, 2010).9
A report to the South African parliament in 2005 estimated that 5,085 ‘legal’
protests, that is “protests for which official permission was sought and obtained,”
and 881 ‘illegal’ protests had occurred in the 12 months between March 2004 to the
end of February 2005 (Booysen, 2007, 23). Booysen (2007) estimates that between
9See Alexander (2010) for a more thorough discussion of the 2004-05 protests.
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1,500 and 2,000 protests occurred in the two-year period from March 2004 to March
2006. Citing data from Visible Policing Unit (VPU) of the South African Police
Service and compiled by Natasha Vally, Alexander puts the number of protests
between 2004 and 2008 at 34,610, 31,749 of which were peaceful and 2,861 of
which were “unrest related” (Alexander, 2010).
4.4.1 Tracking service delivery protests
Although these protests involve many different grievances, including hous-
ing projects, electricity, improved sanitation and water, transportation, education,
and police (Alexander, 2010), the South African media began to group them under
the general heading of service delivery protests. And different organizations began
to track the occurrence of protest throughout the country. Municipal IQ is a for-
profit consulting firm that sells access to its “Hotspots Monitor,”10 a database that
purportedly “collates major protests staged by community members (who can be
identified as living in a particular ward) against a municipality, as recorded by the
media (or other public domain sources such as SAPS releases).” It is not clear what
they consider to be a “major” event but the estimates of Municipal IQ are unrealisti-
cally low: 32 in 2007 and 27 in 2008. Using a broader definition of service delivery
protest, Karamoko and Jain (2011), report the number of community protests to be
96 in 2007, 118 in 2008, and a previously unseen peak of 213 in 2009. They further
report that the number of SDPs declined in the second half of 2010 with the arrival
of the FIFA World Cup and remained low in the first half of 2011. The Multi-level
10Available at http://www.municipaliq.co.za/index.php?site page=hotspots.php
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Figure 4.1: Crowd incidents by year (1997–2013)
Source: South Africa Police Service IRIS data as compiled and reported in Alexander et al. 2015
Government Initiative, a government agency that published Karamoko and Jain re-
port, tracks service delivery protests using a similar definition and methodology in
the Service Delivery Protest Barometer.11 They reported that there were 226 SDPs
in the first eight months of 2012 (de Visser and Powell, 2015).
A LexisNexis search of all English language South African national news
sources appearing in the database between the first democratic elections in April
1994 and the end of March 2015 yields 8,923 unique mainstream print articles
containing the search terms “service delivery” and “protest.”12 Those two terms
appeared together for the first time in a Financial Times article on 16 July 1999.
11Available at http://mlgi.org.za/barometers/service-delivery-protest-barometer
12The initial search returns 12,592 articles but 3,472 are duplicates and another 197 are from on-
line or trade sources (BBC Monitoring, Health-e, ITWeb Online, JSE News Service, and PlusNews).
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Figure 4.2: Articles including “service delivery” and “protest”
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of these stories by source. (Table A.10 shows the
distribution, frequency of publication, circulation, and readership of each source.)
To be sure, the number of articles mentioning service delivery protests is not the best
method to track protests. There is likely considerable reporting bias in the numbers
because media outlets have an incentive to report on the issues that are important
to their audience and may often mislabel events. Furthermore, the frequency of
media mentions of SDP might have in one area a causal effect on the occurrence of
events in other areas as communities learn from each other about how to get media
attention and, thereby, the attention of local authorities.
Figure 4.2 also shows that more articles about service delivery protest ap-
pear in the months around elections. This may indicate an increase in the number
of incidents or it may be the result of election attention to the issue. Assuming the
former, it remains unclear whether this is the result of protesters trying to influence
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elections or recently elected candidates or whether it indicates dissatisfaction with
the process.
4.4.2 Protests and rising food prices
The increases in international food commodity prices of 2007-08 did not go
unnoticed in South Africa. Figure 4.3 shows the trend in domestic food prices in
South Africa compared to the FAO food price index. It reveals that, excluding the
initial volatility in the last half of 1994, food prices have been steadily increasing
since the end of apartheid. The mean monthly change in the domestic food price
index between January 1995 and December 2013 was 0.57% with a standard devia-
tion of 0.71%. This steady increase would place greater pressure on the households
that spend the greatest proportion of household income on food. This increasing
pressure could be one reason why individuals report that lack of food contributes to
higher RD.
There have been periods that food prices rose at higher rates. Between Oc-
tober 2001 and January 2003 the mean increase was 1.37%. Between April 2007
and January 2009 the mean increase was 1.23% and during this period the rate of
increase was the highest in the six months between March 2008 and September
2008, the mean increase was 1.49%. These increases in food prices had a more
adverse effect on the poorest South Africans who spend a higher proportion of their
household income on food. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of household food
spending by income quintile in 2005-06 and 2010-11. (The relationship between
household food spending and population growth will be discussed in detail in the
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Figure 4.3: South African domestic food price index
next chapter.) These periods do not, however, correspond to periods of a high re-
ports of service delivery protests (see Figure 4.2). And Figure 4.1 shows that the
period between 2007 and 2009 was a period of relatively few crowd events.
In May of 2008, however, a rash of anti-immigrant violence spread across
South Africa. Residents of the predominantly Black townships in the major cities,
particularly Johannesburg and Cape Town, attacked immigrants from Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, DRC, and elsewhere leaving 62 dead, 670 wounded, and 100,000 dis-
placed (Claassen, 2014; Misago et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2008). Some attributed this
violence in part to rising food prices. One newspaper report from 18 May 2008
quoted the head of the National Consumer Forum as saying. “The poor are being
squeezed. It is becoming impossible for many to survive. . . . The recent attacks in
Alexandra in the name of xenophobia could actually be linked to poverty because
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Figure 4.4: Household food spending by income quintile (IES)
if people had enough for themselves and if they could afford it, they would not
begrudge anyone else from having more than them” (Naidu, 2008a,b).
It remains unclear whether the anti-immigrant violence was really driven
by rising consumer food prices. Media reports from the period generally cited
rising commodity prices rather than consumer prices. One reporter wrote, “The
cost of wheat has rocketed by 120 percent in the past year. The price of maize
has more than doubled since the beginning of 2006” (Robbins, 2008). Given that
the increases in consumer prices were much less extreme, as discussed above,
this connection is questionable. Nonetheless, some trade unions, most notably
COSATU, rallied their membership to protest against the rising food prices and
resulting corporate profits (Robbins, 2008; Pheko, 2008). These protests often in-
cluded grievances about rising electricity prices (BBC, 2008; Mackay, 2008), which
77
suggested that to the extent that rising food prices were a causal factor they were
only one of multiple drivers. The impact of food security on individual decisions to
participate in protest is discussed further in chapters 5 and 6.
4.5 Service delivery protests and social movement theories
While these service delivery protests that have plagued South Africa since
2004 represent a new phenomenon, the question remains whether SDPs constitute
a cohesive social movement. Tilly and Tarrow (2006, 202) define a social move-
ment as “a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that
advertise that claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities
that sustain these activities.” McCarthy and Zald (1977, 1217–1218) define a social
movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents prefer-
ences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution
of a society.”
Booysen (2007, 21) defines the phenomenon of service delivery protests as
“grass-roots protests against both the quality of service delivery and public repre-
sentation of the grass-roots’ service delivery needs.” Alexander (2010, 26) refers
to local political protests or local protests and defines them as “locally-organised
protests that place demands on people who hold or benefit from political power
(which includes, but is not limited to, local politicians). These have emanated from
poorer neighbourhoods (shack settlements and townships rather than suburbs).”
These protests were undoubtedly about more than bureaucratic failure. They also
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involve a strong perception on the part of participants of a lack of appropriate po-
litical representation. McLennan and Munslow (2009, 21) write “Service delivery
is commonly understood to mean the provision of goods or services, by a govern-
ment or other organisations, to those who need or demand them. However, in South
Africa, given apartheid, the provision of services by the government is linked to
the larger task of redistribution, social justice, poverty alleviation and economic
growth.”
Arguments exist for and against defining SDPs as a social movement. One
could define specific protest actions as individual events within larger episodes,
which might be defined by location, time period, or both. Alternatively, one might
define the movements as distinct but aligned, learning from the failures and leverag-
ing the successes of each other. The events appear similar and are often portrayed by
the media in the same way because the claimants employ a broad range but common
set of tactics or repertoires of contention (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006) including: “mass
meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, toyi-toying, processions, stay-aways,
election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres,
looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships,
confrontations with the police, and forced resignations of elected officials” (Alexan-
der, 2010, 26).
An examination of the political actors involved could also lead to differing
conclusions. On the one hand, SDPs all involve aggrieved residents making claims
against their own municipal and departmental representatives who they accuse of
ineffectiveness or misconduct. On the other hand, the particular actors on both sides
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(Tilly and Tarrow, 2006) differ by location, specific demand, and authority to act.
The grassroots nature of SDP often makes it difficult to identify distinct leadership
structures or networks. It is, therefore, often difficult to identify how particular
actions are organized or mobilized.
It remains unclear whether one should consider service delivery protests to
be a series of episodes of contentious politics bounded by geography and defined
claims but within a larger SDP movement or whether they should be analyzed as
separate movements. Such a determination is largely dependent on the level of
analysis. In the remaining chapters of this dissertation I examine the micro-level
factors that determine individual participation in protest, regardless of whether that
protest is part of a larger movement. If, however, one assumes that SDPs represent a
cohesive movement, one might analyze the emergence and success of the movement
through the following theoretical lenses: (1) the political opportunity structures
within which the movements develop; or (2) the networks, structures and other
resources used to mobilize participants.
4.5.1 Political opportunity theory
Political opportunity structure reflects the relative openness or responsive-
ness of a given polity to social movements (Eisinger, 1973). An analysis within this
framework examines changes in the political opportunity structure to explain the
emergence or success of social movements within the polity.
The history of the anti-apartheid movement resonates in South African soci-
ety today. The long struggle against the apartheid system was ultimately successful
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in bringing down the regime without an outright civil war that plagued many of
South Africa’s neighbors. It gave rise to myriad organizations around different in-
terests and united them in a common cause. It produced numerous leaders and
heroes that are honored today through the naming of municipalities, airports, parks,
and highways. All of this has resulted in a strong South African tradition of political
protest and resistance to perceived injustice. Many of the songs from the freedom
movement are popular today and are often sung during rallies, demonstrations, and
marches.
The present context for social movements and political protest is very dif-
ferent than before 1994. Under the apartheid system, Black and Coloured South
Africans had virtually no voice in the formal political system. Demonstrations and
protest were the only method of political participation available to the vast major-
ity of South Africans. Today, however, liberal democracy is fairly well entrenched
in South Africa. Voter turnout for the most recent election in 2014, while lower
than previous elections, remained high by international standards at 73.48% (Elec-
toral Commission of South Africa, 2014; Nunley, 2012). (See Table 4.1). Although
the African National Congress remains the dominant political force in the country,
48 parties participated in the most recent election and 13 parties won seats in the
National Assembly. Furthermore, South Africa’s liberal democracy is deeper than
free and fair elections. South Africa has a strong civil society and free press. South
Africa ranks 39th on the 2015 World Press Freedom Index, one place behind France
and 10 places ahead of the United States. As of May 2015, no fewer than 181 trade
unions were registered with the Department of Labour (Labour Guide, 2015).
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Table 4.1: South African election turnout
Election Registered voters Total votes cast Voter turnout
2014 National 25,388,082 18,654,771 73.48%
2011 Municipal 23,654,347 13,719,569 57.64%
2009 National 23,181,997 17,919,966 77.30%
2006 Municipal 21,054,954 * 48.40%
2004 National 20,674,923 15,863,558 76.73%
2000 Municipal 18,477,932 8,882,734 48.07%
1999 National 18,172,751 16,228,462 89.30%
1994 National 22,709,152 19,726,610 86.87%
* – Registered voters x ballot types = 55,654,643; votes cast for all ballots = 26,938,560.
Source: South Africa Electoral Commission
This new environment is largely permissive of protest despite response from
the police service that has on occasion resulted in violence. The state has not em-
barked on a widespread campaign of repression and any such campaign would in all
likelihood be met with widespread resistance and condemnation, not just from the
protesters but from other segments of the population who treasure their hard won
ideals of freedom as well as from the international community who revere South
Africa, the so-called “rainbow nation,” as an example of victory over oppression.
From a political opportunity perspective one might conclude that social
movements could thrive in the new more permissive environment. But there were
relatively fewer protests in the decade between 1994 and 2004 than in the decade
after 2004. As reflected in the dual tactics of the SECC and the CCF, that is par-
ticipating in elections and protesting against authorities, there remains a tension
between embracing the new democracy and a skepticism of government.
At a micro-level, the question remains of whether participants in protest
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consider protest to be an alternative or a complement to elections and other formal
institutions. Are protesters the more impoverished residents of informal settlements
who feel disenfranchised from the new democracy? Or are they citizens who believe
in the new democracy and consider protest to be a legitimate means of political
communication and debate (Dunning, 2011; Booysen, 2007)?
4.5.2 Resource mobilization theory
Next, resource mobilization theory seeks to explain the emergence and suc-
cess of social movements such as SECC, CCF and AEC by examining the tangible
and intangible resources available to the movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977;
Tilly and Tarrow, 2006). These resources include the networks in which the actors
operate and communicate with supporters and the established repertoires of claim
making and their perceived legitimacy. In this context, the various grassroots ac-
tors benefit from the strong civil society present today in South Africa. Myriad and
overlapping labor unions, political party structures, and community organizations
facilitate repeated communication with potential supporters.
The success of the anti-apartheid movement contributed to the perceived le-
gitimacy of political protest. Furthermore, the symbolism of apartheid and racism
continue to have considerable mobilizing power today and are often used by grass-
roots movements. In the post-apartheid era, the relative success of the SECC, the
CCF, and the AEC in early 2000s demonstrated the power of community action in
the post-apartheid era. Many of the smaller grassroots protests borrow heavily from
the repertoires and symbols of both of these movements. For example, barricading
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highways with burning tires or throwing human feces onto passing cars are often
effective ways to disrupt the daily lives of other citizens and get the attention of the
news media.
4.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, after the long struggle against apartheid, South Africa expe-
rienced a brief period of calm during the presidency of Nelson Mandela. Within
a decade, however, a new wave of unrest was sweeping the country. Initially, this
was more organized, focused, and confined to the large urban areas, but in 2004 an
increasing number of smaller scale events began to appear throughout the country.
These became a new wave of unrest that continues to plague municipal govern-
ments.
Political opportunity theory and resource mobilization theory provide some
insight into the structural factors that contributed to the spread of the SDPs in South
Africa. In the early 2000s, conditions in South Africa were primed for the outbreak
of protests. The legacy of the anti-apartheid movement contributed to a perception
of street protest as a legitimate method to raise political issues. The transition to
democracy provided a dynamic of change that raised economic and political ex-
pectations, which were likely unrealistic but not unexpected. The transition of the
political system also meant sudden and drastic change in governmental structures
and new and often inexperienced leadership as well as new opportunities for elite
capture of governmental largess.
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Ultimately, however, these theoretical perspectives cannot explain micro-
level participation in SDPs. Political opportunity theory describes the macro con-
ditions necessary for the emergence of social movements, but it provides very little
insight into the differences between individuals that choose to participate in protest
and those that do not. Resource mobilization theory explains why some movements
succeed and others fail by assessing the movement’s resources, but, again, it does
not explain why some people protest and others do not. In the next chapter I turn
to relative deprivation theory to explain micro-level motivations. Ultimately, both a
micro-level understanding and an appreciation of the context are needed for a broad
understanding of service delivery protests.
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Chapter 5
Relative deprivation, inequality, and food security as
drivers of service delivery protests
5.1 Introduction
By most objective measures, living conditions and access to government ser-
vices have dramatically improved in South Africa over the past two decades (Mat-
tes, 2014). According to government estimates, access to piped water increased
from 60% of the total population in 1995 to 95% in 2012 while access to basic san-
itation increased from 50% to 83% over the same time period. Access to electricity
increased from 50% in 1994/95 to 86% in 2013/14 (Presidency, Republic of South
Africa, 2014, 71-72). Since 1994 the government has built and delivered approx-
imately 3.7 million subsidized houses, providing a home to 12.5 million people.
The proportion of the population living in formal housing has increased from 64%
in 1996 to 77.7% in 2011 (Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 2014, 68-69).
Relative deprivation theory, however, predicts that people’s sense of sat-
isfaction or grievance is based primarily on subjective comparisons rather than
objective conditions. To review, relative deprivation can be the result of compar-
isons between one’s individual conditions and those of others, individual RD, or
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between the conditions of one’s identity group and other groups, group RD (Runci-
man, 1961). Similar to social identity theory group RD may depend on the strength
of group identification and the perceived mobility within groups (?).
In this chapter, I will first examine earlier studies of relative deprivation
in South Africa between 1994 and 2000. I will then examine changing trends in
income inequality between groups within South Africa between 1995 and 2011.
Based on past studies of RD and changing income inequality I will propose hy-
potheses about factors that contribute to the development of RD which I will test
using data from the Afrobarometer surveys. Finally, I will present and test hypothe-
ses about the contribution of RD to micro-level participation in protest actions.
In the end I find that individuals that experience high levels of individual RD
experience lower group RD and vice versa. Personal living conditions, particularly
food security and lack of income, are the strongest predictors of individual RD.
Group RD is higher among individuals who are better informed about political and
economic conditions in the country. I also conclude that people with higher levels
of either individual or group RD are more likely to participate in protest but that
group RD is a stronger predictor than individual RD. The strength of this finding is,
however, because the Afrobarometer surveys were not intended to measure protest
participation.
5.2 Relative deprivation in South Africa, 1994–2000
Although most South Africans experienced very little, if any, change in their
living conditions in the five years after the ANC took control of the government and
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many of the old inequities continued to persist into the next decade, the changed
political context could still have strong effects on grievances. The question becomes
how these changes in the political system and in available economic opportunities
affects discontent amongst non-white South Africans even in the absence of change
in de facto economic circumstances. RD theory could suggest different outcomes.
Klandermans (2015, 125) writes, “On the one hand, changes in the socio-
political context could trigger the formation of new grievances. On the other, old
grievances could disappear because people feel that their situation is improving or
they hope for a better future.” Social identity theory would predict that grievance
would diminish because beliefs about social mobility changed. People believed that
they were no longer bound by the old system of discrimination. In Gurr’s frame-
work, the perception that people have a voice in their own destiny may, in itself,
reduce grievances (Gurr, 1971). As a time of dramatic social change, the years
following the first democratic elections was a period during which South Africans
reevaluated the position of their respective group’s position in the social landscape
of the new country (de la Sablonnie`re et al., 2013, 2015).
Klandermans (2015) attempted to answer the question about how the chang-
ing political landscape had affected grievance formation in South Africa between
1994 and 2000. He conducted a series of annual surveys in South Africa between
1994 and 2000. He concluded that living conditions seemed to determine whether
respondents were satisfied at the individual level while ethnicity seemed to retain its
importance for in-group comparisons. “Feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction
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appear to depend much more on processes of social comparison than on objec-
tive circumstances, both quantitatively in terms of the intensity of grievances and
qualitatively in terms of the framing of grievances. Indeed, group grievances were
almost completely determined by comparisons and not by the objective situation of
the person who was making the comparison” (Klandermans, 2015, 141).
Interestingly, Black South Africans seemed to believe that their personal sit-
uation was relatively worse than others but that their group was doing fine, while
White South Africans seemed to believe that personally they were doing better than
others but that their group situation was worsening. Furthermore, race and ethnic-
ity seemed to be lessening in importance for group identification while class was
becoming more important, although in South Africa class and race are strongly cor-
related. When evaluating the relative position of ones group, however, ethnicity
remained the most important single dimension (Klandermans, 2015).
This research suggests that RD was on the decline during the first decade
after the introduction of democracy, but the question remains about whether this
decrease continued into the second post-apartheid decade. de la Sablonnie`re et al.
(2015) argue that during situations “an interaction between group status and RD
trajectory will predict well-being and adjustment to change.” The authors define a
“high decreasing” trajectory as one in which current RD is high but the expecta-
tion is that group conditions will improve rapidly in the future. They argued that
Black South Africans were a low-status group and that members of such groups
who perceived a high-decreasing trajectory experienced higher well-being and bet-
ter adjustment to change than those that perceived little change in their conditions.
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They found evidence supporting this in a 2006 survey. “This may be because it cre-
ates the impression that positive change is possible in the future” (de la Sablonnie`re
et al., 2015, 116). They also found that members of the high-status group, White
South Africans, who perceived the same change reacted negatively and suggested
that they considered the change to be a threat to their position.
In another study, de la Sablonnie`re et al. (2013) argue that different social
groups understand historical changes differently based on the perceived impact of
those changes on their own social group. The authors rely on social identity the-
ory which suggests that strong in-group identification is needed to perceive group
disparities (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). They present evidence from another 2006
survey that some Black South Africans perceived a decreasing group-based depri-
vation trajectory, i.e. that economic conditions had greatly improved between the
apartheid and post-apartheid periods. The majority of Black respondents, however,
perceived a relatively stable group trajectory. de la Sablonnie`re et al. (2013, 713)
argued that “the majority of Africans indicated that economic conditions in South
Africa remained relatively the same from the apartheid period until the present, and
that it will not really improve in the future.”
5.3 Income inequality in South Africa
The World Bank estimates that inequality in South Africa decreased slightly
between the end of apartheid and the turn of the century. As shown in Table 5.1,
the World Bank estimated the Gini coefficient to be 59.33 in 1993, 56.59 in 1995,
and 57.77 in 2000 using household survey data. Between 2000 and 2006, however,
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Table 5.1: Estimates of income inequality in South Africa
Year Gini coeff.
1993 59.33
1995 56.59
2000 57.77
2006 67.40
2009 63.14
2011 65.02
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
inequality actually increased to an estimated Gini coefficient of 67.40, higher than at
the end of apartheid (WDI, 2015). Also using household surveys, the Luxembourg
Income Study estimated the Gini coefficient for South Africa to be 59.4 in both
2008 and 2010 (LIS, 2015).
5.3.1 The deracialization of income inequality
Inequality in South Africa today is becoming deracialized (Seekings and
Nattrass, 2008; Durrheim et al., 2011). This is most clearly evident in the expand-
ing Black middle class. The lower socio-economic class has grown and continues
to be predominantly Black, although a significant portion is Coloured, especially
in the Western Cape.1 Seekings and Nattrass (2008) demonstrate overall inequality
in South Africa changed very little between 1995 and 2000. Interracial inequality,
however, changed significantly. The White population group’s share of total income
declined from 49 percent to either 46 percent or 40 depending on survey weights
1Recognized population groups in South Africa are Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asian,
White, and Other.
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used in the calculations (Seekings and Nattrass, 2008, 304). This decline in interra-
cial inequality was the result of rising intraracial inequality, most notably the rising
Black elite. The proportion of Blacks in the top income decile rose from 18% in
1995 to either 25% or 31%, again depending on survey weights used (Seekings and
Nattrass, 2008, 306).
5.3.2 Decomposing income inequality, 1995–2011
With these findings in mind, I investigated trends in income inequality over
the past two decades using the the Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) con-
ducted by Statistics South Africa (previously the Central Statistical Service) every
five years. The surveys consist of in-person interviews with a nationally representa-
tive sample of South African households (South Africa Central Statistical Service,
1995; Statistics South Africa, 2000, 2006, 2011b).2
I computed the Theil index of inequality for each of the four waves of survey
data since the end of apartheid and examined the contributions to overall inequal-
ity and within-group inequality of each of the four major population groups. The
Theil index is an endlessly decomposable measure; that is the between-group and
within-group inequality as well as group contributions to overall inequality can be
examined by any defined groups and sub-groups (Bourguignon, 1979; Conceic¸a˜o
and Ferreira, 2000; Conceic¸a˜o and Galbraith, 1998). Unlike the Gini coefficient,
the Theil index is not bounded by absolute limits and is largely uninterpretable as
2The total number of households surveyed for each wave is as follows: 1995 29,595 households;
2000 26, 263 households; 2005/06 21,144 households; 2010-11 25,328 households.
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Figure 5.1: Overall Theil index of income inequality
a single data point. It is, however, very useful for comparing trends across time
or inequality between groups. I use the Theil here to compare income inequality
between and within population groups. I use two measures of income to calculate
inequality: (1) the salary/wage income of the head of household; and (2) the total
household income. Household income is derived from multiple sources and often
leads to different conclusions than wage data alone. This may be especially true
when unemployment is high and differs across comparison groups, which leads to
different levels of household reliance on alternative sources of income including
social grants. Such is the case in South Africa.
The changes in overall inequality over time are shown in Figure 5.1. The
overall Theil index of inequality calculated using the individual salary/wage data
was 1.110 in 1995. The Theil index increased to 1.294 in 2000 and increased further
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Figure 5.2: Between-group income inequality
in 2005-06 to 1.446. Then in 2010-11 the Theil index decreased to 1.268 but this
is still higher than it was in 1995, one year after the first democratic elections. An
examination of the Theil index using the household income data shows the same
trend. In 1995, the Theil index using household income data was 0.719. This
increased to 0.792 in 1995 and 0.877 in 2005-06 before decreasing to 0.774 in
2010-11.
Changes in between group inequality is shown in Figure 5.2. Between group
inequality in both salary/wages and household income was lower in 2010-11 than
in 1995. Between group inequality in salary/wages did, however, increase between
1995 and 2000 before decreasing in 2005-06 and then again in 2010-11. Between
group inequality in household income also increased between 1995 and 2000 and
again in 2005-06 before dropping precipitously in 2010-11. In sum, between group
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Figure 5.3: Group contributions to income inequality
inequality in 2010-11 was at or below the 1995 level, but it increased in in the
interim.
The Theil coefficient broken down by the contribution of each population
group to overall inequality is shown in Figure 5.3. The contribution of the White
population group to wage inequality increased between 1995 and 2000 but de-
creased in 2005-06 and again in 2010-11. The contribution of the Black African
population group to overall wage inequality has, for the most part, remained con-
stant between 1995 and 2010-11, although it did increase in 2000 before decreasing
in 2005-06 and again in 2010-11. The contribution of both the White and Black
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Figure 5.4: Within-group income inequality
African population groups to inequality in household income increased between
1995 and 2000 and again between 2000 and 2005-06 before decreasing in 2010-11.
More interesting is an examination of the within group inequality of the
White and Black African population groups, shown in Figure 5.4. Wage inequal-
ity within the Black African population group increased every five years between
1995 and 2010-11. In contrast, wage inequality within the White population group
decreased over the entire period, although it did increase in 2005-06. Within group
inequality of household income exhibited similar trends, increasing over the entire
period for Black Africans and decreasing over the entire period for Whites.
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These findings are consistent with those of Seekings and Durrheim. Al-
though overall income inequality continued to increase in the years following the
end of apartheid, it decreased between 2005 and 2011. While considerable in-
equality continues to exist between population groups it was less pronounced in
2011 than in 1995. The decrease in inequality is driven by decreased inequality
within the White population group and between Whites and Blacks. Inequality has
increased within the Black African population group. This is consistent with the
growth of a Black middle class and the rise of a Black elite while Blacks continue
to constitute the overwhelming majority of the more destitute South Africans.
Taken together the sociological studies present a picture of RD in post-
apartheid South Africa that is consistent with the economic evidence on inequality.
South Africa continues to be one of the most economically unequal societies in the
world. This is undoubtedly a legacy of the apartheid system, which relegated Black
South Africans to lower quality education and less desirable and lower paying jobs
predominantly in manual labor, e.g. mining, and service sectors, while securing the
privileged position of Whites who controlled the vast majority of wealth in the coun-
try. Most Blacks expected that the new democracy would bring new educational
and economic opportunities that would in turn lead to a more equitable distribution
of wealth. Surveys conducted in the last half of the 1990s seem to suggest that
feelings of relative deprivation declined in the years following the introduction of
democracy. This is likely driven more by the political changes and newfound free-
doms rather than any improving economic conditions. Again, relative deprivation is
driven not by objective conditions but by a combination of subjective comparisons,
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expectations of the future, and perceptions of personal ability to change one’s con-
ditions. While objective economic conditions did not change after apartheid, for the
first time Black South Africans were free to participate in the political process and
to have their voices heard.
The expected changes in economic conditions did not come for the majority
of Black South Africans. Overall economic inequality increased between 1995 and
2000 and between 2000 and 2005-06 according to both the World Bank estimated
Gini coefficients and according to my calculations of the Thiel index using the
Income and Expenditure Surveys. The nature of this inequality, however, changed.
It became increasingly deracialized. Between group inequality began to decrease
in the early 2000s while within group inequality began to increase as a new Black
elite and middle class began to emerge. This should lead to a decrease in group
based RD. The vast majority of Black South Africans, however, remained poor,
which might lead to an increase in individual RD as most Blacks did not experience
improvements in their own living conditions.
5.4 Relative deprivation and protest participation in South Africa,
2002 to 2011: Afrobarometer surveys
The Afrobarometer project, “an independent, non-partisan research project
that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa,” has con-
ducted six rounds of nationally representative surveys in South Africa since 2000:
round 1 in 2000; round 2 in 2002; round 2.5 in 2004; round 3 in 2006; round 4 in
2008; and round 5 in 2011 (Afrobarometer, 2015, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011,
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2004). These surveys provide time-series data to examine changes in perceptions
of living conditions. Unfortunately, the questionnaire phrasing and coding of the
round 1 survey in 2000 and the round 5 survey in 2011 makes longitudinal compar-
isons difficult. The following analysis, therefore, focuses on the six years between
2002 and 2008. (See Appendix B for a table of common questions and responses
that were merged across survey rounds.)
The Afrobaromter surveys ask a series of questions about the respondents’
subjective perceptions of their personal living conditions as well as the economic
conditions of their identity group. More objective measures about how often re-
spondents’ go without basic necessities are asked in a battery of questions called
the Lived Poverty Index. Together this data helps determine whether different ob-
jective conditions or other factors account for different perceptions of individual
and group RD. First, I provide an overview of changes in aggregate perceptions
over time.
I start with perceived living conditions compared to others. Afrobarometer
respondents were asked the question: “In general, how do you rate: Your living con-
ditions compared to those of other South Africans?” Responses were on a five-point
Likert scale: 1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 = Better, 5 = Much better.
Figure 5.5 presents the mean response by population group and year. (Means and
standard errors are presented in Tables A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A.) The graph
illustrates that the mean response for Whites was increasing across the time period,
with the exception of 2008. The mean response for Blacks, however, exhibited a
99
2 (Worse)
3 (Same)
4 (Better)
M
ea
n
Black White Coloured Asian
pgyr
2002 2004 2006 2008 2011
1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 = Better, 5 = Much better
Source: Afrobarometer South Africa
Figure 5.5: Personal living conditions compared to others
downward trend across the entire period, although there was a small but not statis-
tically significant increase from 2004 to 2006 and a more substantial increase from
2008 to 2011.
The Afrobarometer survey data suggests that despite objective improve-
ments in housing, water infrastructure, and electricity, Blacks perceived that their
own personal living conditions were increasingly worse between 2002 and 2008.
This suggests that the subjective comparisons may have shifted away from racial
divisions and toward within group comparisons. These changes in comparisons
also came at a time when political authorities were no longer predominantly of a
separate population group. These increased perceptions of relative deprivation were
likely felt by many of the participants in the service delivery protests. This does not,
however, explain why people chose to engage in the particular tactics of service de-
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Figure 5.6: Present living conditions compared to the past
livery protests. In order to gain more insight into that question, the next section
draws on a separate approach to the issue.
Recall from the IES survey analysis that within group inequality increased
between 2000 and 2011. This downward trend in perceived personal living con-
ditions compared to others is consistent with the theory that many Black South
Africans, who may have expected an improvement in their situation after the intro-
duction of democracy, became increasingly aggrieved as some within their group
benefited economically while the majority did not. The increase in the mean in
2010-11 may indicate a change in this trend but this remains to be seen.
Research suggests that temporal comparisons are at least as important as
social comparisons (de la Sablonnie`re et al., 2013, 2015). I, therefore, also examine
responses to two additional questions: (1) perceptions of present living conditions
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compared to 12 months ago; and (2) expected living conditions in 12 months com-
pared to the present. Responses to the question: “Looking back, how do you rate
the following compared to twelve months ago: Your living conditions?” Responses
were on the same Likert scale as above. Figure 5.6 shows the mean response by
population group and year. The data suggest that they perceived very little change
in their personal living conditions compared to the recent past and this did not sig-
nificantly change across the period with the exception of a decrease in the mean
response in 2008. The mean response of Whites, on the other hand, increased be-
tween 2002 and 2006 then decreased in 2008 and rebounded in 2011. The dip in
2008 is consistent across all population groups and is most likely attributable to the
global financial crisis and recession of 2007-08.
Next, Afrobarometer asked the question: “Looking ahead, do you expect
the following to be better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve months time?”
Responses were again on the same Likert scale as above and the mean response by
population group and year is presented in Figure 8. In 2002, the mean response for
Blacks was 3.458, significantly higher than all other population groups. The mean
response for Whites, Coloureds, and Asians increased in 2004 while it remained
statistically constant for Blacks, 3.446, and the mean response increased for all
groups in 2006 and decreased sharply in 2008.
In order to gauge perceptions of group relative deprivation I examined re-
sponses to the question: “Think about the condition of [respon-
dent’s identity group] Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better
than other groups in this country?” Responses were again on the same five-point
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Figure 5.8: Group economic conditions compared to other groups
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Likert scale. The mean response by population group and year are presented in
Figure 5.8. The mean response for Blacks was 3.276 in 2002, which was statisti-
cally lower than the other three population groups, although the difference was not
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This mean dropped sharply in
2004 to 2.859, significantly lower than all other groups and remained low in 2006.
The perceptions of group economic conditions rose for all groups in 2008. This is
somewhat confusing in light of the drop in perceived personal living conditions for
all groups. Nonetheless, the increase in the mean response for Blacks was lower
than that for Whites and the mean remained lower than it was in 2002 unlike that
for Whites.3
5.4.1 Hypotheses
Based on the findings of the sociological studies, the examination of the
changing trends in economic inequality, and the initial analysis of group means
and aggregate attitudes from the Afrobarometer surveys, I develop three testable
3I should note, however, here that a comparison of responses to this question across time is
complicated somewhat by the fact that this question was preceded in the questionnaires by different
questions about the respondent’s identity group. In the Round 2 survey in 2002 the question was
immediately preceded with the question: “We have spoken to many South Africans and they have all
described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language,
ethnic group, race, religion, or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms such as
working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being South African, which specific group do you
feel you belong to first and foremost?” Response choices included race, region, religion, occupation,
class, and gender, as well as others. In 2004 and 2006, however, the question was immediately
preceded with the question: “What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.” In 2008,
the question was preceded by the same question as in 2004 and 2006 but it was phrased slightly
differently, reading: “Think about the condition of [R’s Ethnic Group]. Are their
economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?” In the brackets
identity group was replaced with “Ethnic Group.”
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hypotheses. Individuals compare their personal living conditions to the observable
conditions of others within their community. I hypothesize that objective conditions
play a bigger role in individual RD.
H1: Higher levels of objective poverty as measured by the Lived Poverty
Index lead to higher levels of individual RD.
Next, I expect that individuals who have more interaction with others in
their own group have more sympathy with others. I also expect that people who
are more informed about and interested in public issues are more sensitive to group
issues.
H2a: Individuals who have more interaction with other community
members have higher levels of group RD.
H2b: Individuals who are more informed about politics and community
issues have higher levels of group RD.
H2c: Individuals who are more interested in public affairs have higher
levels of group RD.
Finally, I turn my attention to the effect of RD on participation in protest
activity. Based on relative deprivation theory I hypothesize:
H3: Individuals with higher levels of either individual or group RD are
more likely to participate in protest actions.
The interaction between individual and group RD is unclear. On the one
hand, individuals with higher levels of both individual and group RD might be the
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most inclined to protest. On the other, individual and group RD might be mutually
exclusive. That is, because individual RD is driven by intra-group comparisons and
group RD is driven by inter-group comparisons, it would be unexpected for a given
individual to have high levels of both.
5.4.2 The first-stage analysis: Relative deprivation
In the first stage of the analysis I examine two dependent variables: indi-
vidual RD and group RD. Individual RD is defined as the overall perceptions of
personal living conditions and operationalized as the mean of the responses to the
three questions about perceived personal living conditions: (1) compared to oth-
ers, (2) compared to the past, and (3) expectations of the future (Cronbach’s α of
the interitem correlation for these items is 0.6538). As such, I make no distinc-
tion here between social RD and temporal RD at the individual level. This mean is
then reversed for ease of interpretation and results in a variable on a scale of 1 to 5
with higher values indicating higher levels of grievance (The mean is 3.24 and the
standard deviation is 0.80).
Group RD is defined as individual perceptions about the position of one’s
own identity within society. I operationalize this as the inverse of the survey re-
sponses to question regarding group economic conditions. Again, no distinction is
made between the social and temporal aspects of group RD because no questions
were asked in the Afrobarometer surveys regarding opinions about the present posi-
tion of one’s group compared to the past or expected group conditions in the future.
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In order to test H1, I include as independent variables responses to measures
of the Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index (LPI) that were asked consistently across
the survey years (Mattes, 2008). These questions ask, “Over the past year, how
often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: ?” for each of
the following categories: (1) enough food to eat; (2) enough clean water for home
use; (3) medicines or medical treatment: (4) enough fuel to cook your food; and (5)
a cash income. Responses are collected on a 5 point scale: 0 = Never, 1 = Just once
or twice, 2 = Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = Always (Afrobarometer, 2002).
The means and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 5.2.
In order to test hypothesis H2a, I first include a variable for whether respon-
dents are members of a community group. In order to test hypothesis H2b, I include
a variable for how often the respondents get news from a newspaper. The question
is “How often do you get news from the following sources: Newspapers?” and
available responses are: 0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 = A few times a
month, 3 = A few times a week, 4 = Every day. Finally, I test hypothesis H2c, using
responses to the question, “How interested are you in public affairs?” Available
responses are: 0 = Not interested, 1 = Somewhat interested, 2 = Very interested.
Finally, I include responses to the question, “How much of the time do you
think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councilors, try their best: To
listen to what people like you have to say?” Available responses are: 0 = Never, 1 =
Some of the time, 2 = Most of the time, 3 = Always. Non-responses or “Dont know”
responses are coded as missing and the observation is omitted from the analysis.
Summary statistics are given in Table 5.2 (Afrobarometer, 2002).
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of Afrobarometer sample
Mean SD Min Max
Participated in protest more than once or twice 0.115 0.318 0 1
Indvidual RD 2.742 0.809 1 5
Group RD 2.948 1.014 1 5
Gone without food 0.729 1.079 0 4
Gone without water 0.697 1.217 0 4
Gone without medical care 0.771 1.165 0 4
Gone without cooking fuel 0.670 1.080 0 4
Gone without cash income 1.118 1.314 0 4
Gone without electricity 0.897 1.292 0 4
Member of community group 0.358 0.479 0 1
Newspaper news 2.281 1.546 0 4
Interest in public affairs 1.914 0.794 1 3
Local govt councilors listen 0.897 0.889 0 3
Black African 0.714 0.452 0 1
Coloured 0.110 0.313 0 1
Primary shcool completed 0.833 0.373 0 1
Secondary school completed 0.425 0.494 0 1
Female 0.491 0.500 0 1
Age 38.390 15.092 18 91
Urban 0.645 0.478 0 1
2002 0.265 0.441 0 1
2004 0.254 0.435 0 1
2006 0.251 0.434 0 1
2008 0.229 0.421 0 1
Eastern Cape 0.143 0.350 0 1
Free State 0.076 0.265 0 1
Gauteng 0.189 0.392 0 1
KwaZulu-Natal 0.172 0.378 0 1
Limpopo 0.101 0.302 0 1
Mpumalanga 0.082 0.274 0 1
North West 0.102 0.302 0 1
Northern Cape 0.040 0.197 0 1
Western Cape 0.094 0.291 0 1
Observations 6,436
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I include control variables for whether the respondents are Black African
or Coloured. I also controlled for whether the respondent has completed primary
school and secondary school. (These categories are not mutually exclusive. All
respondents that have completed secondary school have also completed primary
school and are coded accordingly.) I also controlled for the gender of the respondent
with an indicator variable for female and the age of the respondent with linear and
quadratic terms. I included indicator variables for the survey year and the province
of the respondent. Finally, I included interaction terms between Black and each of
the survey years to capture different levels of change across years and population
groups.
The analysis was conducted using ordinary least squares. OLS is used be-
cause the dependent variable is continuous. This specification does assume a linear
relationship between the independent and dependent variables, which may not be
a valid assumption. For this reason quadratic and logarithmic transformations of
the independent variables were tested, but, in the end, these transformations did not
provide a significantly improved model fit. For this reason, only the results of the
OLS models on the untransformed variables are presented.
The results are presented in Table 5.3. The dependent variable in model (1)
is individual RD and the R-squared value indicates that the model explains 17.2% of
the variation individual RD. Model (2) explains 11.1% of the variation in group RD.
Because the dependent variables are on a somewhat artificial scale, the coefficients
are largely uninterpretable except in relationship to each other. In other words,
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it’s difficult to gauge the objective meaning of a one unit change in questionnaire
responses. In general, however, larger coefficients indicate a stronger effect.
The strongest predictors of individual RD are in order lack of sufficient food
(β = 0.084), lack of medical care (β = 0.056), lack of a cash income (β = 0.048), and
lack of electricity (β = 0.030). All of these coefficients are statistically significant
at the α = 0.01 level. All of these provide support for hypothesis H1.
Membership in a community group (β = 0.144) and interest in public af-
fairs (β = 0.102) are both strong and statistically significant (α = 0.01) predictors
of group RD. These coefficients support hypotheses H2a and H2c respectively. Re-
spondents who regularly read newspapers are more likely to have lower levels of
individual RD (β = -0.047) but higher levels of group RD (β = 0.026). Similarly, re-
spondents who have completed a secondary education are more likely to have lower
levels of individual RD (β = -0.094) but higher levels of group RD (β = 0.097).
There is undoubtedly some correlation between these two variables but newspa-
per readership increases group RD even controlling for education. This supports
hypothesis H2b and suggests that there are differences between individuals that ex-
perience higher levels of individual RD and those that experience higher levels of
group RD.
Among Blacks individual RD is lower than other population groups. This
may be the result of comparisons to other similarly or more impoverished individ-
uals within the same group. Holding other factors constant, however, Blacks have
higher levels of group RD than non-Blacks. More interesting is the change in RD
levels over time. The coefficients of the year dummy variables in model (1) show
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Table 5.3: Individual and group relative deprivation: OLS regression results
(1) (2)
Gone without food 0.084** (0.014) -0.008 (0.019)
Gone without water -0.017 (0.013) -0.029+ (0.017)
Gone without medical care 0.056** (0.013) -0.015 (0.018)
Gone without cooking fuel -0.006 (0.015) -0.028 (0.020)
Gone without cash income 0.048** (0.011) -0.029* (0.015)
Gone without electricity 0.030** (0.011) 0.004 (0.015)
Member of community group -0.044 (0.027) 0.144** (0.036)
Newspaper news -0.047** (0.008) 0.026* (0.011)
Interest in public affairs -0.108** (0.014) 0.102** (0.019)
Local govt councilors listen -0.112** (0.012) 0.131** (0.016)
Black African -0.557** (0.050) 0.174** (0.064)
Coloured -0.350** (0.044) 0.079 (0.061)
Primary shcool completed -0.054 (0.034) -0.056 (0.044)
Secondary school completed -0.094** (0.025) 0.097** (0.033)
Female -0.019 (0.021) 0.028 (0.028)
Age 0.017** (0.004) -0.004 (0.005)
Age (squared) -0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Urban -0.039 (0.026) -0.024 (0.035)
2004 -0.304** (0.053) 0.300** (0.072)
2006 -0.334** (0.055) 0.410** (0.075)
2008 0.243** (0.061) -0.092 (0.075)
Observations 6,436 6,436
R2 0.172 0.111
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.106
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; province dummy variables included but not
displayed.
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that in the aggregate individual RD was lower in 2004 and 2006. The coefficient
of the interaction term between Black and 2004 (β = 0.311) has a higher absolute
value than the coefficient for the 2004 indicator variable (β = 0.304). The interpreta-
tion is that the decrease in individual RD is largely driven by non-Black population
groups and that among Blacks, individual RD decreased much less between 2002
and 2004. Individual RD did not decrease significantly for non-Blacks or Blacks
between 2004 and 2006. Individual RD increased for non-Blacks and Blacks alike
between 2006 and 2008 but increased less for Blacks.
In model (2) group RD was higher in 2004 and 2006 than in 2002 overall
and even higher for Blacks than for non-Blacks. Group RD remained statistically
constant in 2006 for non-Blacks and Blacks and decreased in 2008 overall, but
decreased less for Blacks. The trends in individual and group RD are illustrated in
Figure 5.9.
Respondents who believe that local government councilors listen to their
concerns have lower levels of individual RD but higher levels of group RD. One
explanation for these potentially confusing results is that the more impoverished re-
spondents feel that they have less of a voice in local government while those that are
better educated and less impoverished feel that they have more of a voice. In other
words, there is likely an endogenous relationship between relative deprivation and
feelings of voicelessness. This will be discussed more in the context of predicted
protest participation.
Taken together, the results of these two models suggest that, controlling
for population group and age, more impoverished and less educated individuals
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Figure 5.9: Predicted individual and group RD by year
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have higher levels of individual RD but are less politically engaged than their less
impoverished, better educated, and more informed counterparts. The latter group,
however, have higher levels of group RD despite feeling that they have more voice
in local government.
5.4.3 Food as a driver of relative deprivation
Responses to another set of survey questions included in the 2002 survey
help explain the finding that lack of sufficient food is the strongest driver of indi-
vidual RD. Respondents were asked to identify the top three answers to the question
“In your opinion, what does it mean to be ‘poor’?” Of the 2,400 respondents, 1,418
included “lack of food” as one of the their answers, making it by far the top re-
sponse followed by “lack of money” included by 1,138 respondents, “lack of shel-
ter” included by 1,035 respondents, and “lack of employment” included by 1,008
respondents.
Black South Africans spend a higher proportion of their income on food
than other population groups. According to calculations using data from the In-
come and Expenditure Surveys (Statistics South Africa, 2000, 2006, 2011b), the
mean of household food spending as a percentage of household income for White
headed households was 10.18% (SD = 10.34) in 2005-06 and 10.37% (SD = 12.53)
in 2010-11. In contrast the mean for Blacks was 29.09% (SD = 21.10) in 2005-
06 and 27.60% (SD = 22.77) in 2010-11). (Differences in survey methodology
made comparisons to earlier surveys difficult.) Figure 5.10 shows the distribution
of household food spending as a percentage of household income for each of the
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four population groups. This graph illustrates that while the majority of the distri-
bution of White headed households are concentrated around the mean, Blacks have
much more variation with much more of the distribution on the higher end of the
scale. Figure 5.11 shows the same distributions using the National Income Dynam-
ics Surveys (SALDRU, 2008, 2010, 2012). Again, the graphs illustrate that Blacks
on the whole spend a higher percentage of their household income on food.
These data on food spending are no doubt largely driven by the fact that
poor households spend a much higher proportion of household income on food than
wealthier households as discussed in the previous chapter and illustrated in Figure
4.4. Taken together with Afrobarometer responses about what it means to be poor,
it suggest that social comparisons of one’s relative position may be largely based on
food security and food purchasing power. This helps explain why the LPI question
regarding food seems to be the largest driver of individual relative deprivation.
A further analysis of the relationship between individual and group RD sup-
ports the mutual exclusivity hypothesis. There is a negative correlation between
individual RD and group RD, Pearson’s r = -0.3427. Figure 5.12 illustrates this
negative and statistically significant relationship. Because the variables are survey
response scales and are, therefore, ordinal rather than continuous, especially group
RD, it was necessary to introduce some artificial noise in the graph to see the re-
lationship. Nonetheless, it should be clear that individuals who have a stronger
feeling of individual RD are less likely to experience strong group RD. I interpret
this as evidence that individuals who compare their personal living conditions to
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those of others within their own group are less likely to identify strongly with that
group in comparisons to other groups.
5.4.4 The second stage: Protest participation
The next step was to test how individual RD and group RD contribute to
protest participation. To do this, I examined an Afrobarmeter question phrased,
“Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these,
please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past
year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a demonstration or
protest march?” Responses included: 0 = No, would never do this, 1=No, but would
do if had the chance, 2 = Yes, once or twice, 3 = Yes, several times, 4 = Yes, often
(Afrobarometer, 2002). I excluded refusals and missing data as well as responses
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of “Don’t know,” which did not account for more than 2.25% of the observations
in any of the survey rounds. I used the responses to this question to generate an
indicator variable for whether the respondent said that he/she had participated in a
demonstration or protest more than once or twice. In other words, the variable was
coded as a success, “1”, if the response was “3” or “4” and as a failure, “0”, if it
was anything else.
Because this variable is a binary response variable, I use probit regression.
Logistic regression is also appropriate for binary outcome variables and yields sim-
ilar results but only the probit results are presented for the sake of making valid
comparisons to the results of the instrumental variable probit regression described
below. I regressed all of the independent variables in the above analysis on the
Protest binary variable. The results are shown in model (1) of Table 5.4. Of the LPI
components only having gone without food is statistically significant and only at
the α = 0.1 level. The coefficient is positive and suggest that respondents who had
gone with food more often were more likely to have participated in protest more
than once or twice. Being a member of a community group, reading a newspaper
more often, having an interest in public affairs, and believing that local councilors
listen to community concerns are also all positive and statistically significant at the
α = 0.01 level. Again, most of the coefficients have no objective interpretation be-
cause of the subjective nature of the survey responses and the model specification.
Comparisons between variables are possible but must be done with care because
some variables are binaries while others are ordinal scales. So, for example, while
it looks like being a member of a community group has more than twice the size
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of the effect as reading a newspaper, the former is a binary and the later is scaled 0
to 4. The correct interpretation is that being a member of a community group has
more than twice the effect of a one point move on the response scale for reading a
newspaper but a smaller effect than a three point move.
Next, I conducted a probit analysis using the composite individual RD and
group RD variables and omitted the drivers of each as determined in the above
analysis. The results are presented in model (2) of Table 5.4. Neither RD variable is
statistically significant but the coefficients for the demographic variables remained
fairly stable. Only the coefficients for the year dummies changed. For example,
compared to 2002, respondents in 2004 were more likely to have participated in
protest more than twice in model (1) but that effect was not found in model (2).
This is possibly because the increased RD nullifies the effect in 2004.
In model (3) I introduce an interaction term between individual and group
RD. This helps control for the effect of the negative correlation between individual
RD and group RD. Individuals with high levels of both individual and group RD
are less likely to participate in protest (β = 0.066) and the effect is statistically
significant at the α = 0.05 level. It remains unclear why individuals with high levels
of both individual and group RD are less likely to protest, but controlling for the
interaction effect, the effect of individual RD is positive (β = 0.156) and statistically
significant at the α = 0.1 level and the effect of group RD is positive (β = 0.196)
and statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level. This supports hypothesis H3.
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Table 5.4: Protest participation: Probit regression results
(1) (2) (3)
Indvidual RD -0.038 (0.034) 0.156+ (0.083)
Group RD 0.019 (0.026) 0.196** (0.074)
Ind RD * Group RD -0.066* (0.026)
Gone without food 0.056+ (0.031)
Gone without water 0.033 (0.030)
Gone without medical care 0.019 (0.027)
Gone without cooking fuel 0.006 (0.032)
Gone without cash income 0.002 (0.024)
Gone without electricity 0.007 (0.024)
Member of community group 0.244** (0.066)
Newspaper news 0.107** (0.020)
Interest in public affairs 0.187** (0.033)
Local govt councilors listen 0.048+ (0.028) 0.063* (0.028) 0.064* (0.028)
Black African 0.706** (0.129) 0.722** (0.127) 0.737** (0.129)
Coloured 0.264+ (0.153) 0.266+ (0.154) 0.273+ (0.156)
Primary shcool completed 0.162* (0.080) 0.246** (0.076) 0.256** (0.076)
Secondary school completed -0.081 (0.060) -0.024 (0.058) -0.029 (0.058)
Female -0.117* (0.052) -0.167** (0.050) -0.167** (0.050)
Age 0.027** (0.009) 0.030** (0.009) 0.030** (0.009)
Age (squared) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000)
Urban 0.009 (0.064) 0.019 (0.060) 0.018 (0.060)
2004 0.293** (0.087) 0.086 (0.070) 0.090 (0.070)
2006 0.146+ (0.082) 0.006 (0.068) 0.005 (0.068)
2008 0.048 (0.087) -0.077 (0.076) -0.077 (0.076)
Observations 6,436 6,436 6,436
Psuedo R2 0.098 0.066 0.067
Log psuedolikelihood -2139 -2214 -2210
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; province dummy variables included but not
displayed.
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In all of these probit models presented in Table 5.4 there is likely consid-
erably endogeneity between the RD variables and the dependent variable. Partic-
ipating in protest is likely to increase RD, especially group RD. Furthermore, as
discussed above the circumstances in South Africa were considerably more volatile
during 2004 than 2002. These circumstances are likely to contribute to both protest
participation and RD and simply including a year dummy variable is not sufficient
to cleanse the bias from this endogeneity.
As in chapter 3, one analytical method to minimize bias from endogeneity is
to use an instrumental variable approach. Because only one endogenous IV can be
specified at a time, I use this approach in all models in Table 5.5. In models (1) and
(2), individual RD is instrumented using the LPI components because the earlier
analysis revealed that these are all useful predictors of individual RD. In models (3)
and (4) I use member of a community group, reading newspapers, and interest in
public affairs as instruments for group RD. In all models, individual RD and group
RD are positive and statistically significant. There is likely still bias in the estimate
of the non-instrumented IV, group RD in model (2) and individual RD in model
(4). The true effect of individual RD is between 0.505 and 0.424. The true effect of
group RD is likely between 0.943 and 1.012. Therefore, I argue that while higher
levels of individual RD contributes to likelihood of protest participation, higher
levels of group RD is a stronger driver of protest participation.
As discussed in chapter 3, a good instrument must satisfy three assumptions:
(1) exogeneity; (2) relevance; and (3) exclusivity. As evidenced in the first-stage
models, these instruments satisfy the second assumption, relevance. That is, each
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Table 5.5: Protest participation: Endogenous probit regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indvidual RD 0.505** (0.117) 0.424** (0.129) 0.335** (0.025)
Group RD 0.118** (0.036) 0.943** (0.031) 1.012** (0.026)
Gone without food 0.030 (0.022)
Gone without water 0.043* (0.020)
Gone without medical care 0.023 (0.021)
Gone without cooking fuel 0.027 (0.023)
Gone without cash income 0.027 (0.018)
Gone without electricity -0.000 (0.017)
Member of community group 0.247** (0.063)
Newspaper news 0.123** (0.019)
Interest in public affairs 0.228** (0.031)
Local govt councilors listen 0.102** (0.029) 0.107** (0.029) -0.106** (0.022) -0.084** (0.020)
Black African 0.870** (0.128) 0.801** (0.125) -0.043 (0.084) 0.042 (0.079)
Coloured 0.405** (0.152) 0.372* (0.152) 0.026 (0.092) 0.112 (0.085)
Primary shcool completed 0.179* (0.076) 0.293** (0.074) 0.135* (0.055) 0.145** (0.052)
Secondary school completed -0.029 (0.061) 0.045 (0.060) -0.118** (0.039) -0.099** (0.037)
Female -0.098* (0.049) -0.165** (0.048) -0.082* (0.035) -0.067* (0.033)
Age 0.016 (0.010) 0.021* (0.009) 0.015* (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
Age (squared) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Urban 0.019 (0.061) 0.067 (0.060) 0.042 (0.042) 0.030 (0.039)
2004 0.300** (0.082) 0.021 (0.067) -0.329** (0.051) -0.343** (0.048)
2006 0.194* (0.079) 0.003 (0.065) -0.394** (0.047) -0.389** (0.044)
2008 -0.038 (0.082) -0.188* (0.075) -0.110* (0.053) -0.160** (0.049)
Observations 6,436 6,436 6,436 6,436
Psuedo R2 -9361 -9272 -11061 -10875
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; province dummy variables included but not
displayed; individual RD instrumented in models (1) and (2); group RD instrumented in models (3) and (4).
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of the instruments does have a significant effect on RD. As for the other assump-
tions, the LPI components are plausible. One has difficulty imagining how protest
participation could increase objective levels of poverty. Similarly, objective poverty
would only effect protest participation by increasing individual RD.
The instruments for group RD are admittedly more problematic. Commu-
nity involvement, newspaper consumption, and interest in public affairs could in-
crease protest participation by facilitating mobilization rather than increasing RD.
Furthermore, protest participation could cause individuals to become more involved
in the community, pay closer attention to news media, or have an increased interest
in public affairs. These theoretical difficulties are limitations on the strength of the
findings, but are set aside for the remainder of this dissertation.
Taken as a whole, I argue that relative deprivation is a significant driver
of micro-level decisions to participate in protest activities in post-apartheid South
Africa but that individual RD and group RD are based on different factors. Protest
participants are likely to fall into two categories: (1) the most impoverished and
least educated community residents; and (2) those that are better educated, mate-
rially better off, more informed about the political and economic situation of the
community, and more concerned with the position of their group.
I further argue that objective levels of poverty as measured by the Lived
Poverty Index contribute to individual RD but are not the only drivers. Subjective
comparisons to others are also a significant factor and at the individual level these
comparisons are likely to be to other individuals within one’s own population group.
For example, Blacks tend to compare their own personal conditions to other Blacks
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and in the aggregate tend to judge their personal situation favorably. Temporal com-
parisons to the past and expectations for the future are also important components
of individual RD. Unrealized, and possibly unrealistic, expectations of a better life
in post-apartheid South Africa has contributed to higher levels of RD.
Finally, I argue that group RD is higher among those that are in a better
position materially and better informed about the community. Secondary education
contributes positively to both of these aspects. Such individuals are likely to be
more concerned about the community as a whole.
The strength of these findings is limited. Because the survey did not ask
about the timing of protest, it is difficult to draw causal inferences. For example,
many respondents may have participated in numerous protests in the apartheid era
and responded accordingly. Clearly, having higher levels of RD in the 2000s could
not cause that participation. It is plausible, however, that individuals who were more
active in the apartheid struggle might have higher expectations for post-apartheid
redistribution and, therefore, higher levels of RD today. For these reasons, it is
necessary to conduct a focused study among a community that has been the site of
numerous service delivery protests over the past several years. This is the subject
of the next chapter.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that individual RD and group RD should be
considered separately and that changes in income inequality have affected each dif-
ferently. According to data from the Afrobarometer surveys, individual RD was on
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the decline at the beginning of the 2000s but increased between 2006 and 2008. The
opposite is true for group RD. These changes are in part the result of the deracial-
ization of income equality in South Africa.
I presented evidence that both individual and group RD are drivers of micro-
level decisions to participate in protest activity. The strongest predictor of individual
RD is food insecurity. Those that are more food insecure are more likely to have
higher levels of individual RD and steadily rising food prices put more pressure on
poor, Black households that devote a larger proportion of their household income to
food. Food insecurity is, therefore, the strongest indirect predictor of participation
in protest activity despite the relative rarity of food among the cited grievances in
service delivery protests.
Food insecurity may also play a role in protest participation as an indirect
driver of group RD. Afrobarometer survey respondents, regardless of their own
circumstances, associated food insecurity with poverty. In chapter 4 I observed that
in 2008 rising food prices were a rallying call from labor unions and that this was
often linked to other issues. Members of labor unions are not, however, the most
impoverished and food insecure. In other words, food insecurity might contribute
to group RD when one observes other members of one’s identity group struggling
to meet their food needs and rising food prices might contribute to both individual
and group RD because of the impact not only on one’s own finances but also on
other members of one’s identity group.
The next chapter will test the direct effects of individual food insecurity on
decisions to participate in protest through an original survey in Cape Town, South
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Africa. The survey also examines the effects of food insecurity in comparison to
other drivers of individual and group RD. This interaction of food insecurity with
political affiliations is also examined. The indirect effects of food insecurity and
rising food prices on protest participation through group RD are, however, more
difficult to test without a longitudinal study.
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Chapter 6
Determinants of individual participation in service
delivery protest: Survey evidence from Cape Town,
South Africa
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents evidence from a survey conducted in late-2014 in the
Cape Flats, a protest hotspot in Cape Town, South Africa, to identify common
grievances that lead to protest participation, individual characteristics that make
people more likely to engage in protest, and group memberships that contribute to
protest mobilization. In the end, this study finds that contrary to the common per-
ception of protesters as angry and violent young men who throw feces from over-
passes (BBC, 2013) and burn buses on freeways (Nombembe et al., 2014), half of
the survey respondents who have participated in protests in the past year were over
the age of 36 and nearly half, 46.53% were women. Using logistic analysis with
a binary outcome of participation in service delivery protest, this study finds that
living in informal housing, experiencing food insecurity, and lack of acceptable em-
ployment are all significant sources of grievance that drive protest participation. It
also finds that, although some protesters may have defected from the formal politi-
cal process, those that are the most politically engaged are most likely to participate
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in protest. Finally, I provide some evidence that political parties and community
policing organizations are important mobilizing forces behind protests.
6.2 Earlier survey studies of micro-level determinants of protest
participation
The study of micro-level participation in protest activity has generally either
been through indirect sources or through interviews with protest participants. There
are very few studies that have sought to randomly survey populations to determine
the difference between those that choose to participate in protest and those that
choose not to participate. Two studies that did conduct such surveys are discussed
here.
In a survey of participants and non-participants Christian-Muslim riots in
Kaduna and Jos, Nigeria, Scacco (2008) found that individual grievances alone
were a weak predictor of participation in riots but were not a primary driver. Con-
nection to other riot participants and attendance at community meetings were a
stronger predictor, but it was difficult to distinguish whether this was a causal con-
nection or merely that individual personality traits were the driver of both commu-
nity network connections and riot participation. The interaction between grievance
and community networks was the strongest predictor of riot participation. The au-
thor argues “what distinguishes the broader class of people with grievances from
actual rioters is the ‘pull’ factor of neighborhood-level social networks. People
who are centrally embedded in local social networks are more likely to be pulled to
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the battlefront than people who are relatively marginalized in their communities”
(Scacco, 2008, 25).
In a 2011, Claassen (2014) conducted a survey of residents of Alexandra, a
Black township in Johannesburg, about participation in the anti-immigrant violence
of 2008. He found that, in contradiction to the “angry young man theory,” par-
ticipants were not especially young and included a substantial number of women.
Also, participants were more likely to be members of the opposition party, and
to attend community policing meetings. It is, however, unclear from the analysis
whether this is causal or both participation in party politics, community meetings,
and communal violence are all driven by some other latent variable.
6.3 Theory and Hypotheses
This chapter focuses on the micro-level decision to participate in protest
and relies primarily on the Gurr three-stage process of political action (Gurr, 1971,
2012), with influences from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), the
dynamics of contention approach (McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly and Tarrow, 2006),
and the structural-cognitive model (Opp, 2009). The three stages are: (1) the devel-
opment of discontent; (2) the politicization of discontent; and (3) the actualization
of protest. In the first stage, potential participants in political protest develop dis-
content based on certain deprivation-based grievances. This discontent is necessary
but for it to lead to political action it must be focused on political actors. That is,
aggrieved individuals or groups must believe that they can obtain redress from a
specific actor and that the anticipated action can achieve the desired result based
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on past success of such action. Finally, politicized discontent must be actualized.
That is aggrieved individuals with a political target must be mobilized into group
action. This process is not, however, strictly linear. There are dynamic interactions
between the three stages and between groups as individuals move from group to
group. For example, members of community groups may be more likely to develop
group-based grievances based on the deprivation of other group members. Or pre-
vious protesters may be more likely to focus discontent on political actors found to
be amenable to demands.
Based on this theory, I develop four testable hypotheses. The first of which
is:
H1: Individuals are more likely to participate in protest if they expe-
rience one or more of three objective sources of grievance: (a) food
insecurity, (b) un- or underemployment, or (c) living in informal hous-
ing.
In the previous chapter, I found evidence in the Afrobarometer surveys that
lack of food and lack of a cash income are predictors of individual RD but only food
insecurity was found to be a direct correlate with protest participation. Another
major source of grievance in South Africa has been and continues to be access to
affordable housing. This hypothesis tests the direct and policy actionable conditions
of poverty rather than the indirect sociological link.
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The second hypothesis is related to the politicization of protest. While there
was observable tension between participating in or defecting from the electoral pro-
cess in the SECC, the CCF, and the AEC, as discussed in chapter 5, all three cam-
paigns ultimately supported continuing political engagement. The two years of
service delivery protests preceding the 2006 municipal elections were widely seen
as “a systematic revolt against” the ANC Booysen (2007, 21). Nonetheless, in five
of the directly affected municipalities turnout was maintained and support for the
ANC increased. Booysen (2007, 22) argued that this was evidence of “dual-action
repertoires to effect service delivery.” As was discussed in chapter 4, turnout in
national and municipal elections has not significantly fallen in the election since
2004. My second hypothesis is:
H2: Individuals that are more engaged in the election process are more
likely to participate in protest.
Third, membership in community organizations and political parties can ef-
fect protest participation at all three stages. First, in chapter 5 I found evidence that
membership in community groups increases group relative deprivation. Second,
the Democtratic Alliance (DA) the main opposition party, has repeatedly accused
the ANC of using service delivery grievances to foment dissent against the munic-
ipal government. Third, resource mobilization theory predicts that political parties
and community organizations are important mobilizing agents for political protest
(Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978). This gives rise to the third major hypothesis and a
sub-hypothesis:
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H3: Individuals that are members or frequent participants in political
parties or other community organizations are more likely to participate
in protest.
H3a: Individuals identify strongly with the ANC are more likely to par-
ticipate in protest than those that identify strongly with the DA.
6.4 Survey Methods and Data
From October through December of 2014, I conducted individual level sur-
veys in Cape Town, South Africa. The intent was to determine individual level
differences that distinguish protest participants from non-participants. The target
area for the study was an area with a high concentration of protest activity rather
than the entire area of Cape Town.
6.4.1 Questionnaire design
The questionnaire consisted of four modules: (1) demographic and house-
hold characteristics; (2) community affiliations and political attitudes; (3) food se-
curity; and (4) protest participation. The demographic and household characteris-
tics module contained questions on basic demographic data, e.g. age, population
group, origin, and home language, and socio-economic status, e.g. education level
and employment status, of the respondent. It also elicits data about the household,
e.g. household size; number of children, number of income earners, dwelling type,
tenure status, and source household drinking water. Many of these questions were
drawn directly from on based on questions from the South African census question-
naire (Statistics South Africa, 2011a). Data is also collected about assets owned by
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the household; the poverty level of the household using the Lived Poverty Index
battery of questions from the Afrobarometer surveys (Afrobarometer, 2011); and
the household income.
The community affiliations and political attitudes module collects data about
membership and frequency of participation in a different community and political
organizations, e.g. religious groups, labour unions, community policing groups,
parent/teacher associations, volunteer or development organizations, sports leagues,
arts or theatre groups, and vigilante groups. Again using questions based on those
included in the Afrobarometer questionnaire, data is elicited about whether the re-
spondent identifies closely with any particular party and how much the respondent
trusts specific political institutions and actors (Afrobarometer, 2011).
Food security was measured with a battery of six questions designed by the
USDA USDA (2012). Also included in the food security module were a series
of questions about food consumption, a section designed to measure household
expenditures on food, and questions about individual perceptions of changes in
food prices and changes in consumption of particular food items due to changing
prices.
The protest participation module began with questions about whether the
respondent had ever participated in any form of protest. These were followed by
questions about participation in protest in the past year. These included questions
about the primary issue of the protest, advance notice of the action and how the
respondent learned of it, and whether the action involved violence. In order to
encourage truthful answers the respondent was not asked directly whether he or she
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had engaged in violence. Rather, four questions were asked about what occurred
during the action, including whether property was damaged, whether anyone was
physically injured, whether the police were present, and whether the police used
force.
The order of the food module and the protest participation module was al-
ternated on even and odd days in order to ensure no systematic bias in responses as
a result of question order. The full questionnaire is included in Appendix C.
6.4.2 The study area
I chose to focus on the Cape Flats after a geoanalysis of protest events in
Cape Town. The Armed Conflict and Event Location Dataset (ACLED) is a dataset
of conflict events in Africa sourced from an online search of local media sources.
ACLED contains events coded to as “riots” and “protests” (Raleigh et al., 2010). I
used this dataset to identify the study area but was initially faced with some chal-
lenges. ACLED contains geocoordinates, i.e. latitude and longitude, of each event.
An initial analysis of a subset of these geocoordinates, however, found that these
coordinates were often inaccurate and identified the center of the reference admin-
istrative division rather than the actual location of the event. For the purposes of this
high resolution analysis this was not sufficient. ACLED also contains considerably
more events beginning in January 2012 for reasons that remain unclear. Together
with two research assistants1 I re-geocoded over 800 events between January 2012
and October 2014.
1Daniel G. Moody and Matthias Kro¨nke, graduate students at UCT.
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Figure 6.1: Heatmap of protest events in Cape Town, Jan. 2012 – Oct. 2014
I then mapped these and generated a heatmap to identified the highest con-
centration of events. The resulting heatmap is shown in Figure 6.1. The highest
concentration of events was in the Central Business District where Parliament, the
Provincial government offices, and the Municipal government offices are all lo-
cated. The events here are, for the most part, events that people have taken to those
government buildings. The next highest concentration was on the Cape Flats. The
participants in these events are generally residents from the area.
Under South Africa’s apartheid regime prior to 1990, Black and Coloured
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populations of Cape Town were forced to live in designated townships, the largest
concentration of which were located on the windswept, sandy plain just north of
the False Bay coastline and southeast of Cape Town’s central business district and
the wealthier white suburbs in the more desirable real estate in the shadow of Table
Mountain. Today the Cape Flats still consists of a collection of highly segregated
areas, either Black or Coloured, that conform to the old township borders, which
are divided by arterial roads and railroads. The most impoverished areas of Cape
Town, the largest informal settlements, and the areas of highest crime rates are on
the Cape Flats. Also, much of the political unrest is centered here.
The South African national government today is controlled by the African
National Congress (ANC), while the Democratic Alliance (DA), the main oppo-
sition party, controls the Cape Town municipal government as well as the Western
Cape provincial government. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is a new party
formed by Julius Malema, the former leader of the ANC Youth League, after he was
convicted of hate speech and ejected by the ANC. Population group is highly pre-
dictive of party affiliation. Whites and Coloureds are likely to support the DA while
Blacks are highly likely to support the ANC or the EFF. In Cape Town the percent-
age of the population by ward that identifies as Black is highly correlated with the
percentage of the vote in the 2014 national elections cast for the ANC, Pearson’s r
of 0.9787. Similarly, the percentage of the population that identifies as Coloured or
white is highly correlated with the percentage of vote received by the DA, Pearson’s
r of 0.9735. (See Figure 6.2.) Additionally, many in the Coloured community are
Muslim and especially active in pro-Gaza demonstrations of the past year.
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Figure 6.2: Correlation between population group and party support by ward
6.4.3 Sampling design
An historic legacy of apartheid is that Cape Town today remains an ex-
tremely segregated city. According to the 2011 Census over half of Cape Town’s
5,339 enumeration areas2 were over 90% comprised of a single population group
and over three quarters were more than 73% comprised of a single group. Because
of this segregation, the party allegiances of population groups, and the political
context protest in Cape Town, I used a stratified sampling design to ensure repre-
sentation of population groups in the target areas.
The strata were selected based on census enumeration areas in the Cape
Flats. Three strata were delineated around traditionally Black townships: Gugulethu,
Nyanga/Crossroads, and Khayelitsha; two were delineated based on traditionally
Coloured townships: Manenberg and Mitchells Plain; and one was a newer more
2An enumeration area is the smallest unit of the sampling frame used by the Census. In the
Cape Town Municipality the mean population by enumeration area is 699 with a median of 660, a
minimum of 72, and a maximum of 1,737.
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integrated area: Delft (see Figure C.1). I attempted to delineate areas that were
similar in income but more informal settlements are found in the Black townships
(see Figure C.2). As expected, ANC support is high in the Black strata while the
Coloured strata tend to support the DA (see Figure C.3).
The target population of the survey was defined as the adult South African
citizens of economically active age, i.e. 18 to 64, residing in the Cape Flats area.
Because of the segregated nature of the Cape Flats townships, I used a stratified
sampling design to ensure comparable representation of population groups. Six
strata were delineated in three pairs that were roughly matched by household in-
come, concentration of informal housing, access to piped water, and education level
but one of which was predominantly Coloured and one that was predominantly
Black. Table 6.1 shows the demographics of the population by stratum. Enumer-
ation areas were randomly selected and ranked from each stratum and assigned to
one of two teams of field workers by stratum.
6.5 Survey implementation
Training was conducted the first week of November and fieldwork began
on November 10 and went through December 2, 2014. It involved ten fieldwork-
ers, eight enumerators3 and two team leaders.4 The fieldworkers were split into
two teams, one team of Black Xhosa speakers who worked in the predominantly
3Mona Africa, Rasheda Ariefdien, Andrew Bantham, Amanda Malan, Lonwabo Nduku, Loyiso
Nduku, Nobesuthu Sigcu, and Mkuseli Sofika.
4Bernadette Johnson and Shepherd Ngqakayi.
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Figure 6.3: Cape Flats Survey Sampling Design
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Table 6.1: Strata demographics
Mitchells Nyanga/
Delft Gugulethu Khayelitsha Manenberg Plain Crossroads TOTAL
I: GENDER
Male 32,553 19,659 59,694 15,042 54,027 34,014 214,989
Female 34,497 21,603 64,140 16,839 58,515 35,922 231,516
II: POPULATION GROUP
Black 43,215 40,548 122,538 3,972 4,920 68,853 284,046
Coloured 21,792 399 516 26,205 104,955 744 154,611
Asian 219 30 102 186 552 21 1,110
White 81 24 75 21 129 60 390
Other 2,103 282 1,029 1,197 1,413 507 6,531
III: AGE GROUP
Age 18-24 16,140 8,667 31,320 7,389 24,387 17,388 105,291
Age 25-34 23,091 13,116 42,885 8,220 30,570 25,074 142,956
Age 35-44 15,972 8,748 25,188 6,861 21,279 14,151 92,199
Age 45-54 9,117 6,744 15,903 5,931 21,624 8,238 67,557
Age 55-64 2,730 3,987 8,538 3,480 14,682 5,085 38,502
TOTAL 67,050 41,262 123,834 31,881 112,542 69,936 446,505
Source: Statistics South Africa, Census 2011
Black areas and another team of Coloured Afrikaans speakers who worked in the
predominantly Coloured areas.
Each team was assigned two enumeration areas per day, one in the morning
and one in the afternoon. The field teams began their walk patterns at the nearest
intersection to each centerpoint as identified using Google Maps and skipped three
houses between interviews. (The protocol instructions are included in Appendix
C.) Enumerators alternated between male and female respondents and selected a
respondent of the appropriate gender by the next birthdate of all eligible members
of each randomly selected household. Figure 6.3 is a map of the study area, the
sampling strata and PSUs, and the walk pattern starting points. The Selection In-
structions are included in Appendix C.
140
Table 6.2: Survey response
Item Number Per cent
Completed survey 1,390 52.65
Household / premises vacant or locked 429 16.25
No eligible household members 134 5.08
Refused / did not have time 296 11.21
Did not fit gender requirement 368 13.94
Not a citizen / spoke a foreign language 17 0.64
Deaf / did not speak a survey language 6 0.23
Total 2,640 100.00
The surveys were conducted on Android tablets that were connected to a
cellular network and the questionnaire was implemented using Google Forms. I
was able to monitor the data collection in real time and conduct data checks every
couple of days. The survey took between 20 and 45 minutes to complete. In the
end, the teams made 2,640 calls and successfully completed 1,390 surveys for a
response rate of 52.65% (see Table 6.2).
6.5.1 Data
The final sample consists of 1,380 observations from 704 female respon-
dents and 676 male respondents. The sampling strategy resulted in a survey sample
that roughly matches the target population when weighted according to the stratifi-
cation design.
Panel I of Table 6.3 shows that the target population is 48.15% male and
51.85% female. The weighted sample is 49.22% male and 50.78% female. Panel
II shows that 63.59% of the target population is Black and 34.61% is Coloured.
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Table 6.3: Stratified sample demographics
Corrected for Stratified Survey Design
Population Sample Mean Std. error 95% conf. interval
I: GENDER
Male 48.15% 48.99% 49.22% 0.53% 48.16% 50.28%
Female 51.85% 51.01% 50.78% 0.53% 49.72% 51.84%
II: POPULATION GROUP
Black 63.59% 54.71% 58.63% 2.57% 53.49% 63.78%
Coloured 34.61% 44.93% 40.96% 2.53% 35.90% 46.03%
Asian 0.25% 0.29% 0.35% 0.18% -0.02% 0.72%
White 0.09% 0.07% 0.05% 0.05% -0.05% 0.16%
Other 1.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
III: AGE GROUP
Age 18–24 23.58% 18.41% 20.33% 1.36% 17.61% 23.06%
Age 25–34 32.02% 29.28% 29.51% 1.48% 26.55% 32.46%
Age 35–44 20.65% 17.54% 17.55% 1.38% 14.77% 20.32%
Age 45–54 15.13% 17.39% 15.69% 1.36% 12.97% 18.42%
Age 55–64 8.62% 17.39% 16.92% 1.04% 14.84% 19.00%
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The final sample consists of 1,380 respondents of which 755 were Black, 620 were
Coloured respondents, four were Indian/Asian, and one was white. After the sample
is weighted it is, however, 58.63% Black and 40.96% Coloured, which is statisti-
cally similar to the target population. Panel III shows that the 18–24 and 35–44
age groups are slightly underrepresented in the sample and the 55–64 age group is
somewhat overrepresented compared to the target population. Nonetheless, on the
whole the sample is comparable enough to the population to yield valid results.
Also as expected the party distribution closely aligns with strata. The ma-
jority of respondents, 931, said that they did not identify closely with any particular
party. Of those that did identify with a party, 311 identified with the ANC, 89
identified with the DA, 25 identified with the EFF, and 22 identified with another
party. Unsurprisingly, the majority of those who identify with the ANC reside in
Khayelitsha, Nyanga/Crossroads and Gugulethu while those that identify with the
DA reside in Delft, Mitchells Plain, or Manenberg. This concentration of party sup-
port is even more apparent by examining the responses of individuals when asked
for which party they would vote if a presidential election were held tomorrow (see
Figure 6.4).
The first objective of the survey was to describe the Cape Flats residents that
participate in protest activities and the issues over which they protest. Of the 1,380
respondents in the final sample, 397 (28.77%) reported that they had participated
in some sort of protest during their lifetime. By comparison, in the Afrobarome-
ter Round 5 survey of South Africa conducted in 2011, 9.60% of respondents said
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Figure 6.4: Party identification and favored party by stratum
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they had “attended a demonstration or protest march” at least once in their life-
times; 8.39% said they had gone on strike in order to demand a higher salary or
better working conditions” at least once; and 3.19% said they had “used force or
violence for a political cause at least once. After accounting for overlap in these
questions, 12.59% of respondents reported that they had engaged in one of these
behaviors at least once in their lifetime (Afrobarometer, 2011). The proportion
that reported participating in protest in the current survey is more than twice that
from the Afrobarometer survey. This is, however, to be expected because the Afro-
barometer survey is a representative sample of the entire South African population
while the target population of the current survey was chosen because it’s members
are more likely to have participated in protest and the questionnaire was designed
to elicit responses about participation. Table 6.4 shows that when the sample is
weighted slightly more lifetime protest participants were male. This difference is
not statistically significant in the raw data (Pearson χ2 statistic of 2.2208 with a
p-value of 0.1360). When it is weighted, however, the difference is marginally sig-
nificant (Pearson χ2 statistic of 5.0923 with a p-value of 0.1360), which provides
some initial evidence that men are more likely to participate in protest than women.
Figure 6.5 shows the issues about which respondents reported that they have
protested.5 The most contentious issue has historically been the issue of cost or
availability of housing, over which 133 people reported that they have protested at
5Respondents who reported that they had ever participated in protest were asked whether they
had participated in protest over the list of issues shown in Figure 6.5. As such, respondents could
reply that they had protested over multiple issues. The sum of all reported issues is, therefore, greater
than the number of lifetime protest participants, 397.
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Table 6.4: Gender and protest participation in respondent’s lifetime
Protested in Gender
one’s lifetime Female Male Total
No 514 (52.29%) 469 (47.71%) 983
Yes 190 (47.86%) 207 (52.14%) 397
Total 704 (51.01%) 676 (48.99%) 1,380
Row percentages given in parentheses.
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Figure 6.5: Reported issues of protest in respondent’s lifetime
some point. The issue of wages or other labour issue follows this closely, but it
should be noted that this was separated in the list of issues from the lack of em-
ployment or jobs, which is the fourth most reported issue. Only two respondents
reported that they have protested over access to or cost of desirable and nutritious
food.
This adds context but the focus of the survey was recent protest. Out of
the 1,380 survey respondents, 144 (10.43%) reported that they have participated in
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protest in the past year. Table 6.5 shows that, like lifetime protest, slightly more
males have participated in protest in the past year than females but again the dif-
ference is not statistically significant.6 The weighted mean age of protest partici-
pants is 36.66 years, which is not statistically different from the mean age of non-
participants, 37.97 years.7 These basic results are consistent with Claassen (2014),
which found that 8.5% of Alexandra survey respondents had participated in com-
munal violence in 2008, that the median age of participants was 34 and 30% of
participants were women. Like Claassen (2014), the results provide initial evidence
against the theory that protest is the arena of angry young men, although this does
not necessarily hold if limited to violent protest as discussed later. Additionally, of
those that have participated in protest in the past year, only 37 had done so only
once or twice; 74 said they have done so more than twice but fewer than ten times;
and 20 said they have done so more at least ten times but fewer than 20; and nine
said they have done so at least 20 times. This suggests that many of the protests on
the Cape Flats involve the same repeat protesters.
Respondents who said they had participated in protest in the past year were
asked to report the primary issue of the last protest activity in which they partici-
pated, regardless of how many protests in which they have participated in the past
year. Figure 6.6 shows that the cost or availability of affordable housing has also
been a contentious issue in the past year. But an equal number of respondents said
they have protested over international relations and the lack of other government
6The Pearson χ2 statistic is 1.2951 with a p-value of 0.2550. When weighted the Pearson χ2
statistic is 3.0425 with a p-value of 0.1518.
7The unweighted mean age is 38.16, the median is 36 and the inter-quartile range is 29 to 47.
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Table 6.5: Gender and protest participation in the past year
Protested in Gender
the past year Female Male Total
No 637 (51.54%) 599 (48.46%) 1,236
Yes 67 (46.53%) 77 (53.47%) 144
Total 704 (51.01%) 676 (48.99%) 1,380
Row percentages given in parentheses.
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Figure 6.6: Reported issues of protest in the past year
services. The issue of cost or availability of desirable and nutritious food did not
appear on the list of issues of the most recent protest.
6.6 Analysis and results
Because different issues lead to different types of protest directed at differ-
ent targets, I divided this list of issues into four different types of protest for further
analysis. International relations issues are concerns about that rights or treatment of
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those outside of South Africa and are directed at the national government, foreign
governments, or private companies. This was classified as a distinct type of protest.
The category of wages or other labour issues was separate from lack of employment
or jobs because protests over the former generally take the form of labour strikes,
are directed at employers, and are generally organized by labour unions. In con-
trast, protests over the lack of employment are not organized by labour unions and
are often directed at local or national government authorities. Vigilante justice is a
product of the lack of adequate police, but it is directed at the criminals themselves
rather than the authorities. For that reason, it is considered a separate category of
protest. The remaining issues are grouped together under the broad category of
service delivery protest. Figure 6.7 shows the four categories of protest.
The question then becomes who participates in these different types of protest.
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Table 6.6: Participant age and gender by protest category
N Mean age in years Std err Proportion male Std err
No protest 1,236 38.42 0.40 48.46% 1.42%
Service delivery 97 37.55 1.16 53.61% 5.09%
International relations 23 39.13 2.80 65.22% 10.15%
Labour dispute 14 37.79 2.92 35.71% 13.29%
Vigilante justice 10 42.40 3.79 50.00% 16.67%
Total observations 1,380
These means and standard errors are based on the raw data and not weighted. When it is weighted there is still no
statistically significant difference.
The mean age of protest participants and the gender distribution by protest type
is shown in Table 6.6. Without controlling for other factors, there is no statisti-
cally significant difference in age or gender between protest participants and non-
participants.
The probability with standard errors of a Cape Flats resident participating
in different types of protest is shown by stratum in Figure 6.8; by gender in Figure
6.9; by age group in Figure 6.10; by population group in Figure 6.11; by party iden-
tification in Figure 6.12; and by food security category in Figure 6.13. Residents of
Khayelitsha were the most likely to participate in service delivery purposes while
residents of Mitchells Plain were the most likely to have participated in protests
related to international relations. Men were slightly more likely than women and
individuals aged 35 to 44 were the most likely to have participated in service de-
livery protests. Blacks were more likely to have participated in service delivery
protests while Coloureds were more likely to have participated in protests related
to international issues. Residents who identified closely with a party were more
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likely than those that did not to have participated in SDP and those who identify
with the EFF were most likely to have participated in SDP. Finally, residents who
were food insecure or food insecure with hunger were more likely to participate in
service delivery protest than those who are food secure. This bivariate analysis is,
however, problematic because of the high correlation between stratum, population
group, and party identification.
Because this chapter is primarily concerned with service delivery protests,
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I analyzed two dependent variables: (1) participation in service delivery protest in
the past year, and (2) participation in violent SDP in the past year. Because both
dependent variables are binary outcomes, logistic regression was used to test the
stated hypotheses.8
The dataset used for this analysis included 1,310 observations; missing data
for the remaining observations were not imputed. Control variables included were:
a dummy for male; a dummy for Black; dummies for a age groups 18 to 24, 25 to
34, and 35 to 44 (the excluded baseline is the 45 to 64 age group); a dummy for
never married; dummies for education achievement, less than primary school and
completed secondary school (the excluded baseline is completed primary school);
household size; number of children; a dummy for primary income earner; a dummy
for primary household purchaser; and a dummy for the first eight days of survey to
8I also conducted multinomial logit analysis including all four types of protest. The results
were not substantively different and only the logistic regression analysis are included for ease of
interpretation.
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Table 6.7: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Participated in SDP 0.067 0.250 0 1
Participated in violent SDP 0.030 0.170 0 1
Informal housing 0.177 0.382 0 1
Actively seeking employment 0.376 0.485 0 1
Food Insecure 0.590 0.492 0 1
Lived Poverty Index 0.624 0.682 0 4
Voted 0.591 0.492 0 1
Tried to influence others 0.079 0.270 0 1
Attended campaigan rallies 0.053 0.223 0 1
Worked or volunteered for a campaign 0.044 0.204 0 1
ANC 0.230 0.421 0 1
DA 0.067 0.250 0 1
EFF 0.018 0.131 0 1
Union member 0.076 0.266 0 1
Aged 18 to 24 0.182 0.386 0 1
Aged 25 to 34 0.291 0.454 0 1
Aged 35 to 44 0.176 0.381 0 1
Aged 45 to 54 0.174 0.379 0 1
Aged 55 to 64 0.177 0.382 0 1
Less than primary school 0.197 0.398 0 1
Completed secondary school or higher 0.350 0.477 0 1
Household size 4.853 2.312 1 17
Number of children 1.547 1.467 0 10
Primary income earner? 0.353 0.478 0 1
Primary household purchaser? 0.508 0.500 0 1
Observations 1,310
control for potential bias at the beginning of the fieldwork. Summary statistics are
presented in Table 6.7.
The model results are presented in Table 6.8 and odds ratios are reported for
ease of interpretation.9 None of the unreported control variables were statistically
9The displayed standard errors were calculated using Taylor-linearized variance estimation and
implemented using the Stata svy command prefix.
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Table 6.8: Service delivery protest logistic model results
(1) (2) (3)
Informal housing 1.526+ (1.876) 6.488** (4.265)
Food Insecure 2.034+ (1.986) 4.132* (2.007)
Actively seeking employment 1.501+ (1.803) 0.735 (-0.750)
Voted 0.495+ (-1.891) 0.393* (-2.360)
Tried to influence others 2.680+ (1.915) 2.246+ (1.949)
Attended campaigan rallies 2.125+ (1.781) 1.781 (1.371)
Worked or volunteered for a campaign 3.195* (2.450) 2.543+ (1.906)
ANC 2.885* (2.245) 7.991** (3.605)
DA 3.047** (3.313) 8.486* (2.149)
EFF 12.517** (3.926) 27.513** (5.628)
Union member 0.346+ (-1.736) 0.428 (-1.237)
Member of comm policing group 3.914** (3.846) 4.426** (3.684)
Member of volunteer/development org 1.205 (0.482) 1.169 (0.401)
Member of vigilante group 0.869 (-0.202) 0.943 (-0.087)
Informal housing * ANC 0.089** (-3.363)
Food insecure * ANC 0.398 (-1.137)
Seeking employment * ANC 3.684* (2.261)
Informal housing * DA 0.130* (-2.491)
Food insecure * DA 0.238 (-1.293)
Seeking employment * DA 3.550 (1.176)
Male 1.080 (0.239) 0.867 (-0.323) 0.848 (-0.358)
Black African 1.526 (1.043) 1.130 (0.195) 0.712 (-0.499)
Male * Black 2.004+ (1.691) 2.083 (1.432) 2.646+ (1.819)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310
Wald F-statistic 3.7 11.9 20.1
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Survey linearized standard errors in parentheses; 6 strata; 63 PSUs; Unreported
controls variables: never married; less than primary school; completed secondary school; age; age (squared); household
size; number of children; primary income earner; primary household purchaser; dummy for first eight days of survey.
significant in any of the models except primary income earner which was significant
at α = 0.05 and had a negative effect on the probability of participating in protest
(odds ratio of 0.518). The odds ratio for Black males was greater than one in all
models, meaning Black males were more likely than others to participate in protest.
But this effect was statistically significant (α = 0.1) only in models (1) and (4).
Controlling for Black males, males were not more likely than females and Blacks
were not more likely than non-Blacks to participate in protest in any of the models.
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In model (1) of Table 6.8 only the grievance variables and controls were in-
cluded, all of which were statistically significant at alpha = 0.1. Living in informal
housing raises the odds that someone had participated in SDP by 52.6%. The odds
of SDP participation are 103.4% higher for food insecure individuals (defined as
those scoring three or higher on the 6-point food security scale). The odds of SDP
participation are 50.1% higher for those who were actively seeking employment.
This provides initial support for H1 and indicates that of the three grievances tested
food insecurity is the strongest driver of protest participation.
Next, I tested H2 and H3 together because there is considerable correlation
between participation in elections and party identification. The results are shown in
model (2) of Table 6.8. On the whole, the results support H2 and provide evidence
for the proposition that protest in Cape Town is complementary to other forms of
political engagement. The four variables about election / campaign engagement
are mutually exclusive and considered to be graduated levels of engagement. The
lowest form of engagement in the election process is voting; the next level is trying
to influence others to vote in a particular way; third is attending campaign rallies;
and fourth is working or volunteering for a candidate or party. In model (2), trying
to influence others (odds ratio = 2.680), attending campaign rallies (odds ratio =
2.125), and working for a campaign (odds ratio = 3.195) are all associated with
increases in the odds of participating in SDP over not voting. The coefficient for
tried to influence others is not statistically different than the coefficient for attended
campaign rallies. There is some evidence that those who defect entirely from the
political process are more likely to protest than those who merely vote because the
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odds ratio of voted is below one, 0.495, meaning the those who vote are 50.5% less
likely to protest than others.
Model (2) also provides evidence in support of H3. All of the political party
variables increase the odds of participating in SDP. Those who identify with the
ANC are 188.5% more likely to participate in SDP; those who identify with the
DA are 204.7% more likely to participate in SDP; and those who identify with the
EFF are 1,151.7% more likely to participate in SDP. There is, however, no sup-
port for H3a because there is no statistically significant difference between ANC
supporters and DA supporters. Next, members of community policing groups are
291.4% more likely to participate in SDP than non-members. The coefficients for
volunteer/development organizations and vigilante groups are not statistically sig-
nificant.
Model (3) of Table 6.8 combines the models (1) and (2) and adds interac-
tion terms between the grievance variables and political party identification. For the
most part, these results continue to support H1, H2, and H3. In this model the odds
ratios for living in informal housing and food insecurity continue to be statistically
significant and are even stronger than in model (1). This is likely due to the negative
coefficients for the interaction terms between these variables and the variables for
supporting the ANC and the DA. There is very little correlation between party sup-
port and the three grievance variables (see Table 6.9). I interpret this to mean that,
although party identification in general is associated with higher levels of protest
participation, those with a source of grievance are more likely to protest if they do
not feel that they have a voice in either major party.
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Table 6.9: Correlation between party support and grivance
Variables ANC DA
Informal housing 0.136 -0.093
Food Insecure -0.117 0.062
Actively seeking employment -0.050 -0.001
Conversely, the variable for seeking employment is no longer significant
in model (3) but the interaction variables between party support and seeking em-
ployment are statistically significant and positive, meaning that unemployed party
supporters are more likely to participate in SDP. It remains unclear whether this is
because unemployed individuals are more motivated are whether they simply have
more time available and are, therefore, more easily mobilized.
Finally, I conducted the analysis using violent SDP as the dependent vari-
able. Of the 88 individuals who had participated in SDP in the past year, 39 of
them reported that the protest involved some form of violence, i.e. public or private
property was damaged or destroyed, someone was injured, or the police used force
to control the action. The results of these models are reported in Table 6.10. Model
(3) does not include interaction terms because the smaller number of successes,
that is violent SDP participants, made valid estimation difficult. Models (1) and
(3) continue to support H1. Those that live in informal housing are between 85.1%
and 118.2% more likely to participate in violent SDP than those that live in formal
housing. Food insecure individuals are between 247.7% and 517.8% more likely to
participate in violent SDP than food secure individuals. Again, support is found for
the proposition that those who identify with political parties are more likely to par-
ticipate in violent SDP than those who do not identify with a political party. There
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Table 6.10: Violent protest logistic model results
(1) (2) (3)
Participated in violent SDP
Informal housing 1.851+ (1.899) 2.182* (2.081)
Food Insecure 3.747* (2.650) 6.718* (2.364)
Actively seeking employment 1.657 (1.277) 1.264 (0.404)
Voted 0.447 (-1.324) 0.402 (-1.608)
Tried to influence others 2.612 (0.792) 2.663 (0.980)
Attended campaigan rallies 1.572 (0.674) 1.626 (0.644)
Worked or volunteered for a campaign 2.500 (1.180) 1.947 (1.034)
ANC 4.655** (3.450) 7.882** (3.990)
DA 4.310** (2.967) 5.690** (3.319)
EFF 19.018** (5.137) 37.804** (5.618)
Union member 0.115* (-2.569) 0.103* (-2.420)
Member of comm policing group 7.174** (3.062) 6.918** (2.954)
Member of volunteer/development org 1.279 (0.538) 1.362 (0.549)
Member of vigilante group 0.413 (-0.878) 0.373 (-1.030)
Male 1.525 (0.872) 1.068 (0.123) 0.873 (-0.205)
Black African 2.097 (1.091) 1.288 (0.359) 0.664 (-0.552)
Male * Black 2.458 (1.635) 2.567 (1.595) 6.751* (2.368)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310
Wald F-statistic 6.6 32.3 24.0
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Survey linearized standard errors in parentheses; 6 strata; 63 PSUs; Unreported
controls variables: never married; less than primary school; completed secondary school; age; age (squared); household
size; number of children; primary income earner; primary household purchaser; dummy for first eight days of survey.
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is still no statistically significant difference between ANC supporters and DA sup-
porters. The biggest difference in these models and the models presented in Table
6.8 is that the political engagement variables are not statistically significant.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a preliminary analysis of a survey of nearly 1,400
individuals in the Cape Flats, a collection of relatively poor and often underserved
Black and Coloured townships in Cape Town, South Africa. A number of findings
come out of the survey. First, 10.43% of respondents participated in some sort of
protest in the past year; 5.36% participated in at least two episodes of protest; and
7.03% participated in protest related to service delivery. Contrary to the narrative
of protest perpetrated by mostly angry young men, half of the protesters were 36 or
older and nearly half, 46.53%, were women.
An estimated 12.78% (CI: 9.66–15.90%) of residents in the study area par-
ticipated in some form protest last year (10.43% of survey respondents). An esti-
mated 44.65% were female. The estimated mean age of protesters was 36.66 years.
An estimated 8.90% (CI: 5.79–12.01%) of residents in the study area participated
in service delivery protest last year (7.03% of survey respondents). An estimated
41.77% were female. The estimated mean age of protesters was 35.66 years.
A more thorough logistic regression analysis of the data provides evidence
that living in informal housing, experiencing higher levels of food insecurity, and
lack of employment are all sources grievance that have the potential to encour-
age participation in service delivery protest. The results also provide evidence that
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South Africans who are more engaged in the election process are the most likely
to engage in service delivery as well. For these individuals, protest would seem
to be considered a legitimate political activity and complementary to the formal
political process. There is some evidence, however, that those who voted but did
nothing else were less likely to engage in SDP than those that did not even vote,
which suggests that some protesters have defected from the formal political system
entirely. The results further show that those who identify closely with political par-
ties, specifically the ANC, the DA, or the EFF, as well as those that are members
of or frequent participants in community policing organizations are more likely to
participate in SDP. Considering that the analysis controlled for individual levels of
political engagement by including variables about election activities, this suggests
that political parties and community policing organizations are significant mobiliz-
ing forces behind service delivery protest. Although SDPs often occur in areas that
are political strongholds of the ANC, there is little evidence that those that identify
with the ANC are more likely to participate in SDP than those that identify with the
DA.
In conclusion, the service delivery protests that have plagued Cape Town
over the past several years are not fringe activities of disenfranchised angry young
men and cannot be easily dismissed or repressed. Neither are they solely the efforts
of the political opposition to destabilize the local authorities. Typical protesters are
politically engaged members of society that have substantial ties to the commu-
nity and links to both major parties and they have significant grievances about the
availability of housing, employment, and affordable food.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Review of the findings, contributions,
and policy implications
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that food insecurity and rising food
prices contribute to an increase in personal grievance and socio-political unrest.
This finding has policy implications and gives rise to many additional questions.
In this chapter, I first review the findings of the previous chapters. Then I discuss
the policy implications and finally, I conclude with some thoughts about future
research.
7.1 Summary of findings and contributions
The causal link between rising food prices and socio-political unrest is gen-
erally not direct and is rarely singular. Even so-called food riots are the result of
structural changes to economic or political systems that are perceived to be unjust.
As the literature review in chapter 2 revealed, this was the case in the bread riots of
the 18th and 19th century and later during the austerity protests of the 1980s and
90s. This was also the case in the most recently observed food riots in Africa and
the Middle East. To the extent that rising prices contributed to the Arab Spring, it
was merely one of myriad causes.
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In this dissertation I have sought to determine if food insecurity and rising
food prices contribute to protest participation and, if so, which individuals choose
to protest and why. In so doing, this dissertation makes several significant contribu-
tions to the conflict studies literature.
In chapter 3, I demonstrated that the causal relationship between rising food
prices and unrest is endogenous. Causality runs in both directions and both are
often linked to other causes. Nonetheless, I found evidence that an abnormal spike
in consumer food prices does lead to an increase in the probability of unrest, but
not just food riots. This finding was possible because the analytical method used
isolated causality better than that in previously published studies. Furthermore, the
analysis was performed at a level of aggregation not previously used. While this
analysis answered one question, it raised additional questions about why people
react to rising food prices with protest. To gain some insight into that question,
chapter 4 examined service delivery protests in South Africa over the past decade.
In chapter 4, I provided context for the outbreak of service delivery protests
by examining of the history of protest in South Africa from the anti-apartheid move-
ment through the present. This included a look at three different campaigns includ-
ing protests against perceived failures of local government; privatization of govern-
ment functions; and the increased costs of utilities, especially electricity and water.
These campaigns soon gave rise to the grassroots and disorganized phenomenon
of widespread service delivery protests. Chapter 4 concluded with a brief anal-
ysis of the phenomenon through the frameworks of prevailing theories of social
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movements. In the end, however, these theories do not help us understand why
individuals participate in protest activities.
In chapter 5, I turn to relative deprivation theory to provide some answers
to the question of why individuals participate in protest. Through a close examina-
tion of trends in economic inequality in South Africa since the end of apartheid, I
provided some context to two types of subjective comparisons, including an individ-
ual’s perception of personal living conditions compared to others and perceptions of
group economic opportunities compared to other groups. Sociological studies sup-
ported the understanding of a period of dynamic change in South Africa between
1994 and 2000. Since then, however, the rise of a Black elite has led to increasing
individual relative deprivation and changing identities that contribute to a decrease
in group relative deprivation. An analysis of the Afrobarometer survey data further
supported this idea and revealed that lack of food was amongst the strongest drivers
of individual relative deprivation. Other drivers include a lack of a cash income and
a lack of medical care.
In the final analysis of chapter 5, I found that both individual and group
relative deprivation were predictors of participation in protest activities, but that
different types of people were subject to individual and group relative deprivation.
More impoverished and less educated individuals are likely to have higher levels
of individual RD while less impoverished, better educated, and more informed in-
dividuals are likely to have higher levels of group RD. This distinction between
individual and group RD, while somewhat established in sociology, is new to the
conflict studies literature. Recently, the role of relative deprivation in conflict has
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been the subject of renewed research interest. Relative deprivation as described by
Gurr over 40 years ago is primarily individual RD. The distinction between group
and individual RD is an innovation that may help resolve the apparent incongruent
findings between segment of research. On the one hand, some social movement
researchers, especially in American politics, find that protest participants tend to be
younger and wealthier. On the other hand, other researchers argue that the more des-
titute segment of the population have the lowest opportunity cost and are, therefore,
the most likely to engage in revolt. Furthermore, the distinction between individual
and group RD may prove useful in developing a unified theory of social conflict
that includes grievances and resource mobilization.
In chapter 6, I discussed the results of a survey carried out in the Cape Flats
area of Cape Town, a hotspot of protest over the last few years. Unlike earlier stud-
ies of protest participants, this original survey targeted a random sample of Cape
Flats residents in an effort of determine what proportion of the residents have par-
ticipated in protest and what distinguishes participants from non-participants. In
the analysis of the results, I found that food insecurity was a strong predictor of
participation in service delivery protest. Other predictors were living in informal
housing, unemployment, membership in community policing groups, and identifi-
cation with political parties. I found that individuals who are more engaged in the
formal electoral process are also more likely to participate in protest. This supports
the understanding of protest and elections as complementary tactics of political en-
gagement.
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7.2 Policy implications
The findings of this dissertation have important policy implications at both
the national and international levels. Based on the specious correlation between
commodity prices and food riots, prominent policy opinion-makers, such as economist
Jeffrey Sachs and former World Bank President Robert Zoellick, have suggested the
appropriate response is to focus on increasing global production, regulating specu-
lation on food crops, and reducing biofuel production. While these may be laudable
goals (although the last is debatable), they divert attention away from the real prob-
lem. The world produces enough food to feed everyone, the failure is in getting it
on people’s plates. This is often a result of failed local markets. Controlling price
fluctuations in international markets is important on a macro level but will have
little benefit if local markets are still vulnerable to local conditions.
This research shows that price spikes have destabilizing effects regardless
of the source (e.g., a local drought or global speculation), and maintaining con-
sistently low prices is less important than preventing sudden price shocks. These
principles should guide efforts to prevent food-related instability (though it does not
mean countries should institute or maintain price control and subsidy regimes; such
policies may control prices but also have other adverse effects that can contribute to
political instability). Priority should be given to improving irrigation infrastructure
to increase local production and buffer against changing rainfall patterns; expanding
transportation networks to deliver food regionally; increasing local storage capacity
to allow for warehousing; and bolstering local and regional commodity exchanges
to reduce reliance on international markets, as Ethiopia has done. These efforts
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would help stabilize food prices in vulnerable countries in more productive ways
than the existing paradigm and help us understand when instability really is related
to food.
At the national level, more attention should be given to domestic social pro-
grams that aim to provide nutritious food to the most impoverished members of so-
ciety. Such programs are likely more effective at ensuring food security than trying
to regulate food prices through producer subsidies or trade regulations. Expansion
of food voucher programs and school feeding programs are policies directly tar-
geted at promoting increased food security amongst the poor. Direct cash transfers
to those in need, however, may facilitate food security while promoting markets
in underserved areas. The relative efficacy and efficiency of different types of do-
mestic food security policies and the political acceptance of or resistance to such
programs remains a topic of future research.
This research also has implications for the policies of sectoral inter-governmental
bodies (IGOs), such as the World Food Programme, bi-lateral aid agencies, such as
the U.S. Agency for International Development, and non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), such as OxFam, that operate in the food security arena. In emergency
situations the immediate priority of such organizations is and should be relieving
hunger by distributing food to those in need through the most efficient means. These
organizations should recognize, however, that some food distribution programs can
have unintended consequences that distort local market forces, which can in turn
have detrimental consequences to local and regional political stability. Relief orga-
nizations should include these long-term consequences in their policy calculations
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and advocacy efforts. Programs that provide relief in the short-term but undermine
political consequences in the long-term can make a bad situation worse and lead
to more suffering. To the extent possible, agencies should design and implement
food distribution programs that promote long-term food price stabilization as well
as immediate relief. Such programs would include food vouchers to purchase food
locally combined with support for local food markets and local and regional sourc-
ing of food purchases for distribution.
IGOs, aid agencies, and NGOs should also prioritize national price stability
in their advocacy programs. As mentioned above, the stabilization of international
commodity prices is over-emphasized in global economic discussions. Agencies
should direct more focus on U.S. and European food policies, particularly subsidy
programs, that undermine the development of local agriculture sectors and markets
in other parts of the world, especially sub-Saharan Africa. The continued support
in the United States and Europe for such policies is doubly damaging because it
encourages the adoption of protectionist and food sovereignty policies by African
governments at a time when Africa should be cooperating toward regional food
production and distribution systems. Discussions around these issues has typically
been relegated to economic forums but this dissertation has demonstrated that food
security is an inherently political issue and should be more central in discussions of
political stability.
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7.3 Future research agenda
Many questions remain unanswered and additional research will further
hone these recommendations. The first step of my future research agenda is to
replicate the Cape Flats survey in Johannesburg and Durban. Cape Town is a fairly
unique political context. It is the only municipality in South Africa not governed
by the ANC and it is the only municipality in which the majority population is not
Black African, rather it is Coloured. Therefore, whether the findings of chapter
6 are generalizable to other parts of South Africa remains an open question. The
results of similar surveys in other South African cities would either strengthen the
findings or raise additional questions about how different local contexts affect in-
dividual level protest participation. The surveys could then be extended to cities
in other African countries to determine how different national contexts affect such
decisions.
More research is also needed into the myriad local campaigns that emerge
in the landscape of service delivery protest in South Africa. Few protests in South
Africa have explicitly cited food insecurity or food prices as a significant grievance
but this research suggests that food insecurity is, nonetheless, a significant driver
of individual participation. I had originally planned to interview local organizers
in Cape Town and Johannesburg about framing of issues and mobilization strate-
gies. This was not possible with available resources, but any future surveys in Cape
Town, Johannesburg, or Durban should include an additional research component
for more open-ended interviews with protesters and with organizers about these
issues.
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Next, I have argued that certain economic and social programs may help
prevent socio-political unrest. Which policies are more effective and efficient, how-
ever, remains a question for future research. Is it better to ensure stable food prices
through producer subsidies, enable more decentralized production through urban
agriculture programs, or provide direct cash transfers to the most impoverished and
food insecure citizens? These are questions that beg answers.
Finally, I plan to conduct additional research into the extent to which South
African policy-makers consider the effects on socio-political unrest in their delib-
erations about food and agricultural policies and how these decisions could be im-
proved. This line of inquiry would also include research into the economic and
social cost of any potential unrest. Such research combined with the probability
of unrest from differing policies could be used in cost-benefit analyses that could
inform future policy decisions.
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Table A.1: Probit results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Occurrence of unrest
Standardized change in 0.020 0.038* 0.009 0.027 0.023 0.025
domestic food price index (0.219) (0.046) (0.494) (0.100) (0.134) (0.124)
Trade balance adjusted 0.029** 0.017+ 0.015* 0.016*
grain price instrument (0.001) (0.055) (0.036) (0.039)
Nine month dry MSCP (t–1) 0.038+ 0.040 0.050* 0.046+
(0.095) (0.173) (0.036) (0.064)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 1.178** 0.744** 0.965** 0.716**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.022 0.046** 0.039* 0.046**
(0.273) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006)
National elections 0.523** 0.589**
(0.000) (0.000)
Polity IV democracy -0.046* -0.068**
(0.010) (0.001)
Polity IV autocracy -0.068** -0.052*
(0.000) (0.020)
Occurence of armed conflict -0.139 -0.047
(0.141) (0.574)
Population (millions) 0.013** 0.012
(0.000) (0.290)
Population growth (monthly -0.142 -0.137
%) (0.619) (0.684)
Urban population (% of -0.000 -0.015
total) (0.986) (0.504)
Youth population (% of -0.028* -0.032
total 14 & under) (0.015) (0.408)
GDP per cap (in 000, -0.031 -0.155
constant 2005 USD) (0.610) (0.280)
Life expectancy at birth -0.021 -0.015
total (years) (0.145) (0.438)
Infant mortality rate (per -0.004 -0.005
1,000 births) (0.301) (0.407)
Country, year, & cal month FE no yes no yes no yes
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102
Log psuedolikelihood -5,972 -4,837 -5,148 -4,585 -4,850 -4,527
Positive predictive value . 69.67 57.74 68.96 65.80 69.91
Negative predictive value 72.17 79.32 83.66 81.53 80.62 81.72
Correctly classified 72.17 77.92 76.47 79.20 77.93 79.54
Wald X2 2 . 181 . 988 .
X2 p-value 0.219 . 0.000 . 0.000 .
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table A.2: Endogenous probit results using international commodity price instru-
mental variable
(1) (2) (3)
Standardized change in 0.501+ 0.518** 0.484**
domestic food price index (0.075) (0.010) (0.009)
Nine month dry MSCP (t–1) 0.002 0.010
(0.942) (0.717)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.613** 0.604**
(0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.056** 0.055**
(0.000) (0.000)
National elections 0.508**
(0.000)
Polity IV democracy -0.059**
(0.001)
Polity IV autocracy -0.054**
(0.007)
Occurence of armed conflict -0.048
(0.535)
Population (millions) 0.012
(0.255)
Population growth (monthly -0.128
%) (0.645)
Urban population (% of -0.009
total) (0.693)
Youth population (% of -0.021
total 14 & under) (0.467)
GDP per cap (in 000, -0.065
constant 2005 USD) (0.645)
Life expectancy at birth -0.010
total (years) (0.512)
Infant mortality rate (per -0.004
1,000 births) (0.433)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102
Log psuedolikelihood -19,037 -18,764 -18,694
Positive predictive value 57.69 60.62 62.19
Negative predictive value 79.26 81.02 81.31
Correctly classified 75.12 76.69 77.29
Wald X2 1124652 1040056 4.36e+10
X2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 1.900 4.028 4.391
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.168 0.045 0.036
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include country, year, and
calendar month fixed effects.
177
Table A.3: Endogenous probit results using local rainfall instrumental variable
(1) (2) (3)
Standardized change in 0.257 0.543+ 0.594*
domestic food price index (0.496) (0.053) (0.010)
Trade balance adjusted -0.001 -0.004
grain price instrument (0.941) (0.710)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.600** 0.549**
(0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.056** 0.056**
(0.000) (0.000)
National elections 0.466**
(0.001)
Polity IV democracy -0.054*
(0.013)
Polity IV autocracy -0.053**
(0.006)
Occurence of armed conflict -0.046
(0.534)
Population (millions) 0.011
(0.270)
Population growth (monthly -0.120
%) (0.632)
Urban population (% of -0.007
total) (0.759)
Youth population (% of -0.017
total 14 & under) (0.567)
GDP per cap (in 000, -0.037
constant 2005 USD) (0.777)
Life expectancy at birth -0.009
total (years) (0.559)
Infant mortality rate (per -0.004
1,000 births) (0.466)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102
Log psuedolikelihood -19,028 -18,764 -18,694
Positive predictive value 67.48 59.62 58.63
Negative predictive value 79.43 80.93 81.11
Correctly classified 77.58 76.33 76.05
Wald X2 1010815 850215 3221
X2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 0.317 2.233 3.597
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.573 0.135 0.058
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include country, year, and
calendar month fixed effects.
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Table A.4: Endogenous probit results using both instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3)
Standardized change in 0.329 0.534** 0.558**
domestic food price index (0.192) (0.006) (0.001)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.605** 0.569**
(0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.056** 0.055**
(0.000) (0.000)
National elections 0.481**
(0.000)
Polity IV democracy -0.056**
(0.005)
Polity IV autocracy -0.053**
(0.006)
Occurence of armed conflict -0.047
(0.531)
Population (millions) 0.011
(0.261)
Population growth (monthly -0.124
%) (0.634)
Urban population (% of -0.007
total) (0.735)
Youth population (% of -0.018
total 14 & under) (0.531)
GDP per cap (in 000, -0.047
constant 2005 USD) (0.717)
Life expectancy at birth -0.009
total (years) (0.538)
Infant mortality rate (per -0.004
1,000 births) (0.452)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102
Log psuedolikelihood -19,023 -18,764 -18,694
Positive predictive value 64.88 60.08 60.03
Negative predictive value 79.46 81.01 81.21
Correctly classified 77.06 76.51 76.57
Wald X2 211796 467844 5097
X2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 1.185 4.602 6.164
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.276 0.032 0.013
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include country, year, and
calendar month fixed effects.
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Table A.5: Endogenous probit results for different types of unrest (part 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized change in domestic food price index 0.459* 0.626* 0.724** 0.623*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.000) (0.026)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.037 0.066* 0.054** 0.045
(0.168) (0.023) (0.003) (0.110)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.342** 0.173* 0.279** 0.191*
(0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.048)
National elections 0.715** 0.626** 0.473** 0.572**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Polity IV democracy -0.039* -0.031+ -0.042** -0.042*
(0.031) (0.065) (0.005) (0.012)
Polity IV autocracy -0.055* -0.090** -0.067** -0.097**
(0.026) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102 9,844
Log psuedolikelihood -17,006 -16,182 -17,553 -15,676
Wald X2 8305 3856 4000 4019
X2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 4.037 2.825 18.704 2.468
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.045 0.093 0.000 0.116
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include country, year, &
calendar month fixed effects and unreported covariates; model (1) Violent unrest; model (2) Riots (spontaneous and
organized); model (3) Spontaneous events (demonstrations and riots); model (4) Spontaneous violent riots
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Table A.6: Endogenous probit results for different types of unrest (part 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized change in domestic food price index 0.582* 0.483* 0.091 0.046
(0.029) (0.039) (0.900) (0.919)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.046* 0.023 0.019 0.013
(0.024) (0.343) (0.670) (0.761)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.445** 0.419** 0.509** 0.685**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
National elections 0.381** 0.386** 0.438** -0.259*
(0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.034)
Polity IV democracy -0.064** -0.056* -0.074** -0.050**
(0.010) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001)
Polity IV autocracy -0.073** -0.068** -0.069** -0.039
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.170)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102
Log psuedolikelihood -17,585 -16,838 -16,250 -16,706
Wald X2 4755 7406 5734 4415
X2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 2.539 2.792 0.004 0.001
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.111 0.095 0.947 0.970
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include country, year, &
calendar month fixed effects and unreported covariates; model (1) Demonstrations (spontaneous and organized); model
(2) Spontaneous demonstrations; model (3) Organized events (demonstrations and riots); model (4) Strikes; Rwanda
excluded in model (4) because it perfectly predicts failure, i.e. no spontaneous violent riots
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Table A.7: Robustness checks (part 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized change in domestic 0.570** 0.634** 0.541** 0.544**
food price index (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.718** 0.555** 0.507**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.052** 0.060** 0.033
(0.001) (0.000) (0.155)
National elections 0.404** 0.480** 0.571**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Polity IV democracy -0.042** -0.049* -0.057**
(0.005) (0.016) (0.005)
Polity IV autocracy -0.067** -0.041* -0.031
(0.000) (0.047) (0.409)
Occurence of armed conflict -0.102 -0.034 -0.034
(0.237) (0.651) (0.684)
Population (millions) 0.011** -0.006 -0.003
(0.000) (0.569) (0.781)
Population growth (monthly %) -0.024 -0.125 0.141
(0.911) (0.664) (0.759)
Urban population (% of total) 0.000 0.004 0.006
(0.923) (0.823) (0.831)
Youth population (% of total 14 -0.024* -0.031 -0.065
& under) (0.013) (0.307) (0.188)
GDP per cap (in 000, constant -0.034 0.006 -0.106
2005 USD) (0.473) (0.964) (0.519)
Life expectancy at birth total -0.020+ -0.015 -0.009
(years) (0.063) (0.311) (0.651)
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 -0.004 -0.008+ -0.003
births) (0.130) (0.066) (0.685)
Country, year, & cal. month dummies no no yes yes
Observations 10,583 10,102 9,339 6,867
Log psuedolikelihood -21,194 -19,178 -17,318 -12,185
Positive predictive value 29.35 51.52 49.76 63.00
Negative predictive value 72.51 79.05 81.41 79.28
Correctly classified 66.47 72.86 76.39 75.36
Wald X2 10 2223 3973 173176
X2 p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 5.808 6.559 4.682 5.732
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.016 0.010 0.030 0.017
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; model (1) No fixed effects; no control
variables; model (2) No control variables; model (3) Excluding Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa; model (4) Limited to
post-1997 observations
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Table A.8: Robustness checks (part 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized change in domestic 0.554** 0.510** 0.640** 0.542**
food price index (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001)
Occurrence of unrest (t–1) 0.544** 0.597** 0.526** 0.556**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Six month wet MSCP (t–1) 0.064** 0.052** 0.056**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Wet MSCP over 6 months (GPCP) 0.073**
(0.006)
National elections 0.524** 0.496** 0.441** 0.500**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Polity IV democracy -0.056** -0.057** -0.051** -0.050**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Polity IV autocracy -0.040* -0.055** -0.053** -0.042*
(0.041) (0.008) (0.006) (0.043)
Occurence of armed conflict 0.005 -0.064 -0.060 -0.020
(0.950) (0.409) (0.419) (0.792)
Population (millions) 0.027+ 0.012 0.011 0.023+
(0.098) (0.197) (0.201) (0.082)
Population growth (monthly %) -0.012 -0.138 -0.122 -0.112
(0.961) (0.641) (0.638) (0.700)
Urban population (% of total) -0.029 0.002 0.003 -0.028
(0.325) (0.919) (0.853) (0.345)
Youth population (% of total 14 -0.004 -0.029 -0.023 -0.005
& under) (0.876) (0.337) (0.413) (0.862)
GDP per cap (in 000, constant 0.215 -0.049 -0.014 -0.010
2005 USD) (0.183) (0.723) (0.920) (0.928)
Life expectancy at birth total -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0.005
(years) (0.693) (0.467) (0.519) (0.790)
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001
births) (0.624) (0.121) (0.156) (0.887)
Country, year, & cal. month dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 7,387 10,102 10,102 8,295
Log psuedolikelihood -13,886 -18,701 -18,703 -15,486
Positive predictive value 58.51 61.70 56.59 59.48
Negative predictive value 82.16 81.28 80.94 82.26
Correctly classified 77.14 77.13 75.25 77.60
Wald X2 49441 9551 3767 2442
X2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald X2 test of exogeneity 4.958 4.617 6.711 6.110
Exogeneity X2 p-value 0.026 0.032 0.010 0.013
+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; model (1) Limited to pre-2007
observations; model (2) Using 6 month dry MSCP; model (3) Using 12 month dry MSCP; model (4) Using GPCP
rainfall data
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Table A.9: Food price changes and predicted probability of unrest by country
Monthly change in Increase in food prices 1 SD increase in food prices
food prices (%) equal to long-term mean over long-term mean
Pred. 95% C.I. Pred. 95% C.I
Country Mean SD prob (%) lower upper prob (%) lower upper
Algeria 0.86 3.10 44.0 42.7 45.3 65.8 52.2 79.4
Angola 2.15 2.07 23.0 17.4 28.5 42.8 22.4 63.2
Benin 0.51 3.19 14.4 8.6 20.2 30.7 9.9 51.6
Botswana 0.78 0.69 6.8 2.0 11.7 17.6 -0.6 35.8
Burkina Faso 0.42 3.43 21.6 16.2 26.9 40.9 20.8 61.1
Burundi 1.03 4.27 29.9 25.5 34.3 51.2 32.7 69.7
Cameroon 0.42 1.68 19.1 13.3 24.9 37.6 16.7 58.5
Central African Rep 0.72 6.40 38.8 36.3 41.4 60.8 45.3 76.3
Chad 0.54 4.27 15.8 9.9 21.8 32.9 11.8 53.9
Congo 0.55 4.61 12.0 6.3 17.7 26.9 6.4 47.3
Coˆte dIvoire 0.44 2.35 54.2 52.9 55.6 74.7 64.9 84.4
Egypt 0.64 1.99 76.3 70.9 81.7 89.8 86.7 93.0
Ethiopia 0.89 3.09 20.5 14.6 26.4 39.5 18.6 60.4
Gabon 0.31 2.51 20.9 15.5 26.3 40.0 19.8 60.3
Gambia 0.53 1.56 6.1 1.3 10.9 16.1 -1.7 34.0
Ghana 1.39 2.14 20.5 14.8 26.2 39.4 18.8 60.1
Guinea 1.21 2.08 23.2 17.8 28.7 43.1 22.9 63.3
Guinea-Bissau 1.38 4.31 17.0 11.4 22.6 34.6 14.0 55.1
Kenya 1.17 3.43 53.9 52.8 55.0 74.4 64.4 84.4
Lesotho 0.80 0.83 14.5 8.9 20.1 30.8 10.4 51.3
Madagascar 1.03 2.60 17.9 11.9 23.9 35.9 14.7 57.0
Malawi 1.70 5.04 36.1 32.9 39.3 58.0 41.5 74.6
Mali 0.36 2.62 17.4 11.6 23.3 35.2 14.3 56.2
Mauritania 0.55 1.32 25.3 20.3 30.3 45.7 26.3 65.2
Morocco 0.28 1.70 34.6 31.1 38.2 56.4 39.5 73.4
Mozambique 1.05 2.34 18.7 12.9 24.4 37.0 16.1 57.8
Namibia 0.69 0.83 6.3 1.7 10.8 16.5 -1.0 34.0
Niger 0.47 3.01 39.6 37.3 41.8 61.5 46.4 76.7
Nigeria 1.46 2.82 84.6 77.5 91.6 94.2 92.4 96.1
Rwanda 0.79 2.48 15.0 9.2 20.9 31.6 10.8 52.5
Senegal 0.35 2.56 28.7 24.1 33.2 49.8 31.1 68.5
Sierra Leone 1.34 5.16 30.2 25.8 34.6 51.5 33.1 70.0
South Africa 0.73 0.89 76.8 71.2 82.4 90.1 87.4 92.9
Swaziland 0.94 2.42 17.4 11.0 23.7 35.1 13.6 56.6
Tanzania 1.23 2.51 21.0 15.4 26.7 40.2 19.6 60.8
Togo 0.45 3.87 23.8 18.5 29.1 43.8 23.8 63.8
Tunisia 0.37 0.86 15.6 9.3 21.9 32.5 11.1 53.9
Uganda 0.88 3.44 21.9 16.3 27.6 41.4 20.9 62.0
Zambia 2.46 3.69 35.6 31.8 39.4 57.5 40.3 74.7
Zimbabwe 4.31 6.94 59.9 56.7 63.0 79.0 71.5 86.5
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Table A.10: LexisNexis South Africa media sources metadata
Source Number of articles Distribution Frequency Circulation Readership
Saturday 
circulation
Saturday 
readership
Sunday 
circulation
Sunday 
readership
Business Day 896 Nationwide daily 33,690 59,000
Cape Argus * 938 Western Cape (Cape Town) daily 33,247 294,000 43,114 155,000 18,601 140,000
Cape Times 539 Western Cape (Cape Town) daily 35,616 258,000
Daily Dispatch 381 Eastern Cape (East London) daily 28,879 238,000 22,126 130,000
Daily News 354 KwaZuzlu-Natal daily 32,002 295,000
Financial Mail 159 Nationwide weekly 27,691
Mail & Guardian 362 Nationwide weekly 45,279 459,000
Post 44 KwaZulu-Natal; Guateng Wednesdays 44,984 345,000
Pretoria News ** 673 Gauteng; Mpumalanga; North West daily 18,775 141,000 11,382 34,000
Sowetan 730 Gauteng; Nationwide daily 98,258 1,646,000
Sunday Times 336 Nationwide Sunday 442,108 3,411,000
Sunday Tribune 203 KwaZulu-Natal Sunday 75,304 446,000
Sunday World 95 Nationwide Sunday 126,120 1,526,000
The Herald 599 Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) daily 23,372 257,000
The Independent on Saturday 56 KwaZulu-Natal Saturday 44,169 219,000
The Mercury 304 KwaZulu-Natal (Durban) daily 31,025 234,000
The New Age 322 Nationwide daily 107,000
The Star 1,031 Gauteng; Nationwide daily 106,484 615,000 76,897 249,000
The Sunday Independent 314 KwaZulu-Natal; Gauteng; Northern Cape Sunday 35,200 81,000
The Times 472 Nationwide daily 287,000
The Weekender 29
Weekend Post 86 Eastern Cape Saturday 22,137 194,000
* includes Argus Weekend
** includes Pretoria News Weekend
Ceased publication in November 2009
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Table A.11: Afrobarometer living conditions responses
2002 2004 2006 2008 2011
3.367 3.098 3.140 2.943 3.088
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
1554 1698 1769 1482 1503
3.243 3.298 3.460 2.828 3.512
(0.049) (0.053) (0.063) (0.056) (0.049)
345 275 276 372 408
3.118 3.227 3.136 3.023 3.084
(0.058) (0.052) (0.064) (0.055) (0.046)
304 264 236 343 345
3.520 3.511 3.500 3.168 3.162
(0.081) (0.081) (0.11) (0.094) (0.098)
123 133 68 125 105
2002 2004 2006 2008 2011
3.086 3.122 3.164 3.013 3.134
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024)
1580 1710 1791 1496 1525
2.848 2.982 3.157 2.667 3.223
(0.048) (0.047) (0.052) (0.053) (0.044)
342 277 280 387 412
3.054 3.269 3.158 2.815 3.090
(0.056) (0.046) (0.054) (0.054) (0.044)
316 268 240 346 344
3.089 3.269 3.507 3.194 2.705
(0.081) (0.071) (0.109) (0.089) (0.113)
124 134 69 129 105
2002 2004 2006 2008 2011
3.458 3.446 3.771 3.342 3.725
(0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.026)
1449 1635 1689 1441 1471
2.782 3.033 3.330 2.569 3.560
(0.062) (0.048) (0.065) (0.058) (0.051)
294 269 267 369 398
3.221 3.526 3.775 3.206 3.456
(0.063) (0.05) (0.053) (0.063) (0.051)
294 251 227 320 338
2.760 3.402 3.912 3.049 3.068
(0.085) (0.079) (0.106) (0.109) (0.127)
121 127 68 123 103
Black
White
Asian
Personal living conditions compared to others
Personal living conditions compared to 12 months ago
Expected personal living conditions in 12 months compared to present
Black
White
Asian
Coloured
Black
White
Coloured
Coloured
Asian
Source: Afrobarometer South Africa surveys
186
Table A.12: Afrobarometer group economic situation responses
2002 2004 2006 2008 2011
3.276 2.859 2.791 3.057
(0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028)
1461 1530 1648 1285
3.362 3.354 3.022 3.560
(0.052) (0.058) (0.077) (0.06)
298 198 227 325
3.356 3.044 3.246 3.357
(0.059) (0.067) (0.062) (0.057)
281 158 191 255
3.485 3.308 2.556 3.219
(0.096) (0.095) (0.106) (0.109)
103 107 63 114
Black
White
Coloured
Asian
Source: Afrobarometer South Africa surveys
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Appendix B
Afrobarometer survey question merge
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Afrobarometer	  question	  merge
Page	  1	  of	  4
R1 
(2000)
R2 
(2002)
R2.5 
(2004)
R3 
2006) R4 (2008
R5 
(2011)
lc_oth
Personal living 
conditions compared 
to others
Q4 Q2B Q5 Q5 Q5 Q4
In general, how do you rate: Your living 
conditions compared to those of other 
South Africans?
1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 
= Better, 5 = Much better, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
lc_past
Personal living 
conditions compared 
to 12 months ago
Q3B Q6B Q6B Q6B Q5B
Looking back, how do you rate the 
following compared to twelve months 
ago: Your living conditions?
1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 
= Better, 5 = Much better, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
lc_fut
Expected living 
conditions in 12 
months compared to 
present
Q4B Q7B Q7B Q7B Q6B
Looking ahead, do you expect the 
following to be better or worse: Your living 
conditions in twelve months time?
1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 
= Better, 5 = Much better, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
lc_apart
Personal living 
conditions compared 
to apartheid
Q3SAF Q6SAF Q6SAF Is your life today better, about the same or worse than it was under apartheid?
1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 
= Better, 5 = Much better, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
grp_econ
Group economic 
conditions compared 
to other groups
Q85 Q55 Q80A Q80A Q80
Think about the condition of 
____________ [respondent’s identity 
group] Are their economic conditions 
worse, the same as, or better than other 
groups in this country?
1 = Much worse, 2 = Worse, 3 = Same, 4 
= Better, 5 = Much better, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
grp_trmt
Group treatment 
compared to other 
groups
Q86 Q56 Q81 Q81 Q82 Q85A
How often are ___________s 
[respondent’s identity group] treated 
unfairly by the government?
0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = 
Always, 7 = Not Applicable, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Always, 2 = To a large extent, 3 
= Some extent, 4 = Hardly, 5 = Never, 6 = 
don’t know, 97 = Not applicable, 98 = 
Refused, 99 = Missing Data
act_demo
Attended a 
demonstration or 
protest march (0-4)
Q93A Q25D Q31C Q31C Q23C Q26D
Here is a list of actions that people 
sometimes take as citizens. For each of 
these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these things 
during the past year. If not, would you do 
this if you had the chance: Attended a 
demonstration or protest march?
0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = 
Always, 7 = Not Applicable, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Yes, often, 2 = Yes, a few times, 
3 = Yes, once or twice, 4 = No, but would 
do it if had the chance, 5 = no, would 
never do this, 6 = Don’t know, 98 = 
Refused, 99 = Missing Data
act_meet Attended community meetings (0-4) Q25B Q31A Q31A Q23A Q26A
Here is a list of actions that people 
sometimes take as citizens. For each of 
these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these things 
during the past year. If not, would you do 
this if you had the chance: Attended a 
community meeting?
0 = No, would never do this, 1 = No, but 
would do if had the chance, 2 = Yes, once 
or twice, 3 = Yes, several times, 4 = Yes, 
often, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
Questionnaire variable by survey roundVariable 
name Variable label Question Response scale Notes
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Afrobarometer	  question	  merge
Page	  2	  of	  4
R1 
(2000)
R2 
(2002)
R2.5 
(2004)
R3 
2006) R4 (2008
R5 
(2011)
Questionnaire variable by survey roundVariable 
name Variable label Question Response scale Notes
resp_wb Resp for well-being: people vs. govt (1-4) Q19 Q61 Q19 Q19
Lets talk for a moment about the kind of 
society we would like to have in this 
country. Which of the following 
statements is closest to your view? 
Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: 
People should look after themselves and 
be responsible for their own success in 
life. B: The government should bear the 
main responsibility for the well-being of 
people.
1 = Agree Very Strongly with A, 2 = Agree 
with A, 3 = Agree with B, 4 = Agree Very 
Strongly with B, 5 = Agree with Neither, 9 
= Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -
1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = A, strongly; 2 = A, somewhat; 3 
= B, somewhat; 4 = B, strongly, 5 = Don’t 
Know, 6 = Do not agree with either, 98 = 
Refused, 99 = Missing Data
oth_ignore Others don't listen to you (1-5) Q28B Q18B Q18B
Do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? As far as politics is 
concerned, friends and neighbors do not 
listen to you.
1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = 
Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = 
Disagree, 5 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = 
Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 
= Missing Data
lgov_list Local govt councilors listen Q50B Q62B Q62B Q54B Q62B
How much of the time do think the 
following try their best to listen to what 
people like you have to say: Elected 
Local Government Councilors?
0 = Never 1 = Only Sometimes, 2 = 
Often, 3 = Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = 
Refused to Answer, -1 = Missing Data
comm_grp Member of community group Q24A Q28D Q28D Q22B Q25B
Now I am going to read out a list of 
groups that people join or attend. For 
each one, could you tell me whether you 
are an official leader, an active member, 
an inactive member, or not a member: A 
community development or self-help 
association?
0 = Not a Member, 1 = Inactive Member, 
2 = Active Member, 3 = Official Leader, 9 
= Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -
1 = Missing Data
lp_food Gone without food Q13A Q9A Q8A Q8A Q8A Q8A
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: 
Enough food to eat?
0 = Never, 1 = Just once or twice, 2 = 
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = 
Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = 
Rarely, 4 = Never, 5 = Don’t Know, 99 = 
Missing data
lp_wat Gone without water Q13E Q9B Q8B Q8B Q8B Q8B
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: 
Enough clean water for home use?
0 = Never, 1 = Just once or twice, 2 = 
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = 
Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = 
Rarely, 4 = Never, 5 = Don’t Know, 99 = 
Missing data
lp_med Gone without medical care Q13C Q9C Q8C Q8C Q8C Q8C
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: 
Medicines or medical treatment?
0 = Never, 1 = Just once or twice, 2 = 
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = 
Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = 
Rarely, 4 = Never, 5 = Don’t Know, 99 = 
Missing data
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lp_fuel Gone without cooking fuel Q13H Q9E Q8D Q8D Q8D Q8D
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: 
Enough fuel to cook your food?
0 = Never, 1 = Just once or twice, 2 = 
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = 
Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – In the last twelve months, how often 
have you or your family: H. Gone without 
enough fuel to heat your home or cook 
your food?
R1 – 1 = Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = 
Rarely, 4 = Never, 5 = Don’t Know, 99 = 
Missing data
lp_inc Gone without cash income Q13D Q9F Q8E Q8E Q8E Q8E
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: A 
cash income?
0 = Never, 1 = Just once or twice, 2 = 
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = 
Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = 
Rarely, 4 = Never, 5 = Don’t Know, 99 = 
Missing data
lp_elec Gone without electricity Q13G Q9D
Q8F-
SAF
Q8F-
SAF
Q8F-
SAF
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: 
Electricity in your home?
0 = Never, 1 = Just once or twice, 2 = 
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = 
Always, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 = Refused to 
Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = 
Rarely, 4 = Never, 5 = Don’t Know, 99 = 
Missing data
educ Highest education level Q113 Q84 Q90 Q90 Q89 Q97
What is the highest level of education you 
have completed?
0 = No formal schooling, 1 = Informal 
schooling, 2 = Some primary schooling, 3 
= Primary school completed, 4 = Some 
secondary school/ High school, 5 = 
Secondary school completed/High 
school, 6 = Post-secondary qualifications, 
not university, 7 = Some university, 8 = 
radio Radio news Q42A Q26A Q15A Q15A Q12A Q13A How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio?
0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 
= A few times a month, 3 = A few times a 
week, 4 = Every day, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 
= Refused to Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Everyday, 2 = A few times a 
week, 3 = A few times a month, 4 = Less 
than once a month, 5 = Never, 6 = Do not 
know, 98 = Refused, 99 = Missing Data
tv Television news Q42B Q26B Q15B Q15B Q12B Q13B How often do you get news from the following sources: Television?
0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 
= A few times a month, 3 = A few times a 
week, 4 = Every day, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 
= Refused to Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Everyday, 2 = A few times a 
week, 3 = A few times a month, 4 = Less 
than once a month, 5 = Never, 6 = Do not 
know, 98 = Refused, 99 = Missing Data
papers Newspaper news Q42C Q26C Q15C Q15C Q12C Q13C How often do you get news from the following sources: Newspapers?
0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 
= A few times a month, 3 = A few times a 
week, 4 = Every day, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 
= Refused to Answer, -1 = Missing Data
R1 – 1 = Everyday, 2 = A few times a 
week, 3 = A few times a month, 4 = Less 
than once a month, 5 = Never, 6 = Do not 
know, 98 = Refused, 99 = Missing Data
internet Internet news Q13D How often do you get news from the following sources: Internet?
0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 
= A few times a month, 3 = A few times a 
week, 4 = Every day, 9 = Don’t Know, 98 
= Refused to Answer, -1 = Missing Data
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int_pa Interest in public affairs Q27 Q16 Q16 Q13 Q14 How interested are you in public affairs?
R2.5 – R5: 0 = Not at all interested, 1 = 
Not very interested, 2 = Somewhat 
interested, 3 = Very interested, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
R2; 0 = Not interested, 1 = Somewhat 
interested, 2 = Very interested, 9 = Don’t 
Know, 98 = Refused to Answer, -1 = 
Missing Data
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FOOD & PROTEST QUESTIONNAIRE – ODD DAYS 
 
 
A01 Enumerator 
number  A02 Date DD/MM/YYYY A03 Start time 
AM 
PM 
 
A04 Municipality CPT A05 Enumeration area 199___________ 
 
A06 In what language is the interview being conducted? Afrikaans 1 
English 2 
IsiXhosa 3 
IsiZulu 4 
Other [Specify]:  
 
A07 Module order Protest module first 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS MODULE 
 
Transition into module: 
The first few questions are basic demographic questions. Remember that I will not record your name or any other 
identifying information. Still, if you are uncomfortable answering any of these questions, you are free to decline. 
 
D01 What is the gender of the respondent? Female 1 
Male 2 
Other / refused 9 
 
D02 What is your current age?  D03 In what year were you born?  
 
D04a In which country were you 
born? 
South Africa [GO TO D04b] 1 
Other [Specify]: [GO TO D05]  
Don’t know / refused [GO TO D05] 9 
 
D04b In which province were you born? 
Eastern Cape 1 Mpumalanga 6 
Free State 2 North West 7 
Gauteng 3 Northern Cape 8 
KwaZulu-Natal 4 Western Cape 9 
Limpopo 5 Not applicable 88 
 Don’t know / refused 99 
 
D05 How would you describe yourself in terms of population group? 
Black African 1 White 4 
Coloured 2 Other 5 
Indian / Asian 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
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D06 Which language is predominantly used in your household? [Select from below based on response.] 
Afrikaans 01 Sesotho 07 
English 02 Setswana 08 
IsiNdebele 03 Sign language 09 
IsiXhosa 04 Tshivenda 10 
IsiZulu 05 Xitsonga 11 
Sepedi 06 Other [Specify]: 12 
 Don’t know / refused 99 
 
D07 What is your present marital status? [Select from below based on response.] 
Married 1 Widowed 4 
Living together like married partners 2 Separated 5 
Never married 3 Divorced 6 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D08 What is the highest level of education you have completed? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS. CODE FROM 
RESPONSE] 
No formal schooling 01 Post-secondary qualification (diploma or certificate with more than Grade 12 / Std 10) 06 
Some primary school (less than Grade 9 / Std 7) 02 Some university but no degree 07 
Primary school completed (Grade 9 / Std 7) 03 Bachelors degree  08 
Secondary school diploma with Grade 12 / Std 
10 (Matric) 04 
Honours degree 
  09 
Diploma or certificate with less than Grade 12 / 
Std 10 05 
Higher degree (Masters / PhD) 10 
 Don’t know / refused to answer 99 
 
D09a How would you describe your current employment status? 
Unemployed [GO TO D09b] 1 
Working on a temporary or day-labor basis [GO TO D09b] 2 
Self-employed [GO TO D09b] 3 
Employed part-time (less than 30 hours per week) [GO TO D10] 4 
Employed full-time (more than 30 hours per week) [GO TO D10] 5 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO D09b] 9 
 
D09b [IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED 1, 2, 3 OR 9 ABOVE, 
ASK:] Are you actively seeking employment at this time? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Not applicable 8 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D10 How many people are in your household, including children? A household member is 
someone who regularly sleeps and takes meals in the household, and relies substantially 
on the combined household income for support. 
 
 
D11 How many children under age 18 are in your household? [Children 17 years and under.]  
 
D12 How many members of your household contribute to the household income, i.e. help pay 
household expenses?  
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D13 Are you the primary income earner for your household? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D14 Are you the person primarily responsible for purchasing food 
and other household needs? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D15 Which of the following best describes the MAIN dwelling that your household occupies? [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
House or brick/concrete block structure on a 
separate stand or yard 01 House/flat/room in backyard 06 
Traditional dwelling/hut/structure made of 
traditional materials 02 Informal dwelling (shack in backyard) 07 
Flat or apartment in a block of flats 03 
Informal dwelling (shack not in backyard, e.g. 
in an informal/squatter settlement or on a 
farm) 
08 
Cluster house in a complex 04 Caravan/tent 09 
Semi-detached house 05 Other 10 
  Don’t know / refused 99 
 
D16 What is the tenure status of this dwelling? [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
Occupied rent free 1 Rented 4 
Owned and fully paid off 2 Other 5 
Owned but not yet paid off 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D17 In which way does this household mainly get piped water for household use? [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
Piped (tap) water inside the dwelling 1 
Piped (tap) water inside the yard 2 
Piped (tap) water on a community stand 3 
No access to piped water 7 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D18 Does this household own any of the following in working order? [READ EACH ITEM AND RECORD 
RESPONSE.] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. Refrigerator 0 1 9 
b. Electric / gas stove 0 1 9 
c. Vacuum cleaner 0 1 9 
d. Washing machine 0 1 9 
e. Computer / laptop 0 1 9 
f. Satellite television 0 1 9 
g. DVD player 0 1 9 
h. Motorcar 0 1 9 
i. Motorcycle / scooter 0 1 9 
j. Television 0 1 9 
k. Radio 0 1 9 
l. Landline / telephone 0 1 9 
m. Cell phone 0 1 9 
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D19 On what basis does your household receive regular income, if at all? [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
Weekly [Insert WEEK in questions D20 and D21.] 1 
Bi-weekly (every two weeks) [Insert MONTH in questions D20 and D21.] 2 
Monthly [Insert MONTH in questions D20 and D21.] 3 
No regular income [Insert WEEK in questions D20 and D21.] 4 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
D20 How much was your ACTUAL household income in the PAST (week / two weeks / 
month), not including any social grants from the South African Social Security Agency 
(SASSA)? 
ZAR 
 
D21 How much is your AVERAGE household income in a NORMAL (week / two-week 
period / month), not including any social grants from the South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA)? 
ZAR 
 
D22a In the past 12 months, since November of last year, have 
you or anyone in your household received a Child Social 
Grant (CSG) or Foster Care Grant from the South 
African Social Security Agency SASSA)? 
No [GO TO D23a] 0 
Yes [GO TO D22b] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO D23a] 9 
 
D22b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK:] What was the approximate total amount per month of the Child 
Support Grant(s) and/or Foster Care Grant(s) received from SASSA? ZAR 
 
D23a In the past 12 months, since November of last year, have 
you or anyone in your household received any other 
social grant or grants from the South African Social 
Security Agency SASSA)? 
No [GO TO D24] 0 
Yes [GO TO D23b] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO D24] 9 
 
D23b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK:] What was the approximate total amount per month of any grant 
or grants, other than CSGs and Foster Care Grants, received from SASSA? ZAR 
 
D24 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
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a. Gone without enough food to eat? 1 2 3 4 5  9 
b. Gone without enough clean water for home use? 1 2 3 4 5  9 
c. Gone without medicines or medical treatment? 1 2 3 4 5  9 
d. Gone without enough fuel to cook your food? 1 2 3 4 5  9 
e. Gone without a cash income? 1 2 3 4 5  9 
f. Gone without electricity in your home? 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
 
 
COMMUNITY AFFILIATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDE MODULE 
 
Transition into module: 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about your community and political affiliations and attitudes. Again, remember 
that your responses are completely anonymous. Still, you are free to refuse to answer if you choose. 
 
C01a Are you a member of a trade / labour union? No [GO TO C02] 0 
Yes [GO TO C01b] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO C02] 9 
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C01b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK:] To which union do 
you belong? ENTER RESPONSE 
 
C02 Which religion, if any, do you follow or identify with? ENTER CODE FROM RESPONSE OR SPECIFY IF OTHER 
 
C03 How important is religion in your life? 
Not important at all 1 
Not very important 2 
Somewhat important 3 
Very important 4 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
C04a Do you feel close to any particular political party? No [GO TO C05] 0 
Yes [GO TO C04b] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO C05] 9 
 
C04b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK; OTHERWISE SELECT “888”] Which party is that? 
[DO NOT READ OPTIONS. CODE FROM RESPONSE.] 
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 01 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 12 
African Independent Congress (AIC) 02 National Freedom Party (NFP) 13 
African National Congress (ANC) 03 National Party South Africa (NP) 14 
African People's Convention (APC) 04 Pan Africanist Congress Of Azania (PAC) 15 
Agang South Africa 05 Patriotic Alliance (PA) 16 
Al Jama-Ah 06 Ubuntu Party 17 
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 07 United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) 18 
Congress  Of The People (COPE) 08 United Democratic Movement (UDM) 19 
Democratic Alliance (DA) 09 Vryheidsfront Plus (VF+) 20 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 10 Other [Specify]:  
Independent Civic Organisation Of South Africa 
(ICOSA) 11 Not Applicable 88 
  Don't Know / Refused 99 
 
C05 Thinking about the last election, did you take any of the following actions? [READ EACH ITEM AND RECORD 
RESPONSE.] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. Did you vote? 0 1 9 
b. Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally? 0 1 9 
c. Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain presidential 
or legislative candidate or political party? 0 1 9 
d. Did you work or volunteer for a candidate or party? 0 1 9 
 
C06 When you get together with your friends or family, how 
often would you say that you discuss political matters? 
[READ OUT OPTIONS] 
Frequently 2 
Occasionally 1 
Never 0 
Don’t know / refused 9 
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C07 Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these things during the past 12 months, since November of last year. [IF YES, 
READ OUT OPTIONS 2–4]. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? [FOR NO, READ OUT OPTIONS 0 
AND 1] 
 Yes No 
D
on
’t 
kn
ow
 / 
re
fu
se
d  
Often Several times 
Once or 
twice 
Would if 
had the 
chance 
Would 
never 
do this 
a. Attended a community meeting 4 3 2 1 0 9 
b. Got together with others to raise an issue 4 3 2 1 0 9 
c. Contacted a government department to raise an 
issue 4 3 2 1 0 9 
d. Contacted radio, TV or a newspaper to complain 
about an issue 4 3 2 1 0 9 
e. Refused to pay for services provided by 
government like water, electricity or property 
rates 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
f. Refused to pay a tax or fee to government 4 3 2 1 0 9 
g. Attended a demonstration or protest march 4 3 2 1 0 9 
h. Gone on strike in order to demand a higher 
salary or better working conditions 4 3 2 1 0 9 
i. Used force or violence for a political cause 4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
C08 If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for? [DO NOT READ 
OPTIONS. CODE FROM RESPONSE] 
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 01 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 12 
African Independent Congress (AIC) 02 National Freedom Party (NFP) 13 
African National Congress (ANC) 03 National Party South Africa (NP) 14 
African People's Convention (APC) 04 Pan Africanist Congress Of Azania (PAC) 15 
Agang South Africa 05 Patriotic Alliance (PA) 16 
Al Jama-Ah 06 Ubuntu Party 17 
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 07 United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) 18 
Congress  Of The People (COPE) 08 United Democratic Movement (UDM) 19 
Democratic Alliance (DA) 09 Vryheidsfront Plus (VF+) 20 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 10 Other [Specify]:  
Independent Civic Organisation Of South Africa 
(ICOSA) 11 Don't Know / Refused 99 
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C09 How much do you trust each of the following, not at all, just a little, somewhat, or a lot, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say? [READ EACH ITEM AND OPTIONS AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
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a. The President, Jacob Zuma 1 2 3 4 9 
b. Parliament 1 2 3 4 9 
c. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 1 2 3 4 9 
d. The Premier of this Province, Helen Zille 1 2 3 4 9 
e. The Western Cape Provincial Government 1 2 3 4 9 
f. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) 1 2 3 4 9 
g. The Mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille 1 2 3 4 9 
h. The City of Cape Town Municipal Government 1 2 3 4 9 
i. The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) 1 2 3 4 9 
j. Opposition political parties 1 2 3 4 9 
k. The Police (SAPS) 1 2 3 4 9 
l. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 1 2 3 4 9 
m. The Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations, the Hawks 1 2 3 4 9 
n. The Army 1 2 3 4 9 
o. Courts of law 1 2 3 4 9 
p. Government broadcasting service, SABC TV and radio 1 2 3 4 9 
q. Independent broadcasting services like E TV, Radio 702 and 
community radio stations 1 2 3 4 9 
r. Independent newspapers 1 2 3 4 9 
 
C10 Are you a member or frequent participant in any of the following organizations? [READ OUT OPTIONS.] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. Community policing group / neighbourhood watch 0 1 9 
b. Parent teacher association 0 1 9 
c. Volunteer / development organisation 0 1 9 
d. Sports team / league 0 1 9 
e. Arts / theatre organisation 0 1 9 
f. Vigilante group 0 1 9 
g. Other [Specify]: 0 1 9 
h. Other [Specify]: 0 1 9 
i. Other [Specify]: 0 1 9 
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C11 How frequently do you attend any of the following types of meetings / gatherings? [READ OUT OPTIONS.] 
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a. Community policing / neighbourhood watch meetings 1 2 3 4 9 
b. Parent teacher association meetings 1 2 3 4 9 
c. Sporting events (as a participant) 1 2 3 4 9 
d. Volunteering opportunities 1 2 3 4 9 
e. Arts / theatre group meetings 1 2 3 4 9 
f. Religious services 1 2 3 4 9 
g. Political party meetings 1 2 3 4 9 
h. Labour / trade union meetings 1 2 3 4 9 
i. Other [Specify]: 1 2 3 4 9 
j. Other [Specify]: 1 2 3 4 9 
k. Other [Specify]: 1 2 3 4 9 
 
 
PROTEST PARTICIPATION MODULE 
 
Transition into module: 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about activities in which you may have participated in the past. 
 
P01 Have you ever participated in a march, protest, strike or any other type of public demonstration intended to 
express a grievance with or demand action from any of the following types of organizations or individuals? [READ 
EACH ITEM AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. The national government or a branch thereof? 0 1 9 
b. The provincial government or a branch thereof? 0 1 9 
c. The municipal government or a branch thereof? 0 1 9 
d. A foreign government? 0 1 9 
e. A private corporation or individual? 0 1 9 
 
P02 Have you ever participated in any public demonstration 
or protest of any type for any other purpose? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
SCREEN: If respondent answered “NO” all parts of P01 and P02, then skip to the next module, otherwise go to P03 
 
P03 Approximately how many times would you say that you have participated in some sort of demonstration or protest 
activity regardless of the grievance or demand? [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
Once or twice 1 At least 20 but fewer than 50 times 4 
More than twice but fewer than 10 times 2 At least 50 times or more 5 
At least 10 but fewer than 20 times 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
P04 Have you ever participated in any public demonstration 
or protest in the past 12 months, since November of last 
year? 
No [GO TO P09] 0 
Yes [GO TO P05] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO P09] 9 
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P05 Thinking about the most recent demonstration or protest in which you participated, approximately how many 
people were involved the action? [READ OUT OPTIONS] 
Less than 10 1 At least 200 but fewer than 1,000 4 
At least 10 but fewer than 50 2 At least 1,000 or more 5 
At least 50 but fewer than 200 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
P06 Thinking about the most recent demonstration or protest, please answer the following questions. [READ EACH 
ITEM AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. Was public or private property damaged or destroyed during the 
action? 0 1 9 
b. Was anyone physically injured during the action? 0 1 9 
c. Were the police present to keep order? 0 1 9 
d. Did the police use force to control the action? 0 1 9 
 
P07 Thinking about the most recent demonstration or protest in which you participated, what was the main issue 
expressed? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS BUT CODE FROM RESPONSE.] 
Cost or availability of electricity 01 
Lack of employment or jobs 02 
Wages or other labour issue 03 
Cost or availability of housing, including destruction of informal housing 04 
Cost or availability of transportation services 05 
Cost or availability of water 06 
Access to or cost of desirable and nutritious food 07 
Access to, cost or quality of education 08 
Access to, cost or quality of healthcare 09 
Lack or quality of other government services, e.g. sanitation, rubbish removal, etc. 10 
Lack of police or high crime (directed to authorities) 11 
Vigilante justice (directed at criminals) 12 
International relations, including international human rights 13 
Racial equality 14 
Gender equity or women’s rights 15 
Climate change / environmental issues 16 
Other [Specify]:  
 
P08a Again thinking about the most recent demonstration or 
protest in which you participated, was the action planned 
in advance? 
No [GO TO P09] 0 
Yes [ASK P08a – P08e] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO P09] 9 
 
P08b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK] How far in advance did you know about the action? [READ OPTIONS OUT] 
One day 1 More than one week but less than one month 4 
Two to three days 2 More than one month 5 
Four days to one week 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
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P08c [IF YES TO P08a, ASK] How did you first learn about the action? [READ OPTIONS OUT] 
Word of mouth, i.e. heard from friends or family 1 Notice in newspaper 5 
Phone call, email or SMS directly from organizer 2 Notice on radio or television 6 
Street posting or notice on community messaging 
board 3 
Other [Specify]: 
  
Website or internet posting 4 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
P08d [IF YES TO P08a, ASK] Did you attend any planning or 
organizing meetings prior to the actual activity? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
P08e [IF YES TO P08a, ASK] Did you tell others about the 
event or try to recruit others to join? [READ OPTIONS 
OUT] 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
P09 Thinking about ANY of the demonstrations or protests in which you have participated, please answer the 
following questions? [READ EACH ITEM AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. Was public or private property damaged or destroyed during the 
action? 0 1 9 
b. Was anyone physically injured during the action? 0 1 9 
c. Were the police present to keep order? 0 1 9 
d. Did the police use force to control the action? 0 1 9 
 
P10 Thinking about ANY of the demonstrations or protests in which you have participated, have any of them been 
about any of the following issues? [READ OUT EACH ITEM] 
 No Yes Don’t know / refused 
a. Cost or availability of electricity 0 1 9 
b. Lack of employment or jobs 0 1 9 
c. Wages or other labour issue 0 1 9 
d. Cost or availability of housing, including destruction of informal 
housing 
0 1 9 
e. Cost or availability of transportation services 0 1 9 
f. Cost or availability of water 0 1 9 
g. Access to or cost of desirable and nutritious food 0 1 9 
h. Access to, cost or quality of education 0 1 9 
i. Access to, cost or quality of healthcare 0 1 9 
j. Gender equity or women’s rights 0 1 9 
k. Lack or quality of other government services, e.g. sanitation, rubbish 
removal, etc. 
0 1 9 
l. Lack of police or high crime (directed to authorities) 0 1 9 
m. Vigilante justice (directed at criminals) 0 1 9 
n. International relations, including international human rights 0 1 9 
o. Racial equality 0 1 9 
p. Gender equity or women’s rights 0 1 9 
q. Climate change / environmental issues 0 1 9 
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FOOD SECURITY MODULE 
 
Transition into module: 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about food used in your household and the ways you are managing to meet 
your food needs. 
 
INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS: Select the appropriate fill from the parenthetical choices depending on the number of 
persons and number of adults in the household. 
 
I’m going to read you two statements that people have made about their food situation. For these statements, please tell 
me whether the statement was OFTEN true, SOMETIMES true, or NEVER true for (you/your household) in the last 12 
months—that is, since November of last year. 
 
F01 The first statement is “(I/We) worried whether (my/our) 
food would run out before (I/we) got money to buy more.” 
Was that often true, sometimes true, or never true for 
(you/your household) in the last 12 months, since 
November of last year? 
Often true 1 
Sometimes true 2 
Never true 3 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F02 “(I/we) couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.” Was that 
often, sometimes, or never true for (you/your household) 
in the last 12 months, since November of last year? 
Often true 1 
Sometimes true 2 
Never true 3 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F03a In the last 12 months, since last (name of current month), 
did (you/you or other adults in your household) ever cut 
the size of your meals or skip meals because there 
wasn't enough money for food? 
No [GO TO F04] 0 
Yes [GO TO F03b] 1 
Don’t know / refused [GO TO F04] 9 
 
F03b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK] How often did this happen – 
almost every month, some months but not every month, 
or in only 1 or 2 months? 
Almost every month 1 
Some months but not every month 2 
Only 1 or 2 months 3 
Not applicable 8 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F04 In the last 12 months, since November of last year, did 
you ever eat less than you felt you should because there 
wasn't enough money to buy food? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F05 In the last 12 months, since November of last year, were 
you every hungry but didn't eat because you couldn't 
afford enough food? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F06 In the past 24 hours, how many times have you eaten the following food items? [READ EACH ITEM AND 
RECORD RESPONSE.] 
a. Bread  e. Cheese  
b. Meat or meat products  f. Fish or fish products  
c. Fresh fruit  g. Rice  
d. Fresh vegetables  h. Maize or maize meal  
 i. Coffee or tea  
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F07 What proportion of your weekly household income would you estimate that you spend on food? 
Less than 10 per cent 1 30 to 40 per cent 4 
10 to 20 per cent 2 40 to 50 per cent 5 
20 to 30 per cent 3 More than half 6 
  Don’t know / refused 9 
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Now I’m going to ask you some questions about places where you and your household purchase food? 
 
F08a First, did you or anyone in your household shop for food at a 
supermarket or grocery store in the last seven (7) days? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F08b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK; OTHERWISE ENTER “0”] How much did your household 
ACTUALLY spend at supermarkets and grocery stores in the last seven (7) days? [Enter 
“DK” if resp. does not know or refuses to answer.] 
F08b    ZAR 
 
F08c [IF YES ABOVE, ASK; OTHERWISE ENTER “0”] How much of this was for non-food 
items, such as pet food, paper products, alcohol, detergents, or cleaning supplies? [Enter 
“DK” if resp. does not know or refuses to answer.] 
F08c    ZAR 
 
F09a Think about other places where people buy food, such as meat 
markets, produce stands, bakeries, and tuck shops. Did you or 
anyone in your household buy food from any stores such as these 
in the last seven (7) days? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F09b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK; OTHERWISE ENTER “0”] How much did your household 
ACTUALLY spend for food at stores such as meat markets, produce stands, bakeries, 
and tuck shops in the last seven (7) days? [Enter “DK” if resp. does not know or refuses 
to answer.] 
F09b    ZAR 
 
F10a In the last seven (7) days, did you or anyone in your household 
buy food at a restaurant, fast food place, cafeteria, or vending 
machine? (Include any children who may have bought food at the 
school cafeteria). 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F10b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK; OTHERWISE ENTER “0”] How much did you or your household 
ACTUALLY spend for food at restaurants, fast food places, cafeterias, and vending 
machines in the last seven (7) days, not including alcohol purchases? [Enter “DK” if resp. 
does not know or refuses to answer.] 
F10b    ZAR 
 
F11a Did you or anyone in your household buy food from any other kind 
of place in the last seven (7) days? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F11b [IF YES ABOVE, ASK; OTHERWISE ENTER “0”] How much did you or your household 
spend for food at any other kind of place in the last seven (7) days? [Enter “DK” if resp. 
does not know or refuses to answer.] 
 F11b    ZAR 
 
INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS: Pause here to complete 
calculations to the right and use the total, WEEKLY FOOD 
SPENDING, in the indicated space in question F12a. 
 Amounts from F08b F08b 
+ F09b F09b 
+ F10b F10b 
+ F11b F11b 
=  
– Amount from F08c F08c     
= WEEKLY FOOD SPENDING 
 
F12a It seems that (you/your household) spent [WEEKLY FOOD SPENDING] on food in the 
past week. Now think about how much (you/your household) USUALLY spend(s). How 
much (do you/does your household) USUALLY spend on food at all of the different 
places we've been talking about IN A WEEK? 
ZAR 
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People do different things to meet their food needs besides purchase food with their own money. I’m going to read a list of 
alternative ways to meet food needs, and I’d like you to tell me how often you or anyone in your household has done any 
of these things in the past 12 months. 
 
F13a Grown or produced your own food in your own household property or a community garden. How often have you 
done this in the past 12 months? 
Never [SKIP TO F14a] 1 More than 2 but not every month 3 
Only 1 or 2 months 2 Almost every month 4 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F13b Have you done this in the past (30) days? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F14a Purchased food with money received from “Social Relief of Distress” from SASSA. How often have you done this 
in the past 12 months? 
Never [SKIP TO F15a] 1 More than 2 but not every month 3 
Only 1 or 2 months 2 Almost every month 4 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F14b Have you done this in the past (30) days? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F15a Received food from a government run school feeding program. How often have you done this in the past 12 
months? 
Never [SKIP TO F16a] 1 More than 2 but not every month 3 
Only 1 or 2 months 2 Almost every month 4 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F15b Have you done this in the past (30) days? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F16a Received food from a church, a food pantry, a food bank, or other community program. How often have you done 
this in the past 12 months? 
Never [SKIP TO F17a] 1 More than 2 but not every month 3 
Only 1 or 2 months 2 Almost every month 4 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F16b Have you done this in the past (30) days? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F17a Purchased food with borrowed money. How often have you done this in the past 12 months? 
Never [SKIP TO F18a] 1 More than 2 but not every month 3 
Only 1 or 2 months 2 Almost every month 4 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F17b Have you done this in the past (30) days? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
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F18a Received food from a friend or family member when unable to purchase food. How often have you done this in 
the past 12 months? 
Never [SKIP TO F19] 1 More than 2 but not every month 3 
Only 1 or 2 months 2 Almost every month 4 
 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F18b Have you done this in the past (30) days? No 0 
Yes 1 
Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F19 In your opinion, how have food prices changed over the past 12 months compared to previous years? 
Fallen 1 Risen moderately 4 
Stayed about the same 2 Risen a lot 5 
Risen slightly 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F20 In your opinion, how have food prices changed over the past 30 days compared to previous months? 
Fallen 1 Risen moderately 4 
Stayed about the same 2 Risen a lot 5 
Risen slightly 3 Don’t know / refused 9 
 
F21 Now, focusing on a specific food items, how have the price changed over the past 12 months compared to 
previous years? [READ EACH ITEM AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
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a. Bread 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
b. Meat and meat products 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
c. Fresh fruit 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
d. Fresh vegetables 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
e. Cheese 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
f. Fish and fish products 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
g. Cooking oil 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
h. Sugar 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
i. Rice 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
j. Maize and maize meal 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
k. Coffee or tea 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
l. Ready-to-eat / prepared 
meals 1 2 3 4 5 
8 9 
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F22 In the past year have you or your household reduced consumption of and of the following items because it has 
become unaffordable? [READ EACH ITEM AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
 
No Yes 
Don’t normally 
consume / not 
applicable 
Don’t know / 
refused 
a. Bread 0 1 8 9 
b. Meat and meat products 0 1 8 9 
c. Fresh fruit 0 1 8 9 
d. Fresh vegetables 0 1 8 9 
e. Cheese 0 1 8 9 
f. Fish and fish products 0 1 8 9 
g. Cooking oil 0 1 8 9 
h. Sugar 0 1 8 9 
i. Rice 0 1 8 9 
j. Maize and maize meal 0 1 8 9 
k. Coffee or tea 0 1 8 9 
l. Ready-to-eat / prepared meals 0 1 8 9 
 
 
EXPERIMENT MODULE 
 
Transition into module: 
I will now read you a short news article and then ask you a few last questions. 
 
Interviewer: Read the randomized paragraph and indicate number of paragraph, then proceed with questions E02 – E05. 
 
E01 Experimental condition 1 2 3 4 5 
 
E03 How likely are you to participate in each of the following actions? [READ EACH ITEM AND RECORD 
RESPONSE.] 
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a. A demonstration march to Parliament to demand that the 
government take some action to help control food prices. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
b. A protest disrupting traffic to raise awareness for the 
difficulties of those most affected by high food prices. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
c. A labour strike demanding higher wages to help families 
afford healthy food. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
d. A civil disobedience action to seize food from a local 
supermarket and distribute it to families in need. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
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E02 I’m going to read you a list of five different policy initiatives that the South African government could take. Please 
tell me which of these initiatives you think is MOST IMPORTANT to respond to this information. [READ ALL 
ITEMS AND RECORD RESPONSE.] 
a. Provide subsidies to farmers to help control production costs. 1 
b. Impose export restrictions to ensure that South African agricultural products are used to meet needs in 
South Africa. 2 
c. Impose price controls on the consumer price of food and subsidize corporate food retailers for the higher 
costs. 3 
d. Increase job programs and raise minimum wages to help more people support themselves. 4 
e. Institute an expanded food voucher system to help low-income households cope with higher food prices. 5 
 
I would now like to ask you if you are willing to sign two petitions via SMS. You may choose to sign either or both of them 
or not to sign either one. The first petition asks government to take measures to control food prices and the second asks 
government to institute or expand a food voucher system to help low-income households purchase healthy food. 
 
E04 Would you sign a petition asking government to take measures to control food prices? If so, please send your 
name and “I support food price control” via SMS to 076 931 9031? Your name or number will not be connected to 
your responses to this questionnaire. 
YES, respondent sent SMS 1 
NO, respondent did NOT send SMS 0 
Respondent did not have a cell phone 9 
 
E05 Would you sign a petition asking government to institute a food voucher system to help low-income households 
purchase healthy food? If so, please send your name and “I support expending food vouchers” via SMS to 076 
931 9031? Your name or number will not be connected to your responses to this questionnaire. 
YES, respondent sent SMS 1 
NO, respondent did NOT send SMS 0 
Respondent did not have a cell phone 9 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. The news article that I read to you was a hypothetical, that is, it was not an 
actual news story. You should not be concerned about food prices rising as was stated. The petition will, however, be 
delivered to appropriate officials for consideration. 
 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
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SELECTION INSTRUCTIONS 
 
It is your job as an interviewer to select a random household (a household is a group of people who 
regularly eat meals together) and an appropriate member from each household to interview. Only 
adult South African citizens at least 18 but not more than 64 years old are eligible for participation. 
You must alternate between male and female respondents throughout the duration of the fieldwork. 
That is, if you end the day with an interview of a male you must begin the next day with a female. 
 
Starting at the predetermined intersection each interviewer must proceed in a different direction, if 
possible. If there are more interviewers than branches proceeding from the starting intersection, 
then two interviewers may proceed in the same direction and select households from opposite sides 
of the street. Use a three-house interval pattern to select households. For example, beginning your 
walk pattern from the corner select the third house on the left, unless two interviewers are 
proceeding in the same direction. You should take care to include households that may not be 
clearly visible from the road, such as backyard flats or shacks If you get no response from the first 
house you stop at indicate it on the call sheet and continue to the next house until you find someone 
at home. 
 
STEP 1 
 
When you find someone at home introduce yourself with the following script inserting your name 
and the appropriate gender: 
 
Hello, my name is _______________. I do not represent the government or any political 
party. I am conducting interviews for a researcher affiliated with the University of Cape 
Town. We are asking people about consumer perceptions and political activities. 
You’re household has been randomly selected to participate. All information obtained 
will be anonymous and confidential. As a token of appreciation a small amount of 
airtime credit will be transferred to the respondent’s account in the next few days. Are 
you willing to help us identify an eligible [male / female] respondent from your 
household? 
 
STEP 2 
 
If participation is refused or not possible, indicate the reason on the call sheet and continue to the 
next household. If the household is willing to participate, proceed according to the following script. 
 
a. How many [male / female] household members are between the ages of 18 and 64? 
[Note the number in your notepad.] 
 
b. Which of these household members has the next birthday? [Note the name in your 
notepad.] 
 
c. Is [insert name from above] available to be interviewed? [If “yes”, proceed to step 3. If 
“no” repeat questions (b) and (c) until you identify an eligible respondent. Then proceed to 
STEP 3.] 
 
STEP 3 
 
When you identify an eligible and willing participant, you must read the “Letter of Consent” to the 
respondent and obtain verbal consent. Leave the letter with the respondent. Once informed consent 
is obtained, record the gender of the respondent and the mobile phone number on the call sheet 
and proceed with the interview. Be sure to indicate to the respondent that the phone number is 
recorded on the call sheet and no identifying information is recorded on the questionnaire. 
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Proceed with the interview using the next questionnaire form in your stack for that day. Note that the 
order of the Food Security Module and the Protest Participation Module are not necessarily in the 
same order. The order of these modules is intended to be random. Do NOT alter the order and take 
care to proceed with the interview questions in the order that they appear in the particular 
questionnaire in use. 
 
When you get to the Experiment Module consult the random number table below and read the 
number of the experimental condition paragraph they corresponds with the date and the number of 
interview for that day. Do NOT make any substitutions of paragraphs and do NOT expand upon the 
paragraph read. 
 
  Interview                     
Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
10-Nov 1 1 4 3 3 3 4 1 4 3 2 4 
11-Nov 1 5 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 
12-Nov 1 2 4 2 2 5 1 5 2 4 4 1 
13-Nov 5 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 5 3 1 
14-Nov 5 3 1 5 3 1 5 2 1 2 2 3 
15-Nov 1 1 2 1 3 5 2 1 3 4 5 2 
17-Nov 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 5 3 4 1 1 
18-Nov 1 4 2 4 3 4 5 1 3 4 4 4 
19-Nov 1 2 1 1 3 1 4 2 3 1 1 5 
20-Nov 1 4 4 1 5 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 
21-Nov 3 5 4 4 2 4 2 5 5 1 1 1 
22-Nov 2 4 4 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 
24-Nov 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 4 4 1 1 3 
25-Nov 1 4 5 1 1 4 2 3 2 3 1 3 
26-Nov 4 3 3 3 4 1 4 5 4 1 5 4 
27-Nov 1 1 4 2 1 5 3 2 2 3 4 1 
28-Nov 2 3 5 1 2 4 5 4 5 4 1 3 
29-Nov 2 2 3 1 3 3 4 4 1 3 1 1 
 
STEP 4 
 
After the completion of the interview, thank the respondent. Be sure that you have the mobile 
number for transfer of the airtime credit. When you leave the household proceed in the same 
direction as before and select the fifth house on the same side of the street to begin the process 
again. 
 
GOOD LUCK AND HAVE FUN!! 
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EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
 
1. Prices of staple foods have stabilized and are set to remain constant in the next month. Favorable 
conditions have produced good harvests in South Africa and other large food exporting countries. 
Over the past several years, steady increases in food prices that have put mounting pressure on 
the budgets of low-income households, which dedicate a larger proportion of their monthly 
income to food purchases than middle and upper income households. News of steady prices is, 
therefore, welcome news for South African consumers. 
 
2. Prices of staple foods are set to rise 2 to 2.5% in the next month. This increase is to due to failed 
rains in the maize-producing areas of South Africa. The South African Weather Service reports 
that the amount of rain in Limpopo and Mpumalanga is significantly below normal for this time of 
year. Over the past several years, steady increases in food prices that have put mounting 
pressure on the budgets of low-income households, which dedicate a larger proportion of their 
monthly income to food purchases than middle and upper income households. News of this 
additional price hike is, therefore, unwelcome news for South African consumers. 
 
3. Prices of staple foods are set to rise 2 to 2.5% in the next month. This increase is due to a rise in 
the price of maize on international commodity markets as other major maize producing countries, 
particularly the US and Australia, have bolstered policies that lead maize producers to divert their 
crops from food to fuel production. Over the past several years, steady increases in food prices 
that have put mounting pressure on the budgets of low-income households, which dedicate a 
larger proportion of their monthly income to food purchases than middle and upper income 
households. News of this additional price hike is, therefore, unwelcome news for South African 
consumers. 
 
4. Prices of staple foods are set to rise 2 to 2.5% in the next month. This increase is due to recent 
wildfires in Australia and Russia that have destroyed large tracts of maize. The fires were caused 
mainly by lightening strikes after long periods of below average rainfall that left fields overly dry 
and prone to burn. Over the past several years, steady increases in food prices that have put 
mounting pressure on the budgets of low-income households, which dedicate a larger proportion 
of their monthly income to food purchases than middle and upper income households. News of 
this additional price hike is, therefore, unwelcome news for South African consumers. 
 
5. Prices of staple foods are set to rise 2 to 2.5% in the next month. This increase is due a failure on 
the part of the government to control the fall of the Rand against other currencies. The falling rand 
has made imports of food and agricultural products more expensive and South African consumers 
are bearing the majority of this increase. Over the past several years, steady increases in food 
prices that have put mounting pressure on the budgets of low-income households, which dedicate 
a larger proportion of their monthly income to food purchases than middle and upper income 
households. News of this additional price hike is, therefore, unwelcome news for South African 
consumers. 
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EKSPERIMENTELE OPSIES 
 
1. Pryse van stapelvoedsel het gestabiliseer en is ingestel in die volgende maand konstant te bly. 
Gunstige toestande geproduseer goeie oeste in Suid-Afrika en ander groot kos uitvoer lande. Oor 
die afgelope paar jaar, het bestendige stygings in voedselpryse toenemende druk op die 
begroting van laer-inkomste huishoudings, wat 'n groter deel van hul maandelikse inkomste aan 
voedsel aankope as middel- en hoër inkomste huishoudings wy sit. Nuus van bestendige pryse is 
dus welkom nuus vir Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikers. 
 
2. Alle aanduidings is daar dat die prys van basiese voedselsoorte vanaf volgende maand met 
tussen 2 en 2.5% gaan styg. Die verhoging is die gevolg van swak reëns in die mielie-
produserende streke van Suid-Afrika. Volgens die Suid-Afrikaanse Weerdiens is die hoeveelheid 
reën wat in die Limpopo en Mpumalanga geval het, aansienlik laer as wat normaalweg die geval 
vir die tyd van die jaar is. Oor die afgelope paar jaar, het bestendige stygings in voedselpryse 
toenemende druk op die begroting van laer-inkomste huishoudings, wat 'n groter deel van hul 
maandelikse inkomste aan voedsel aankope as middel- en hoër inkomste huishoudings wy sit. 
Nuus van hierdie bykomende verhoging is dus onwelkome nuus vir Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikers. 
 
3. Alle aanduidings is daar dat die prys van basiese voedselsoorte vanaf volgende maand met 
tussen 2 en 2.5% gaan styg. Dit is die gevolg van die styging in die mielieprys op die 
internasionale kommoditeits mark. Die prysverhoging kan direk daaraan gekoppel word dat die 
vernaamste mielieproduserende lande, veral Amerika en Europa, besluit het om meer mielies vir 
die vervaardiging van bio-brandstof beskikbaar te stel nadat so ‘n beleid goedgekeur is. Oor die 
afgelope paar jaar, het bestendige stygings in voedselpryse toenemende druk op die begroting 
van laer-inkomste huishoudings, wat 'n groter deel van hul maandelikse inkomste aan voedsel 
aankope as middel- en hoër inkomste huishoudings wy sit. Nuus van hierdie bykomende 
verhoging is dus onwelkome nuus vir Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikers. 
 
4. Alle aanduidings is daar dat die prys van basiese voedselsoorte vanaf volgende maand met 
tussen 2 en 2.5% gaan styg. Die prysstyging is die gevolg van die onlangse verwoestende 
veldbrande in Australië en Rusland wat groot gebiede, waar graan verbou word, vernietig is. Die 
brande, wat deur weerlig veroorsaak is, het vinnig versprei as gevolg van langdurige 
ondergemiddelde reënval. Die baie droëmateriaal in die veld, het veroorsaak dat die veldbrande 
vinnig versprei. Oor die afgelope paar jaar, het bestendige stygings in voedselpryse toenemende 
druk op die begroting van laer-inkomste huishoudings, wat 'n groter deel van hul maandelikse 
inkomste aan voedsel aankope as middel- en hoër inkomste huishoudings wy sit. Nuus van 
hierdie bykomende verhoging is dus onwelkome nuus vir Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikers. 
 
5. Alle aanduidings is daar dat die prys van basiese voedselsoorte vanaf volgende maand met 
tussen 2 en 2.5% gaan styg. Die prysverhoging kan daaraan toegeskryf word dat die regering nie 
instaat was om die verswakking van die rand teenoor ander geldeenhede te kon stuit nie. Dit het 
tot gevolg dat die invoer van voedsel en ander landbouprodukte duurder is en dat die Suid-
Afrikaanse verbruiker die grootste deel van die styging sal moet dra. Oor die afgelope paar jaar, 
het bestendige stygings in voedselpryse toenemende druk op die begroting van laer-inkomste 
huishoudings, wat 'n groter deel van hul maandelikse inkomste aan voedsel aankope as middel- 
en hoër inkomste huishoudings wy sit. Nuus van hierdie bykomende verhoging is dus onwelkome 
nuus vir Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikers. 
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IINZAME EZILINGIWEYO 
 
6. Amaxabiso okutya okungundoqo [ukutya okufana nomilimili, umbona, iitapile, njl njl] alindeleke 
ukuba ame ngxi, anganyuki kule nyanga izayo. Iimeko ezivumayo zenze ukuba kuvunwe kakuhle 
eMzantsi Afrika nakumazwe amakhulu arhwebayo [okanye athengisa ukutya eMzantsi Afrika.] 
Kwiminyaka edlulileyo, kuye kwabakho ukunyuka okungahliyo kwamaxabiso okutya nathe abeka 
uxinzelelo olukhulu kwiibhajethi zamakhaya arhola imivuzo emincinci nawachitha imali eninzi 
ekuthengeni ukutya xa uwathelekisa namakhaya arhola imivuzo ethe chatha. Iindaba zamaxabiso 
angaguqukiyo, zamkelwe ngabathengi baseMzantsi Afrika. 
 
7. Amaxabiso okutya okungundoqo [okunjengomilimili; iitapili nomngqusho] alindeleke ukuba 
anyuke ngeepesenti ezi-2 ukuya kwezingama-2.5 kule nyanga izayo. Oku kunyuka kubangelwe 
kukunqongophala kwemvula kwindawo ezithile zemveliso yombona eMzantsi Afrika. Imozulu 
yase-Mzantizi Afrika ichaza ubungakanani bemvula eLimpopo kunye nase-Mpumalanga nokuba 
kuphantsi kakhulu kunesiqhelo kwelixesha lonyaka. Kwiminyaka edlulileyo, kuye kwabakho 
ukunyuka okungahliyo kwamaxabiso okutya nathe abeka uxinzelelo olukhulu kwiibhajethi 
zamakhaya arhola imivuzo emincinci nawachitha imali eninzi ekuthengeni ukutya xa uwathelekisa 
namakhaya arhola imivuzo ethe chatha. Iindaba zokunyuka kwalamaxabiso, azamkelekanga 
konke kubathengi baseMzantsi Afrika. 
 
8. Amaxabiso okutya okungundoqo [okunjengomilimili; iitapili nomngqusho] alindeleke ukuba 
anyuke ngeepesenti ezi-2 ukuya kwezingama-2.5 kule nyanga izayo. Oku kunyuka 
kwalamaxabiso angunobangela wokunyuka kwexabiso lomilimili kwiimakethe zorhwebo zezizwe 
jikelele kuba amazwe amakhulu anjengeMelika ne-Australia nakwavelisa umbona, axhasa 
imithetho ekhokelela ukuba abavelisi abaphambili bombona batshintshele izivuno zabo zokutya 
kwimveliso zamafutha eenqwelo-mafutha okanye kumafutha okubasa. Kwiminyaka edlulileyo, 
kuye kwabakho ukunyuka okungahliyo kwamaxabiso okutya nathe abeka uxinzelelo olukhulu 
kwiibhajethi zamakhaya arhola imivuzo emincinci nawachitha imali eninzi ekuthengeni ukutya xa 
uwathelekisa namakhaya arhola imivuzo ethe chatha. Iindaba zokunyuka kwalamaxabiso, 
azamkelekanga konke kubathengi baseMzantsi Afrika. 
 
9. Amaxabiso okutya okungundoqo [okunjengomilimili; iitapili nomngqusho] alindeleke ukuba 
anyuke ngeepesenti ezi-2 ukuya kwezingama-2.5 kule nyanga izayo. Oku kunyuka kubangelwe 
yimililo enwenwayo kumazwe anjenge-Australia neRashiya nethe yatshabalalisa imimmandla 
emikhulu nekulinywe kuyo umbona. Le mililo ibangelwe ikakhulu kukubaneka emva kwexesha 
elide leemvula ezithe zanetha ngaphantsi kwesiqhelo nezithe zashiya amasimi ome nko 
ekwalindeleke ukuba angatsha naninina. Kwiminyaka edlulileyo, kuye kwabakho ukunyuka 
okungahliyo kwamaxabiso okutya nathe abeka uxinzelelo olukhulu kwiibhajethi zamakhaya 
arhola imivuzo emincinci nawachitha imali eninzi ekuthengeni ukutya xa uwathelekisa namakhaya 
arhola imivuzo ethe chatha. Iindaba zokunyuka kwalamaxabiso, azamkelekanga konke 
kubathengi baseMzantsi Afrika. 
 
10. Amaxabiso okutya okungundoqo [okunjengomilimili; iitapili nomngqusho] alindeleke ukuba 
anyuke ngeepesenti ezi-2 ukuya kwezingama-2.5 kule nyanga izayo. Oku kunyuka kubangelwa 
kukusilela kukarhulumente waseMzantsi Afrika ukuba alalwule ukuwa kweRandi xa ithelekiswa 
nezinye neemali zamanye amazwe. Ukuwa kwerandi kwenze ukuba ukungeniswa [okanye 
ukuthengwa] kokutya  kwakunye neemveliso ezilinywayo eMzantsi Afrika [zisuka kwamanye 
amazwe] kubeduru kubathengi abaninzi baseMzantsi Afrika. Kwiminyaka edlulileyo, kuye 
kwabakho ukunyuka okungahliyo kwamaxabiso okutya nathe abeka uxinzelelo olukhulu 
kwiibhajethi zamakhaya arhola imivuzo emincinci nawachitha imali eninzi ekuthengeni ukutya xa 
uwathelekisa namakhaya arhola imivuzo ethe chatha. Iindaba zokunyuka kwalamaxabiso, 
azamkelekanga konke kubathengi baseMzantsi Afrika. 
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Figure C.1: Population group concentration in sampling strata
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Figure C.2: Income and informal housing in sampling strata
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Figure C.3: 2014 election results in sampling strata
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